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K A T E  A N D R I A S  
An American Approach to Social Democracy: 
The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act 
abstract.  There is a growing consensus among scholars and public policy experts that fun-
damental labor law reform is necessary in order to reduce the nation’s growing wealth gap. Ac-
cording to conventional wisdom, however, a social democratic approach to labor relations is 
uniquely un-American—in deep conflict with our traditions and our governing legal regime. This 
Article calls into question that conventional account. It details a largely forgotten moment in Amer-
ican history: when the early Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established industry committees of 
unions, business associations, and the public to set wages on an industry-by-industry basis. Along-
side the National Labor Relations Act, the system successfully raised wages for hundreds of thou-
sands of Americans, while helping facilitate unionization and a more egalitarian form of admin-
istration. And it succeeded within the basic framework of contemporary constitutional doctrine 
and statutory law. 
 By telling the story of FLSA’s industry committees, this Article shows that collective labor law 
and individual employment law were not, and need not be, understood as discrete regimes—one 
a labor-driven vision of collective rights and the other built around individual rights subject to 
litigation and waiver. It also demonstrates that, for longer than is typically recognized, the nation 
experimented with a form of administration that linked the substantive ends of empowering par-
ticular social and economic groups to procedural means that solicited and enabled those same 
groups’ participation in governance (to the exclusion of other groups). Ultimately, recovering this 
history provides inspiration for imagining alternatives to the current approach to worker partici-
pation in the American political economy and to administrative governance more broadly. 
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introduction 
There is now widespread consensus that economic inequality in the United 
States poses a growing and grave problem.
1
 Income disparities are the highest 
they have been since the 1920s, leading some commentators to proclaim a Sec-
ond Gilded Age.
2
 Indeed, the three wealthiest people in the United States now 
own more wealth than the entire bottom half of the population.
3
 Over the last 
several decades, the share of income and wealth going to the top one percent of 
earners has grown substantially, while workers’ real wages have barely budged.
4
 
Nearly one-third of workers earn less than twelve dollars an hour, often with 
unpredictable schedules and poor working conditions.
5
 At the same time, social 
 
1. Nelson D. Schwartz, Economists Take Aim at Wealth Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/business/economy/economists-take-aim-at-wealth 
-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/W6K5-X7T3]. 
2. On the rise of inequality, see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23-
24 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014); and Estelle Sommeiller et al., Income Inequality in the 
U.S. by State, Metropolitan Area, and County, ECON. POLICY INST. 2, 7 (2016), http://www.epi
.org/files/pdf/107100.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXK2-MRJ2]. On parallels between the first 
Gilded Age and our current political economy, see, for example, SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY 
AGAINST DOMINATION (2016); and Paul Krugman, Gilded Once More, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/opinion/27krugman.html [https://perma.cc
/QS6Z-VJVL]. 
3. Chuck Collins & Josh Hoxie, Billionaire Bonanza: The Forbes 400 and the Rest of Us, INST. FOR 
POL’Y STUD. 2 (2017), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/BILLIONAIRE 
-BONANZA-2017-FinalV.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ9Q-9XL5]. 
4. See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure: Narrowing, 
Widening, Polarizing, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 135 (2007), https://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/2007b_bpea_goldin.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HF8P-24MN]; Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Q7BF-GFAX]; Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Esti-
mates for the United States 2-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22945.pdf [https://perma.cc/44X2-AS4X]. Although 
economic indicators have improved since the Great Recession ended in 2009, over ninety per-
cent of the growth in the U.S. economy over the subsequent three years inured to the benefit 
of the top one percent of the income distribution. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The 
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2013 Preliminary Estimates) 6 tbl.1 
(Jan. 25, 2015), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C2K3-CPYF]. 
5. Michelle Chen, Trump’s Budget Proposal Is an Attack on the Working Class, NATION (Feb. 28, 
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-budget-proposal-is-an-attack-on-the 
-working-class [https://perma.cc/UR5K-4AP2]; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND 
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 12, 13 tbl.3 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf [https://perma.cc/788Z-BF36] 
(providing demographic data on people in poverty). 
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mobility has declined, locking in the staggering economic divide.
6
 These eco-
nomic trends threaten political equality. As in the Gilded Age, democracy itself 
seems to be at stake, with a few megacompanies wielding outsized power and 
economic elites exercising disproportionate influence over nearly every facet of 
governance.
7
 
The American system of labor relations is partly to blame for this situation.
8
 
Unions once bargained for more than a third of American workers, helping to 
raise wages and benefits throughout the economy and providing a collective 
voice for workers in politics and in the workplace.
9
 They served as a countervail-
ing force to corporate power in the political economy. Now, however, unions 
represent only about a tenth of the labor market and only about six percent of 
the private sector workforce.
10
 As unions have shrunk to pre-New Deal levels, 
the United States has lost a key equalizing force in the economy and in politics. 
Yet features of American labor law, combined with intense employer resistance 
to unionization, make it nearly impossible to reverse unions’ decline.
11
 Mean-
while, federal employment law, under which workers are individually entitled to 
rights, does little to redress systemic inequality. The law guarantees very little, is 
 
6. See Raj Chetty et al., The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940, 
356 SCIENCE 398 (2017). 
7. E.g., LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME 
POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE (2015); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE 
AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); KAY LEH-
MAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE 
BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Test-
ing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 
564, 576-77 (2014); see also Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of 
Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015) (collecting and analyzing literature). 
8. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016) (detailing the failures of con-
temporary employment and labor law). 
9. JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1 (2014). 
10. See Dylan Matthews, Europe Could Have the Secret to Saving America’s Unions, VOX (Apr. 17, 
2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/17/15290674/union-labor 
-movement-europe-bargaining-fight-15-ghent [https://perma.cc/Z7PB-VYG6]; see also 
ROSENFELD, supra note 9, at 10-30 (providing comparative unionization rates); cf. RICHARD 
B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984) (describing, as of the mid-
1980s, the role of trade unions in the United States). 
11. See Andrias, supra note 8; Kate Andrias & Brishen Rogers, Rebuilding Worker Voice in Today’s 
Economy, ROOSEVELT INST. (Aug. 9, 2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads
/2018/07/Rebuilding-Worker-Voices-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M422-LQYP] (summa-
rizing aspects of labor law that limit worker power and union growth); Sanford M. Jacoby, 
American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of Management, in MASTERS TO MANAGERS 
173 (Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1991) (discussing intense opposition to unionism among Ameri-
can employers). 
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weakly enforced, and effectively excludes entire categories of workers from many 
of its protections.
12
 
Demands for something new, something different, are gaining steam. Across 
the country, under such banners as the “Fight for $15,” “Red for Ed,” and “Do-
mestic Workers Alliance,” workers have been pressing governments to raise min-
imum wages, to increase pay and benefits for workers on a sector-wide basis, 
and to enact new employment law and social welfare protections, while demand-
ing union rights not just for their particular workplace but for entire industries.
13
 
At the same time, labor scholars and policy makers have begun converging in 
their calls for a new, more social democratic system of labor law.
14
 And adminis-
trative law scholars are increasingly urging new mechanisms to hold both gov-
ernment elites and private actors accountable—and in so doing, to create a more 
equitable political economy.
15
 
Yet one of these mechanisms, sectoral bargaining—which would enable un-
ions to negotiate for higher wages and better employment standards for all 
workers throughout the economy—still elicits skepticism.
16
 There is a sense that 
 
12. See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. 
13. See Andrias, supra note 8; Kate Andrias, Feller Memorial Labor Law Lecture, Peril and Possi-
bility: On Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Era of Trump, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Andrias, Peril and Possibility]. 
14. Andrias, supra note 8; Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. 
REV. 1623, 1624 (2016); Dylan Matthews, The Emerging Plan to Save the American Labor Move-
ment, VOX (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/9/17205064 
/union-labor-movement-collective-wage-boards-bargaining [https://perma.cc/J5RW 
-5WY9]; Matthews, supra note 10; David Rolf, Toward a 21st Century Labor Movement, AM. 
PROSPECT (Apr. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/toward-21st-century-labor-movement 
[https://perma.cc/GD3P-K46U]; Clean Slate, HARV. L. SCH. LAB. & WORKLIFE PROGRAM, 
https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/programs/clean-slate [https://perma.cc/3GTQ-6CBZ]; David 
Madland, The Future of Worker Voice and Power, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2016), https://cdn
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/06051753/WorkerVoice2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JA9C-8RDV]; David Madland & Alex Rowell, How State and Local Governments Can 
Strengthen Worker Power and Raise Wages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 2017), https://cdn
.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/sites/2/2017/05/01144237/C4-StateLocalWorker 
Voice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZY3-8V7S]. 
15. See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 2; Andrias, supra note 7. On disparities of power in public law 
more generally, see GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: 
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017); Kate Andrias, Confronting 
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2016); and Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 
2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016). 
16. See Chris Opfer, White House Hopefuls Find Labor Reform Pickle, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 12, 
2018), https://www.bna.com/white-house-hopefuls-n73014482499 [https://perma.cc
/WA9D-Y5NW] (describing doubt within some quarters of the labor movement about the 
wisdom of a proposed bill that would expand collective action rights while establishing a new 
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a sectoral bargaining approach integrating labor and employment law is dis-
tinctly European, and therefore distinctly un-American.
17
 This argument is not 
entirely unfounded. Virtually all European countries empower unions to nego-
tiate employment rights for workers on a sectoral basis.
18
 Through one method 
or another, the government extends—or facilitates extension of—union-negoti-
ated standards to workers throughout the economy; workers also have rights of 
participation at the shop level through, for example, works councils, local un-
ions, or competing minority unions.
19
 Moreover, in most industrial democracies, 
unions have an official seat at the table when important questions about the 
workplace, social benefits, and the political economy more generally are up for 
debate. The American system, however, rejects this social democratic approach 
to labor law. It valorizes private contracting, permits significant employer re-
sistance to unions, and provides only a marginal role for unions in a minimal 
social welfare state.
20
 More broadly, American law does not empower representa-
tive organizations in administrative decision-making. It embraces judicial-like 
rule-of-law principles, technocratic decision-making, liberal pluralistic partici-
pation, and presidential control.
21
 
The conventional wisdom holds that the United States briefly experimented 
with the social democratic, sectoral approach in the early 1930s, before abandon-
ing it in 1935. According to this story, in the early years of the Depression, the 
United States Congress, pressed by President Roosevelt, enacted the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).
22
 The cornerstone of President Roosevelt’s in-
itial response to widespread poverty, labor unrest, and economic instability, 
NIRA gave unions, businesses, and consumers shared power to set industry 
codes, including minimum wages and maximum hours, while simultaneously 
providing workers the right to organize unions. NIRA, however, was short-
 
system of industry committees). For discussion of debate among academics, policy makers, 
and union leaders about the benefits of sectoral bargaining, and labor law reform more gen-
erally, see Andrias, supra note 8, at 44-46, 70-76. 
17. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 10. 
18. See STEVEN J. SILVIA, HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER: GERMAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 
POSTWAR ERA 26-28, 38-48 (2013); Franz Traxler & Martin Behrens, Collective Bargaining Cov-
erage and Extension Procedures, EURFOUND (Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu
/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/collective-bargaining-coverage-and 
-extension-procedures [https://perma.cc/JG2D-MFMP]. 
19. See Madland, supra note 14; see also Andrias, supra note 8, at 6, 33-34, 77-80. 
20. See infra Section I.A. 
21. See infra Section I.B and notes 388-393 and accompanying text. 
22. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933). 
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lived. Soon after its enactment, the law became mired in implementation chal-
lenges. Then, in 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,23 concluding that NIRA delegated too 
much legislative power. 
While Schechter Poultry is famous in the constitutional and administrative 
law canons as a rare exercise of the nondelegation doctrine, it is also widely un-
derstood to have ended the nation’s brief, failed experiment with a form of social 
democratic power sharing in governance sometimes known as “tripartism” or 
“labor corporatism.”
24
 Tripartism is used in various forms in most industrialized 
democracies, particularly Europe’s social democracies; it gives worker organiza-
tions, business groups, and sometimes consumer organizations a legally defined 
role in decisions about the direction of the economy generally and about social 
welfare policy in particular.
25
 
According to the standard narrative, after Schechter Poultry, the United States 
switched course.
26
 In 1935, Congress enacted what is now called labor law: the 
 
23. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
24. Short-lived emergency boards that governed particular industries, particularly during both 
World Wars, are recognized exceptions. See MELVIN DUBOVSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN 
MODERN AMERICA 61-81, 182-91 (1994) (detailing the experience of war labor boards); Nelson 
Lichtenstein, The Demise of Tripartite Governance and the Rise of the Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Regime, in ACHIEVING WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 95 (Richard P. Ap-
pelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2016) (defining terms). In this Article, I will use the 
term “tripartism” to describe formal power-sharing arrangements among labor, business, the 
public, and the state. Although sometimes known as “corporatism,” I will avoid that freighted 
term because it also describes a range of different practices, including those practiced by fascist 
governments of the 1920s and 1930s. See HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARA-
TIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER GREAT “ISM” 12, 21-22, 66, 72-80 (1996) (describing varieties of 
corporatism). 
25. WIARDA, supra note 24, at 5, 36-42; see also Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist 
Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 589-90 (2007) (contrasting liberal 
pluralism, under which “[p]olicy outcomes are determined by competition for the votes of 
individuals in a political marketplace,” with corporatism, under which groups are enfran-
chised as political actors as well as individuals, and are incorporated into governmental pro-
cesses). 
26. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 295-310 (2000) (describ-
ing President Roosevelt’s turn away from the early New Deal approach); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE 
END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 31-64 (1995) (detailing de-
bates within the Roosevelt Administration); JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION 104-
11 (2016) (describing NIRA as the New Deal’s false start and the subsequent New Deal laws 
as representing a “dramatic departure” from prior efforts); GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING 
WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN 7 (1996) (“After the demise of the National Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA), the president abandoned further experimentation in government-spon-
sored industrial cooperation . . . .”); Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE 
L.J. 2279, 2322 (1999) (“Roosevelt responded to Schechter by dropping full-blown corporatism 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
27
 The NLRA, like NIRA, provided for 
the right to organize and bargain, but it no longer gave unions a seat at the table 
in federal administration, nor did it require sectoral bargaining.
28
 Subsequently, 
Congress enacted what is now employment law, chiefly the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (FLSA), which established a system of government-guaranteed min-
imum wages through traditional administrative law mechanisms.
29
 On the con-
ventional account, American tripartism following the demise of NIRA was lim-
ited to wartime emergencies and some industry-specific problems,
30
 and the 
basic federal workplace regime that replaced NIRA separated private collective 
bargaining from individual employment law. The employment law regime as-
pired only to bare minima in wage protection, and, with respect to administra-
 
from the New Deal agenda and coming forward to the American People in 1936 with a quali-
tatively different program.”); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1243-53, 1261 (1986) (describing the post-NIRA legislation as a second 
phase of the New Deal and emphasizing that NIRA, “the New Deal program that provided a 
framework for a genuine departure in regulation of the economic sector—a move either to the 
corporatist state or to a planned economy—was never resurrected to test the mettle of the 
‘new’ Court”); Wachter, supra note 25, at 606-07, 610-13 (describing “the abandonment of a 
formal corporatist structure” following NIRA, though noting the brief return of corporatism 
with war boards in World War II). But cf. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) 
(viewing liberal pluralism as an extension of corporatism). 
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2018). 
28. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 128-30 
(1991) (showing that encounters with courts at the turn of the century led dominant elements 
of the labor movement to demand private ordering of industrial relations between unions and 
employers rather than more radical political reform); Wachter, supra note 25, at 606 (“[T]he 
passing of the baton from the NIRA to the NLRA significantly reduced the public policy role 
of unions. Unions had no seat at the government’s policy table because peak associations, 
including labor, were no longer invited.”); cf. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the 
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1415 (1993) 
(describing the NLRA as a break from NIRA’s corporatist approach but emphasizing the con-
tinuing embrace of cooperative democracy). 
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2018). 
30. On the repeated use of tripartism in times of emergency, see DUBOVSKY, supra note 24, at 61-
81, 182-91; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME 51-53, 89-95 [hereinafter LICHTEN-
STEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME]; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF 
AMERICAN LABOR 101-02 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION]; 
ROBERT ZIEGER, THE CIO, 1935-1955, at 141-252 (1995); and Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corpo-
ratism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar 
Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 122, 122-34 (Steve Fraser 
& Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) [hereinafter Lichtenstein, Corporatism to Collective Bargaining]. On 
the use of tripartism in particular industries following the collapse of NIRA, see ELLIS W. 
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 205-46 (1966). 
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tion, it embraced a technocratic, legalistic approach, rather than a system that 
affirmatively granted worker organizations power in political decision-making.
31
 
This conventional narrative, however, occludes an important part of the his-
tory. Shared power over economic policy, in the service of raising living stand-
ards for American working people, remained an important feature of national 
and state policy well into the New Deal—not only through the important but 
anomalous war boards or the esoteric Railway Labor Act but also in the core 
employment law statutes that remain in force today. That is, after Schechter Poul-
try, when Congress enacted first the NLRA and then FLSA, it not only sought to 
protect workers’ right to organize and to a subsistence wage but also affirma-
tively brought worker organizations into the governing process and empowered 
them to negotiate for all workers. 
In particular, the original FLSA was more ambitious both procedurally and 
substantively than the low minimum wages and overtime protections for which 
it is known today. It created “industry committees” or wage boards composed of 
tripartite representatives—employers, unions, and the public—with discretion 
to set minimum wages on an industry-by-industry basis within a statutorily de-
fined range. Supporters of FLSA saw the law as a means to end poverty wages, 
while extending the reach of unions throughout the nation and throughout the 
economy. Thus, even more so than the NLRA, FLSA embodied a commitment 
to empowering worker organizations in the political economy; in fact, many 
contemporaries saw FLSA as a direct outgrowth of NIRA and tripartite models 
abroad.
32
 And together with the NLRA, FLSA created an interconnected system 
 
31. See Craig Becker, Thoughts on the Unification of U.S. Labor and Employment Law: Is the Whole 
Greater than the Sum of the Parts?, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 162-63 (2016) (describing the 
enactment of the NLRA and FLSA and the bifurcation of labor and employment law at the 
time of the New Deal); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 328-29 (2005) (noting that “command-and-control 
mechanisms gained a foothold in the New Deal workplace with the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938,” and describing the New Deal as establishing “a floor on some basic economic terms 
of employment” but leaving “most terms and conditions to the newly established regime of 
[private] collective bargaining or, outside the union sector, to individual contract”); see also 
infra Sections I.A, I.B (describing the structure of modern workplace law and its administra-
tion). 
32. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. For historical work complicating the traditional 
account of American exceptionalism and demonstrating that American progressivism and Eu-
ropean social democracy were complementary and overlapping developments, see JAMES T. 
KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN 
AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (1986); and DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: 
SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (2000). See also BRINKLEY, supra note 26 (describing a 
broader social democratic tradition of the early New Deal that gave way to less redistributive 
“rights-based” and “compensatory” liberalism). 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
626 
of labor law and employment law and an American system of sectoral bargain-
ing.
33
 
For a brief period, the system was a notable though limited success—at least 
in the view of those who sought to create a more democratic and egalitarian po-
litical economy. FLSA officially incorporated worker organizations in admin-
istration. The resulting committees increased the wages of hundreds of thou-
sands of workers during a short period, and, coupled with the NLRA’s 
protections for organizing rights, FLSA helped facilitate the rapid rise of union-
ism in the New Deal period.
34
 To be sure, the industry committees were limited 
in important ways. They had to set minimum wages within a statutorily pre-
scribed dollar range and time period, lacked jurisdiction over working conditions 
or benefits,
35
 and excluded groups of workers, in particular many African Amer-
icans in the rural south.
36
 Nor did the FLSA boards permanently alter the char-
acter of American political economy, since they did not fundamentally change 
common law rights of employers and employees or the ownership of resources.
37
 
Nonetheless, during their existence, the FLSA industry committees represented 
a high-water mark of broadly inclusive, state-supported collective bargaining. 
Moreover, the industry committees were widely considered efficient and ef-
fective during their time. The wage-board approach was abandoned during the 
postwar period not because of perceived self-dealing or inefficiency (the cri-
tiques leveled against NIRA), but for political reasons: rising hostility to unions, 
the opposition of Southern Democrats to extension of labor rights to African 
American workers, and divisions within the labor movement. By the late 1940s, 
 
33. See infra Part III. 
34. See infra Sections III.B.5, III.C. 
35. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.C. 
36. See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013) (de-
scribing how President Roosevelt repeatedly permitted Southern legislators to write discrim-
inatory provisions into the New Deal programs, including by excluding agricultural laborers 
and domestic workers from the minimum wage laws); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT 
OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 106 (2001) (discussing disproportionate exclusion of women from FLSA and noting 
that “African-American women, more than a third of whom still worked as domestic servants 
in 1935, and African-American men, who constituted 80 percent of agricultural workers, al-
most completely lacked its protections”); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1987) (detailing 
how FLSA’s agricultural exclusions were an effort to preserve “the social and racial plantation 
system in the South—a system resting on the subjugation of blacks and other minorities”). 
The exclusions may not be surprising given the history of race, gender, and class in the United 
States, but they were contested; and the outcome of that contest helped cement hierarchies in 
the labor market and in unions. For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
37. See infra Section III.C. 
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a weakened Democratic Party and an embattled and divided labor movement 
were willing to trade off the committee system to ensure passage of a new mini-
mum wage increase.
38
 From that point to the present day, legally mandated sec-
toral bargaining has persisted only in particular industries and during specific 
crises.
39
 As a form of governance, tripartism receded from the core of federal 
labor and employment statutes. 
Examining FLSA’s early history and its industry committees yields three key 
insights. First, the story offers a necessary broadening of scholarship about 
workplace law and its administration. Unlike the NLRA, whose history and am-
bition have been thoroughly plumbed, FLSA barely registers in contemporary 
legal scholarship,
40
 perhaps because the statute is viewed as “much less trans-
formative than the extraordinary Wagner Act.”
41
 FLSA’s industry committees in 
particular have been almost entirely ignored by modern legal theory. They are 
not covered in textbooks and receive only a passing mention in law review arti-
cles.
42
 This Article demonstrates, however, that industry committees were a cen-
 
38. See infra Sections III.B.4, III.C. 
39. See supra notes 24, 30 and accompanying text; infra notes 112, 353 and accompanying text. 
40. Recent scholarly discussion of FLSA appears primarily in student notes and specialty journals, 
with almost no sustained discussion of the statute in leading law reviews. See David Freeman 
Engstrom, “Not Merely There to Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws, Collective Rights, and the Mak-
ing of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2018) (observing the absence of treatment 
of FLSA in law review literature). A few exceptions include Linder, supra note 36; Deborah C. 
Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2212-13 (1998); and Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2687-91 (2008). Several other recent articles touch on FLSA, in-
cluding Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 263 
(2013), which offers a synthesis of employment law that includes FLSA; and Judith Resnik, 
Vital State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class 
Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780-87 (2017), which offers a 
short history of FLSA’s collective procedures. 
41. Samuel Moyn, The Second Bill of Rights: A Reconsideration (Apr. 14, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); see also SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AN UNEQUAL WORLD 30 (2018) (describing the NLRA as “extraordinarily interventionist” in 
comparison with the later FLSA); Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Rela-
tions: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1020 
(1984) (critiquing the Wagner Act system of collective bargaining and contrasting it with 
FLSA, which exemplifies a “system of free individual choice supplemented by minimally ac-
ceptable statutory terms” to correct market defects); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing 
Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1778 (1983) (not-
ing that many considered the Wagner Act “the most radical legislation of the New Deal”). 
42. Even Michael Wachter’s excellent history of labor and corporatism in the United States, 
Wachter, supra note 25, fails to mention FLSA and the industry committees. For passing men-
tions, see JEROLD L. WALTMAN, MINIMUM WAGE POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES 59 (2008); Andrias, supra note 8, at 15 n.53; Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and 
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tral component of the approach to labor and employment law in the Progressive 
and New Deal periods, and that FLSA, at the outset, was both ambitious and 
transformative.
43
 
Second, this Article’s analysis of FLSA and its relationship to the NLRA com-
plicates the dominant narrative in the legal literature about the nature of the 
modern administrative state. On that view, administrative law won its legitimacy 
by 1940 through an embrace of a legalistic, technocratic, and ideologically neu-
tral system of governance.
44
 The history of the wage boards, however, is further 
evidence that, for nearly another decade, that vision was deeply contested and its 
valence far from neutral.
45
 For longer than is typically recognized, the nation 
adopted a form of administration that linked the substantive ends of empower-
ing particular social and economic groups to procedural means that solicited and 
enabled their participation in governance (to the exclusion of other groups). 
Courts, in reviewing such mechanisms, blessed such civil-society delegations, 
even when faced with objections that the system impermissibly empowered as-
sociations to negotiate on behalf of objecting individuals.
46
 The decision in the 
 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 139 & n.753 (2000); Bruce E. 
Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial Relations Strategy and Policy, 
57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 23-24 (2003); and Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The 
Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 69 n.72 (1991). 
43. At the time of enactment and operation, the industry committees captured a tremendous 
amount of attention in both the popular press and law review literature. See infra Part III and 
sources cited therein. 
44. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014) (arguing that lawyerly decision-making helped 
achieve the legitimation of the administrative state); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 471 (2015) (“[T]he master metaprinci-
ple of administrative law is that it has no single theoretical master principle, at least not with 
any kind of ideological valence.”). For a cogent examination and critique of this position, see 
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718 (2016) 
(reviewing ERNST, supra). 
45. For illuminating accounts of the broader context over the shape of the American welfare state 
during this period, see LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003), which traces the rise of mass consumption ideals 
in relation to economic recovery in the 1930s and the post-World War II era; MEG JACOBS, 
POCKETBOOK POLITICS: ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005), 
which provides a historical account of the role of redistributive economic policies in twentieth-
century economic restructuring; and JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LA-
BOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (2003), which details 
the rise of a commercial welfare system post-New Deal and examines labor relations from the 
1910s to the 1960s. See also Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 462 (2017) (discussing the history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and how it facilitated 
workers’ countervailing power). 
46. See infra Section III.B.3. 
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late 1940s to move to a regime based solely on technical expertise, judicial-like 
procedures, and more pluralistic participation, while also constraining collective 
action through the Taft-Hartley Act,
47
 was neither ideologically neutral nor a re-
sult of consensus. Instead, it was a contested political decision that shifted the 
distribution of power in governance and the economy. 
Third, the story of the wage boards unsettles assumptions about the nature 
and possibilities of workplace law. The account given here undermines the idea 
that a social democratic, sectoral bargaining approach is incompatible with 
American culture and contemporary statutes. It shows that within the broad 
statutory framework that still exists today, worker organizations were once 
granted formal power in policy making and the capacity to bargain for all work-
ers in an industry. A more sectoral and social democratic form of labor law was 
part and parcel of the New Deal. In addition, the story of FLSA’s industry com-
mittees blurs the bright line that today exists between labor and employment 
law. It shows that while the separate enactments of the NLRA and FLSA may 
have created the conditions for the bifurcation of labor and employment law, the 
division was only realized later. At the outset, labor law and employment law 
were intertwined—unions were given a role in the implementation of FLSA, and 
FLSA was seen as a way to advance unionization. This regime survived consti-
tutional challenge, flourished past the early New Deal, and existed within the 
basic statutory framework that survives today. Finally, the history highlights the 
extent to which legal structures, and contests over those structures, shaped the 
role unions play in society. Amendments to FLSA, like those to the NLRA, played 
a critical role in constructing American unions as representative of particular 
members and not of the working class more generally.
48
 
To be clear, my claim is not that American workplace law in the New Deal 
period achieved the social democratic approach prevalent in Europe—or the 
democratic-socialist approach urged by more radical components of the Progres-
sive and New Deal Era movements or by activists today. Nor is my argument 
that powerful wage boards and broadly inclusive unions could have easily sur-
vived the twentieth century or could easily be recreated. Indeed, though a 
merged labor and employment law system of sectoral bargaining, benefiting all 
workers, is consistent with existing constitutional doctrine, it is in significant 
tension with the emerging agenda of the conservative majority on the Supreme 
Court.
49
 Rather, my claim is that reformers sought to democratize the political 
 
47. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2018) 
(amending the NLRA). 
48. See infra Section III.C. For an account of how the NLRA and its amendments shaped the role 
of unions, see Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). 
49. See infra notes 117-118, 426-433 and accompanying text. 
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economy using an intertwined labor and employment law and an alternative ad-
ministrative process; the laws they enacted, which bore the characteristic fea-
tures of labor tripartism, persisted in the United States longer than is widely 
realized. They were abandoned not because of widespread dysfunction and fail-
ure, but because of ideological opposition and political choices. Moreover, much 
of the legal framework within which tripartism existed remains on the books 
today. That history shows our current system to be more contingent than it 
seems, and it enriches our view of what an “American” system of workplace law 
is or might be. Tripartism’s longer historical pedigree should encourage greater 
institutional imagination. 
Ultimately, this Article offers the forgotten history of FLSA’s industry com-
mittees as inspiration for a fundamental rethinking of labor and employment 
law—and of democratic administration more broadly.
50
 The history suggests 
that, with new political mobilization and struggle, a more social democratic ap-
proach to labor and employment law, and perhaps to administration more gen-
erally, could once again be understood as consistent with our governing institu-
tions and culture. 
i .  flsa and the structure of contemporary labor and 
employment law 
To understand the extent to which the original FLSA and its industry com-
mittees depart from contemporary approaches to workplace regulation and ad-
ministrative law, a brief look at contemporary U.S. law is warranted. Such a sur-
vey also highlights the ways in which contemporary law reflects and contributes 
to a political economy strikingly similar to that of the first Gilded Age. 
 
50. In prior work, I argued that the potential for a sectoral and social democratic labor law regime 
is emerging from the efforts of contemporary social movements, and I provided a defense of 
that approach. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 46-69. This Article does not reiterate those de-
scriptive and normative arguments, nor does it describe critics who oppose unions, minimum 
wages, and broadly applicable employment laws. For examples of such critiques, see Richard 
A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 990-91 (1984); and James 
Sherk, $15 Minimum Wages Will Substantially Raise Prices, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-01/BG3160_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F6N4-9JRN], which argues that minimum wages increase prices. For a normative defense 
of minimum wages, see Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social 
Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
an american approach to social democracy 
631 
A. The Labor/Employment Divide and Worksite Bargaining 
Today, workplace law is generally understood to divide into two categories: 
employment law and labor law.
51
 Employment law is the body of law that offers 
rights to workers on an individual basis, irrespective of their membership in a 
union.
52
 Although employment law is thick and varied,
53
 the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act is a cornerstone statute. FLSA guarantees minimum wage, overtime pay, 
and maximum hours protections to workers who are covered by the Act and not 
exempt from its requirements.
54
 Like other state and federal employment laws, 
FLSA operates largely independently of any collectivization in the workplace.
55
 
The law creates procedures through which employees can aggregate their claims, 
though rights under the law remain guaranteed to employees only as individu-
 
51. See, e.g., LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 141, 171; REUEL E. SCHILLER, 
FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW AND THE COLLAPSE OF POST WAR LIBERALISM 3, 5, 12 
(2015); Becker, supra note 31; James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the 
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996); Estlund, supra note 31; Sachs, supra note 40, at 2700-
05; Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, 
and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (1999); Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment 
Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992); cf. Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1319 (2012) (describing bifurcation between 
rights-based approaches and power-based approaches in other areas of law as well). 
52. Brudney, supra note 51, at 1569-70. For accounts of how the division between labor law and 
employment law breaks down, see Estlund, supra note 31, at 328-30; and Sachs, supra note 40, 
at 2688-89. Cf. Sophia Lee, Rights in the New Deal Order, in BEYOND THE NEW DEAL ORDER 
(Gary Gerstle et al. eds., forthcoming) (challenging historical accounts that posit an opposi-
tion between economic collective rights and individual civil rights). 
53. See Bagenstos, supra note 40, at 263 (offering a synthesis of employment law). 
54. Initially, FLSA applied only to private employers; in 1966 and 1974 the law was extended to 
reach state and federal employers. Exempt employees include executive, administrative, or 
professional employees; individuals employed at retail stores that do not have interstate op-
erations; and agricultural employees, as well as enterprises with annual sales of less than 
$500,000. 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.101-.102, 779.245, 779.401-.404, 780.300-.522, 779.258-.259 
(2018). 
55. See Sachs, supra note 40, at 2688-89. 
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als.
56
 And while some unions have pursued FLSA claims on behalf of groups of 
workers, the statute grants them no official or formal role in its operation.
57
 
Collective action among workers, meanwhile, is governed separately by labor 
law, chiefly the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRA is administered by an 
administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which 
oversees representation elections and determines whether employees’ rights to 
organize and bargain under the statute, or to refrain from doing so, have been 
violated. Unlike legal regimes prevalent in Europe’s social democracies, the 
NLRA does not grant unions particular power to participate in the process of 
drafting and implementing mandatory standards for all workers; nor does it em-
power unions to bargain on behalf of all workers in an industry or sector. In-
stead, the NLRA establishes a decentralized, voluntarist system, where collective 
bargaining is a private negotiation between individual employers and employees 
at worksites where a majority has chosen to unionize.
58
 
The scholarly consensus on the distinction between employment law and la-
bor law views each as embracing fundamentally different approaches to protect-
ing workers: employment law bestows individual rights, whereas labor law fa-
cilitates collective power.
59
 Recently, scholars have recognized that the two 
approaches can be mutually reinforcing.
60
 Both aim to enhance the dignity of 
workers and to promote social equality.
61
 Indeed, in some circumstances, indi-
vidual employment statutes provide protection for collective action.
62
 But more 
 
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (providing for collective FLSA actions, but noting that “[n]o 
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to 
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”); 
Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage Rights 
by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523 (2012). 
57. See Sachs, supra note 40, at 2709-15 (describing a worker center’s campaign to use FLSA to 
facilitate collective action and protect individual employee rights). 
58. Andrias, supra note 8, at 6, 16, 28-35. In the words of the Supreme Court, the NLRA is distinct 
from employment statutes because it “does not undertake governmental regulation of wages, 
hours, or working conditions. Instead it seeks to provide a means by which agreement may 
be reached with respect to them.” Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 
318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943). 
59. See sources cited supra notes 51-52. 
60. For examples of scholarship emphasizing the mutually constitutive relationship between col-
lective labor law and individual employment law, see Lee, supra note 52; and Sachs, supra note 
40, at 2705-09. Cf. NANCY MACCLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH (2006) (showing how civil 
rights activists and feminists concluded that civil rights alone would not suffice, and arguing 
that access to jobs at all levels is a requisite of full citizenship). 
61. See Bagenstos, supra note 40, at 231; David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employ-
ment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 523 (2009). 
62. Sachs, supra note 40, at 2687. 
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frequently, labor and employment law have been understood to be in tension 
with one another. Scholars have highlighted how, at different points in American 
history, particular unions privileged majoritarian preferences and prejudices 
over the rights of minorities.
63
 Conversely, other scholars have shown how the 
rise of rights-conscious liberalism, including the proliferation of individual em-
ployment rights, undermined trade unionism by favoring individual over collec-
tive rights.
64
 Yet as the following Parts show, the original understanding of the 
two regimes and their relationship to one another was quite different. 
B. Modern Administrative Governance 
FLSA today is not only an exemplar of the contemporary bifurcated approach 
to workplace law but also a quintessential regulatory statute. A specific office, 
the Wage and Hour Division, within an expert agency, the Department of Labor 
(DOL), administers and enforces its provisions.
65
 The agency issues rules, reg-
ulations, and interpretations under the Act, and it conducts inspections and in-
vestigations to determine compliance.
66
 The leadership of the agency, like that 
of other executive agencies, is nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.
67
 And like most other agencies, DOL is subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), enacted in 1946, eight years after FLSA.
68
 
The structure and procedures of the Department of Labor are designed to 
vindicate the basic commitments of modern administrative law. A thick set of 
procedures aims to “secur[e] the rule of law and protect[] liberty by ensuring 
 
63. PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN-AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE DE-
CLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008). 
64. See LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 171 (“By advocating state protection 
as opposed to collective action, American liberals implicitly endorsed the idea, long associated 
with anti-union conservatism, that the labor movement could not be trusted to protect the 
individual rights of its members or of workers in general.”); SCHILLER, supra note 51, at 3, 5, 
12 (analyzing tensions between labor law and fair employment law); cf. SOPHIA Z. LEE, WORK-
PLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 5-6, 73-75 (describing how 
conservative antiunion lawyers marshaled individual rights claims of the civil rights move-
ment to advance their vision of a “right to work” free from union dues). 
65. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§ 4, 6-7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 204, 206-207 (2018). 
66. See, e.g., id. §§ 204, 206(a)(2), 212(b), (d), 213(a)(1). The Act also can be enforced by private 
employee lawsuits. Id. § 216. 
67. Id. § 551 (establishing the Department of Labor and instructing that its head, the Secretary of 
Labor, will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate); see also 
id. § 204 (requiring that the head of the Wage and Hour Division be appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
68. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
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that [the] agenc[y] follow[s] fair and impartial decisional procedures, act[s] 
within the bounds of the statutory authority delegated by the legislature, and 
respect[s] private rights.”
69
 Judges from the DOL Office of Administrative Law 
Judges, for example, “preside[] over formal hearings” and “render fair and eq-
uitable decisions under the governing law, the facts of each case, and the proce-
dures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act.”
70
 In administering FLSA, 
DOL’s procedures also seek to promote two other core goals of the modern ad-
ministrative state: (1) expert, effective, and efficient decision-making; and (2) 
democratic accountability.
71
 These goals are reflected in the composition of the 
agency. Staff economists
72
 engage in cost-benefit analysis in accordance with 
presidential orders before issuing significant regulations.
73
 DOL is also subject 
to political control; agency heads at DOL are not only appointed by the Presi-
dent, but also serve at his discretion and under his direction (or at least his sug-
gestion),
74
 and they remain subject to congressional oversight.
75
 As a result, the 
theory goes, the agency is derivatively responsive to the electorate.
76
 On this 
view, democratic accountability is also achieved through processes like notice 
 
69. Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 
(2003); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331 (2001) 
(describing the basic aims of the modern administrative state). 
70. Office of the Chief Info. Officer, OALJ Case Tracking System (CTS) FY 2018, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/oasam/ocio/programs/PIA/OALJ/OALJ-CTS.htm [https://perma.cc
/P8SW-JNPQ]; see also 29 C.F.R. § 18 (2018) (elaborating procedures). 
71. Kagan, supra note 69, at 2331. 
72. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, About the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Feb. 
16, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/bls/infohome.htm [https://perma.cc/3TLH-DVW8]. 
73. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 
Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993); cf. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) 
(requiring two existing regulations to be identified for elimination for every one new regula-
tion issued). 
74. Compare, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Adminis-
trative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) (arguing that Presidents may oversee 
particular agency decisions but may not direct them), with Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher 
S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 
(1997) (arguing for a strong unitary executive with directive authority). 
75. On Congress’s powers, see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AU-
THORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). 
76. Kagan, supra note 69, at 2331-38 (arguing that presidential control promotes democratic ac-
countability). But see Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Adminis-
trative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1174-78 (2014) (questioning emphasis on democratic ac-
countability and noting potential costs); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the 
Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076-83 (2005) (arguing that accounta-
bility is furthered not by occasional elections but by the complex chains of authority and ex-
pertise that characterize bureaucracy). 
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and comment.
77
 DOL and other labor agencies hear from a wide range of affected 
interest groups and individuals before making decisions. The law grants no spe-
cial authority to particular constituent groups, nor does it incentivize or encour-
age their growth.
78
 
C. Labor and Inequality 
From the vantage point of contemporary administrative law, the labor and 
employment agencies function relatively well—at least until recent partisan 
breakdowns.
79
 Political appointees, along with diligent and expert civil servants, 
 
77. See Kagan, supra note 69, at 2253-55 (describing interest-group control as one of four evolving 
and overlapping methods of agency control); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670, 1713 (1975) (arguing that administrative 
law’s purpose became, over time, “to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected 
interests in the process of administrative decision[making]”); cf. Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging 
the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1390-92 (2000) (describing the shift from “interest group pluralism” 
in the 1940s and 1950s to individual participation or “legal liberalism” beginning in the 1960s 
and analyzing the effect of this shift on administrative law). 
78. The NLRB similarly embraces these cornerstone principles of administrative law. Also subject 
to the APA, it follows judicial-like procedures and allows for individual and interest-group 
participation on important policy matters, even though it performs most of its work through 
adjudication. See Invitation to File Briefs, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/cases 
-decisions/invitations-file-briefs [https://perma.cc/QH4U-LCVN]. However, the NLRB is 
considered an independent agency; its five members are removable only for cause, and by 
tradition, are a mix of Democrats and Republicans, theoretically rendering the NLRB more 
sheltered from presidential control. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Inde-
pendent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769-71 (2013) (developing 
a taxonomy of agencies and identifying various indicia of independence of agencies, including 
for the NLRB). But see id. at 772-76 (explaining that the difference between “independent” 
and “executive” agencies is often exaggerated); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Inde-
pendent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 
491-92 (2008) (arguing that agencies’ categorization as independent does not remove them 
from the political fray); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26-32 
(2013) (describing powers other than removal that Presidents can use to influence agency 
leaders). 
79. The NLRB has been criticized for frequent “flip-flops”—often changing its position with a 
change in administration, but few suggest it exceeds the bounds of proper administrative 
practice. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2057 
(2009) (describing and critiquing NLRB flip-flop and other procedures). Recent heightened 
partisanship has, however, resulted in its inability to operate for lack of confirmed members. 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (rejecting presidential recess appointments to 
the NRLB); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88 (2010) (noting that in 
the absence of a lawfully appointed quorum, the Board cannot exercise its powers). 
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work hard to vindicate the statutes’ goals. Both the President and Congress pro-
vide oversight to ensure effective operation. The agencies follow a host of rules 
and procedures to ensure that rule-of-law and separation-of-powers values are 
respected.
80
 Numerous and diverse stakeholders comment whenever an agency 
considers a particular rule. 
Yet from the perspective of those who view labor and employment law and 
administrative law as tools to advance social, political, and economic equality—
that is, to redistribute resources and democratize governance—the contemporary 
regime falls far short.
81
 Inequality in the United States has reached a staggering 
level, nearly as high as it was during the Gilded Age. The top 1% of earners in 
the United States brings home 24% of the national income, and that group is 
estimated to hold about 40% of the nation’s wealth.
82
 The three wealthiest peo-
ple in the United States—Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and Warren Buffett—now own 
more wealth than the entire bottom half of the American population combined, 
a total of 160 million people or 63 million households.
83
 Workers’ real income 
has barely grown during recent decades, even as productivity, total working 
hours, and educational attainment have increased.
84
 Political inequality has 
soared as well.
85
 As Martin Gilens observes, “when preferences between the well-
off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to 
the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”
86
 
 
80. On internal, administrative mechanisms that function to separate and check power within the 
government, see, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between In-
ternal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 436, 453 (2009); and Jon D. 
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 529-51 (2015). 
81. For further elaboration of this critique, see Andrias, supra note 8, at 13-30. For the argument 
that the core purpose of employment law is to promote social equality, see Bagenstos, supra 
note 40. 
82. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 
2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 10 (2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2N8-8DDY]. In 
some areas of the country, the numbers are even more stark. In New York, for example, the 
average family in the top one percent of earners has forty-five times more income than an 
average family in the bottom ninety-nine percent. See Sommeiller et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
83. Collins & Hoxie, supra note 3, at 2. 
84. LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 12-16; Goldin & Katz, supra note 4, at 
135; Mishel et al., supra note 4; Piketty et al., supra note 4, at 3. 
85. Recent studies by political scientists such as Larry Bartels and Martin Gilens reveal that con-
gressional policies reflect the views of the wealthy but not of the working class. LARRY M. 
BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2010); 
GILENS, supra note 7, at 81. 
86. GILENS, supra note 7, at 81. 
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Labor and employment law play an important role in structuring this polit-
ical economy. Consider the NLRA. It categorically excludes from its protections 
some of the most vulnerable workers, including agricultural workers, domestic 
workers, and workers classified as independent contractors.
87
 Meanwhile, weak 
enforcement mechanisms, slight penalties, and lengthy delays—all of which em-
ployers routinely exploit to resist unionization—fail to protect even covered em-
ployees’ ability to organize and bargain collectively with their employers.
88
 In 
addition, the NLRA’s emphasis on worksite-based organizing and bargaining is 
mismatched with a globalized and increasingly fissured economy.
89
 Unlike re-
gimes in Europe, Australia, and other industrialized democracies, the NLRA 
does not provide worker organizations power to bargain for all workers in an 
economic sector, nor does it mandate multiemployer bargaining.
90
 Rather, work-
ers must organize unions worksite by worksite, facing significant resistance from 
both their direct employers and other employers in their supply chains, with lit-
tle hope of building power throughout an industry. These features of American 
labor law have contributed to the decline of unions in the United States and to 
the rise of economic and political inequality. Between 1954 and 2017, union mem-
bership rates fell from about 35% of the workforce
91
 to about 11%.
92
 Today, less 
than 7% of the private sector workforce belongs to a union,
93
 even though the 
majority of workers continue to report that they support unions.
94
 Some scholars 
 
87. National Labor Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2018). 
88. See Weiler, supra note 41, at 1769-70. 
89. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 290 (2004); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK 
BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10 (2014); Andrias, 
supra note 8, at 21-30. 
90. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 32-36; see also Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character 
of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (1971) (describing the ways in which 
American labor law is uniquely underprotective of workers, as compared to other industrial-
ized nations); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character 
of American Labor Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1 (describing how “American labor law codified 
and furthered the weakness of American labor”). 
91. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 22-23 (2004); see also Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the 
Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513 (2011) (describing decline in the union 
membership rate). 
92. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2017, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/57Y4-F9BF]. 
93. Id. 
94. Danielle Paquette, Republicans Suddenly Seem to Like Unions Again, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/04/republicans 
-suddenly-seem-to-like-unions-again [https://perma.cc/7R93-7X5W]. 
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estimate that this decline in unionization is responsible for up to one-third of the 
rise in income inequality in recent decades.
95
 They also identify the decline in 
union strength as one critical factor in explaining the rise in political inequality.
96
 
Meanwhile, individual employment rights, enacted and promulgated 
through traditional legislative and regulatory processes, do little to reduce ine-
quality.
97
 One problem is that the substantive rights provided by FLSA and other 
U.S. employment and social welfare laws are meager.
98
 Most nonunion workers 
are employed “at will” with few protections against termination.
99
 Federal law 
and most state laws lack guarantees of paid family leave, vacation, or sick time; 
and statutory minimums do not provide the wages or benefits necessary to keep 
workers out of poverty.
100
 In addition, many of the most vulnerable workers are 
excluded from coverage.
101
 Enforcement of employment law is lax and violations 
 
95. Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 513; see also Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality 
over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 24587, 2018) (finding that “unions have . . . a significant, equalizing effect 
on the income distribution”). 
96. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON 
MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 142 (2010); SCHLOZ-
MAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 325-26. 
97. Andrias, supra note 8, at 37-40. 
98. Id. 
99. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 
n.9, 5 n.10, 8 (2010); Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and 
Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8 (2002). 
100. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4856, THE EFFECTS OF A MINIMUM-WAGE INCREASE ON 
EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY INCOME 11 (2014); KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A 
DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN AMERICA (2015); David Cooper, The Minimum Wage 
Used to Be Enough to Keep Workers Out of Poverty—It’s Not Anymore, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 
4, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-workers-poverty-anymore 
-raising [https://perma.cc/CV5D-5ED5]. 
101. For example, while FLSA defines “employ” and “employee” more broadly than does the com-
mon law, the statute does not extend to independent contractors. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2018); 
see also United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1945) (stating that a “broader or 
more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be difficult to frame,” with the excep-
tion of those employees “specifically excluded”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., 
Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1 (July 15, 2015) (addressing the issue of employers 
evading FLSA’s expansive definitions by misclassifying workers as independent contractors). 
Other statutes like the Family Medical Leave Act and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act adopt FLSA’s definition of “employ.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2018); 
id. § 1802(5). In addition, while FLSA’s blanket exemptions for domestic workers were elim-
inated in 1974, the statute still exempts from its protections many domestic workers who pro-
vide companionship services as well as live-in domestic workers. Id. § 213(a)(15), (b)(21); see 
also Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding a Department 
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are rampant, particularly in low-wage workforces.
102
 Inadequate resources ham-
per government enforcement, while employees’ fear of suing their employers 
chills private enforcement.
103
 And even when employees do sue, effective reme-
dies are often unavailable because of mandatory arbitration clauses,
104
 the diffi-
culties of class certification,
105
 and restrictions on remedies available to immi-
grants.
106
 
Ultimately, the mechanisms of democratic accountability embraced by 
American governance have not enabled workers meaningfully to shape their own 
workplaces or to participate in economic policy making. A key problem is that 
the administration of employment law, like administrative governance and the 
legislative process more generally, takes as a given the resource and power im-
balances that exist among different social and economic groups. Those inequal-
ities then reverberate through processes that are formally equal. For example, 
workers can participate through the regulatory notice-and-comment process, 
and they can lobby their elected representatives or the President for new legisla-
tion. But they compete with business organizations and economic elites, who 
have disproportionate ability to engage the governing process at every level.
107
 
 
of Labor rule that extended overtime and minimum wage protections to employees of third-
party providers and discussing FLSA’s history with respect to domestic workers). 
102. See, e.g., KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE 
NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 6-22 (2009); WEIL, supra note 89, at 
214-22; David Weil, Regulating the Workplace: The Vexing Problem of Implementation, in 7 AD-
VANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 247 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1996); Annette 
Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws 
in America’s Cities, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 50 (2009), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6KC-6GXD] 
(“[F]ront-line workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City 
lose more than $56.4 million per week as a result of employment and labor law violations.”). 
103. See Becker, supra note 31, at 171. 
104. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Pri-
vate of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); see 
also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form 
Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) (describing employer-imposed arbitra-
tion and noncompete agreements, both of which require the employee to give up critical back-
ground rights to the advantage of the employer). 
105. See Becker, supra note 31, at 171-72. 
106. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that federal im-
migration policy foreclosed the NLRB from awarding back pay to an undocumented immi-
grant who had not been authorized to work in the United States). 
107. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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The use of technocratic expertise within agencies does not solve this funda-
mental problem. Indeed, the dominant framework for expert policy reasoning—
cost-benefit analysis—approximates market pricing even where it does not exist, 
asking, for example, how much people are willing to pay to avoid harms in work-
places already shaped by inequality. Such methods can facilitate economic effi-
ciency in decision-making, but they are not redistributive or egalitarian in aim 
and can actually work to reinforce inequality.
108
 
In contrast, scholars have shown that more egalitarian outcomes are achieved 
when the law creates inclusive systems of sectoral bargaining, which enable 
power sharing in decisions about wages, benefits, and the economy more 
broadly. Unlike voluntary worksite-based bargaining, which tends to compress 
wages within individual firms, sectoral bargaining directly affects wages 
throughout the labor market.
109
 It also reduces incentives for fissuring of the 
employment relationship and can ensure that all workers, whether classified as 
contractors or employees, receive the benefit of negotiated standards.
110
 Indeed, 
comparative labor law studies suggest that if more equal distribution is the goal, 
then broadly inclusive union organizations empowered to negotiate on a sectoral 
basis are key.
111
 Historical evidence from the United States similarly suggests 
that when unions have achieved enough density to force employers to agree to 
something akin to sectoral bargaining in particular industries—for example, 
 
108. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) (arguing that reg-
ulation should be designed to maximize net benefits and increase economic wealth without 
regard to distribution). For a critique of the reigning approach, see Richard L. Revesz, Regu-
lation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018), which argues that distributional conse-
quences should be a core concern of the regulatory state. Cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 
(2017) (arguing that modern theories rationalize but do not justify our market society). 
109. See Jonas Pontusson et al., Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Par-
tisanship and Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 281, 289-90 (2002); Michael Wal-
lerstein, Wage Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies, 43 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 649, 669, 672-76 (1999). 
110. Andrias, supra note 8, at 78. 
111. KATHLEEN THELEN, VARIETIES OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SOCIAL SOLIDAR-
ITY 5, 9-10, 194, 203-07 (2014); see also SILVIA, supra note 18, at 27-28, 38-41 (describing ele-
ments of Germany’s sectoral bargaining system); PETER SWENSON, FAIR SHARES: UNIONS, 
PAY, AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY (1989) (comparing Swedish and West 
German industrial relations practices); Lowell Turner, Introduction to NEGOTIATING THE NEW 
GERMANY: CAN SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP SURVIVE? 3-4 (Lowell Turner ed., 1997) (describing Ger-
many’s “social market” economy); Traxler & Behrens, supra note 18 (emphasizing the central 
role the law and state institutions play in sustaining the German industrial relations system); 
Einat Albin, Sectoral Norm-Setting in Labor Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (drawing on British historical examples to argue in favor of sectoral bargaining). 
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through multiemployer or pattern bargaining—they have had much greater suc-
cess at raising economic standards for workers.
112
 Sectoral bargaining also tends 
to increase workers’ voice in the democracy by giving worker organizations an 
official seat at the table when important decisions about workplace policy and 
the political economy are made.
113
 More generally, worker organizations’ greater 
bargaining power and broader mandate may enhance their incentive and ability 
to serve as a counterweight to organized business interests in the political sphere. 
Lacking such bargaining power, American workers have little ability to ben-
efit from productivity gains or to shape effectively a host of critical issues—from 
conditions at their own workplaces, to employment law and social welfare policy, 
to trade and tax policy, and societal responses to automation. Recently, the pic-
ture for workers has only grown bleaker. The Trump Administration, with the 
support of members of Congress, has sought to reduce wage-and-hour protec-
tions,
114
 roll back worker-safety rules,
115
 and reverse rulings that protect work-
ers’ fundamental right to engage in concerted activity.
116
 Meanwhile, in Janus v. 
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, the conservative ma-
jority on the Supreme Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the 
 
112. See CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 
(2016) (describing industry-wide bargaining in Hollywood); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE 
MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT 271-98 (1995) (describing United Auto Workers pattern 
bargaining); Mark Anner et al., Learning from the Past: The Relevance of Twentieth-Century New 
York Jobbers’ Agreements for Twenty-First-Century Global Supply Chains, in ACHIEVING WORK-
ERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 239 (describing jobbers’ agreements 
negotiated among workers, garment manufacturers, and purchasers in the U.S. garment sec-
tor in the early and mid-twentieth century); Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of 
Immigrant Janitors in Southern California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMI-
GRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199 (Ruth Milkman 
ed., 2000); see also Andrias, supra note 8, at 19-20, 46-47 (discussing these models and the 
difficulty of replicating them under current law). 
113. Rogers, supra note 90, at 40-43. 
114. See Noam Scheiber, Labor Dept. Plan Could Let the Boss Pocket the Tip, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/economy/tips-rule.html [https://
perma.cc/W736-HGXY]. 
115. Timothy Noah, Does Labor Have a Death Wish?, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www 
.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/07/labor-movement-trump-betrayal-215796 
[https://perma.cc/29AY-DNTL]. 
116. See PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. 160 (2017) (overruling Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. 
Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. 934 (2011), and rescinding the right of smaller groups of workers 
to unionize); NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Considering Rulemaking to Address Joint Em-
ployer Standard, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (May 9, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach
/news-story/nlrb-considering-rulemaking-address-joint-employer-standard [https://
perma.cc/K7DK-E2VU] (presenting the question of whether to define joint employment 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
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longstanding precedent that permitted public sector employers and unions to 
require workers to pay fair-share fees.
117
 Those fees covered the costs of union 
representation, facilitated well-funded, independent worker organizations, and 
avoided the free-rider problem inherent in a system of exclusive representation. 
Only a few weeks prior, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,118 the Court curtailed the 
ability of workers to engage in group legal action, holding that employers may 
force workers to sign arbitration agreements with class-action waivers. In so do-
ing, it narrowed the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA, which protects concerted 
action among workers. Together, these decisions further weaken both unions as 
such and the ability of workers to take collective action. 
i i .  the intellectual and legislative origins of flsa’s 
industry committees 
A century ago, Americans faced similar, if not greater, problems. Rampant 
inequality, dire working conditions, high unemployment, a judiciary hostile to 
labor rights, and ultimately the collapse of the American economy set the stage 
for the egalitarian reforms of the 1930s. By 1928, the share of wealth owned by 
the top one percent of American households had surged to more than fifty per-
cent.
119
 Not unlike today, American democracy itself seemed to be at risk. Work-
ers’ lack of basic workplace rights, combined with the disproportionate political 
power exercised by a few megabusinesses and the wealthy more generally, struck 
many as incompatible with a republican form of government.
120
 Reforming la-
bor law was widely understood to be essential both to solving the crisis of Amer-
ican capitalism and to reinvigorating democracy.
121
 The ultimate response was 
the New Deal, when, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, Congress en-
acted the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and a host 
 
117. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruling Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)). 
118. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
119. SEAN WILENTZ, THE POLITICIANS & THE EGALITARIANS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 58 (2016). 
120. RAHMAN, supra note 2; William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (1999); cf. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS 
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2013) (exploring the relationship between democracy 
and inequality generally); SITARAMAN, supra note 15 (arguing that a strong middle class is a 
prerequisite to the American constitutional system and tracing its importance from the 
Founding Era). 
121. LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 20, 30-35. On the consumerist roots of 
the New Deal, see, for example, JACOBS, supra note 45. 
an american approach to social democracy 
643 
of other statutes beyond the labor and employment field that remain in existence 
today and form the core of the modern administrative state.
122
 But the New Deal 
came after decades of efforts to create a more just economy and democracy.
123
 
These efforts reflected an enduring idea that political problems and economic 
problems were inextricably linked, and that treating the latter required address-
ing the former. Revisiting the Progressive Era, in particular, provides a better 
sense of the scope of the reformers’ ambitions and the assumptions underlying 
their worldview—and reveals a significant difference from contemporary no-
tions of administrative governance. 
A. The Progressive Era and the Vision of a Democratic Political Economy 
As the United States rapidly industrialized in the years after the Civil War, 
many American workers resisted the transformation to wage labor. They viewed 
it as a form of “wage slavery”
 
and sought to return to a system of “free labor” in 
which citizens were self-employed, small producers, or members of a “coopera-
tive commonwealth.”
124
 By the turn of the century, however, it was increasingly 
clear that wage labor would be a permanent fact of working-class life for men 
and women, white and black. Labor responded by pushing for a “living wage.” 
 
122. See, e.g., 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW 
DEAL 150-51 (1958). 
123. In this sense, labor regulation further underlines the point, made powerfully in recent years 
by historians of the administrative state, that the New Deal did not represent a simple shift 
from laissez faire individualism to interventionist statecraft but rather was part of a long, en-
ergetic, and contested process of state building beginning as early as 1866. See JERRY L. 
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 
OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW 
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, 
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-
1940 (2013); William Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870-1920, in 2 THE CAM-
BRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 
2008). 
124. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 60-68, 124 (1998); LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, 
A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 11-13, 80 
(1997); ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR 
AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 96-137 (2015); ELIZABETH SANDERS, 
ROOTS OF REFORM 30-177 (1990); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE 
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 244-45 (1998). 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
644 
The Constitution’s promise of political equality, they argued, required that all 
citizens have a level of material security and economic independence.
125
 
Despite broad consensus on aims, the labor movement was deeply divided 
on strategy. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), for instance, opposed 
state intervention into the employment relationship.
126
 On its view, wage ar-
rangements for the “able-bodied”—a group that, for the AFL, was generally lim-
ited to white men—should be settled through voluntary collective bargaining.
127
 
The Federation and its members focused their energy on removing the state’s 
coercive power from organizing and bargaining, particularly in craft occupa-
tions.
128
 Other unions, by contrast, envisioned a greater role for the state and a 
more inclusive approach to labor rights. Emerging industrial unions joined with 
the waning Knights of Labor and Progressive women’s reform groups like the 
National Consumers League (NCL) to urge legislation that would both guaran-
tee workers’ substantive rights and protect the right to bargain.
129
 
The ambitions of unionists and social reformers with respect to labor condi-
tions were part and parcel of a broader struggle to resist turn-of-the century lais-
sez faire economics and to democratize the political economy. In the early dec-
ades of the twentieth century, Progressives developed a sweeping critique of 
 
125. GLICKMAN, supra note 124, at 11-54 (describing how, between the Civil War and the 1930s, 
working-class attitudes toward wage labor shifted from opposition to “wage slavery” to sup-
port for a “living wage”); Forbath, supra note 120 (discussing republican ideology and labor 
demands). 
126. See LANDON R.Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM 43 (2000). On the relationship of the labor 
movement to state intervention, see generally FORBATH, supra note 28; CHRISTOPHER L. TOM-
LINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985); and William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the Amer-
ican Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989). On the AFL’s craft approach and hos-
tility to immigrants and nonwhite workers, see LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra 
note 30, at 40-41. See also JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF LABOR AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1917, at 217-41 (1998) (describing the complex-
ity of the AFL’s relationship to the state). 
127. LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 40-41. 
128. Forbath, supra note 126. In 1913, Samuel Gompers, President of the AFL, was quoted as in-
sisting that, “If it were proposed in this country to vest authority in any tribunal to fix by law 
wages for men, labor would protest by every means in its power.” Howard D. Samuel, Trou-
bled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 
2000, at 33. 
129. STORRS, supra note 126, at 41-59; see also STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL RULE: SIDNEY HILLMAN 
AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 114-45 (1991) (describing garment union president Sidney 
Hillman’s ambivalence towards, but ultimate embrace of, political intervention, as well as his 
commitment to industrial organizing over a craft focus). On the Knights of Labor, see 
GOUREVITCH, supra note 124, at 1-7. 
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Lochner Era liberalism.130 Intellectuals like John Dewey and Herbert Croly, ac-
tivists like Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark, and future jurists like Louis 
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter all rejected the formalist common law approach 
that granted extensive power to judges, that defined liberty as a negative right,
131
 
and that, in Roscoe Pound’s words, “force[d] upon legislation an academic the-
ory of equality in the face of practical conditions of inequality.”
132
 The Progres-
sives also argued against what they believed to be an excessively individualist 
American culture, urging a renewed and more fundamental commitment to de-
mocracy.
133
 In so doing, they set out to redefine democracy itself. In their view, 
though electoral democracy was important, it was not enough. Democracy re-
quired a much thicker set of institutional commitments than the franchise.
134
 As 
Dewey argued, “The problem of democracy was . . . not solved, hardly more 
 
130. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 32; NOVAK, supra note 123, at 279-
90; RODGERS, supra note 32; MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT 
AGAINST FORMALISM 101-03 (1976); see also DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE 
OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 50 (1988). 
131. See John Dewey, Individualism, Old and New, in 5 THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 41-123 (Jo 
Ann Boydston ed., 1984); Brief for Defendants in Error upon Re-Argument, Stettler v. 
O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (Nos. 25, 26) [hereinafter Stettler Brief], reprinted in NAT’L CON-
SUMERS’ LEAGUE, OREGON MINIMUM WAGE CASES (1917), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt
?id=uc1.b3116228; Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 
107) [hereinafter Muller Brief], 1908 WL 27605. Both briefs were authored by Louis Brandeis 
and Josephine Goldmark. See also KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S 
WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900 (1995); cf. DAVID M. RABBAN, 
LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 472-
519 (2013) (complicating the history of legal formalism). 
132. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909). 
133. BRAND, supra note 130, at 50. 
134. NOVAK, supra note 123. Recent work in law and political economy echoes this commitment. 
See Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (2016); Kate Andrias, 
Hollowed-Out Democracy, N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2014); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, 
Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave 
of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2016); cf. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, 
Wealth, Commonwealth, and the Constitution of Opportunity, in WEALTH: NOMOS LVIII 45 
(Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg eds., 2017) (seeking to revive a “discourse of constitu-
tional political economy”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of “Constitutional Political 
Economy,” 94 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (2016) (emphasizing the need to attend to material factors 
when analyzing constitutional political economy). 
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than externally touched, by the establishment of universal suffrage and repre-
sentative government.”
135
 Rather, democracy—and liberty—required that prin-
ciples of equality be extended beyond the formal boundaries of the political 
sphere so as also to engage the gritty realities of the socioeconomic sphere.
136
 
Indeed, Progressives understood politics as inseparable from the economy.
137
 
They became convinced that, in the context of great disparities in wealth and 
power, democracy could not function.
138
 Only fundamental structural changes 
in the mode of economic organization could guarantee both individual liberty 
and a genuinely democratic regime.
139
 Brandeis and others, for instance, were 
particularly concerned about the “curse of bigness”—megacorporations, trusts, 
monopolies, and the threats these private actors posed to economic well-being 
and the public good—and they sought to break up monopoly power.
140
 Yet an-
titrust measures were not the only measures Progressives pursued to democra-
tize the economy. The more radical Progressive Era thinkers, like Dewey, devel-
oped a broad critique of capitalism and sought to lay the foundations for a 
democratic-socialist alternative.
141
 
 
135. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, in 11 THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 25 (Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., 1987). 
136. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 32, at 6. 
137. NOVAK, supra note 123, at 4. 
138. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 118-21, 125 (1927); ROBERT LEE HALE, COER-
CION AND DISTRIBUTION IN A SUPPOSEDLY NON-COERCIVE STATE (1923); John Dewey, The Im-
perative Need for a New Radical Political Party, COMMON SENSE 2, 6 (1933); see also BRAND, supra 
note 130, at 50; MORTON J. HORWITZ, The Legacy of Legal Realism, in HORWITZ, supra note 
130, at 193-212; MARC STEARS, DEMANDING DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A 
NEW POLITICS 94-97 (2010); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 434-36 (1991). 
139. STEARS, supra note 138, at 94-97; WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 435-38. 
140. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 
(Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935); see RAHMAN, supra note 2; Robert Pitofsky, Political Content 
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051-52 (1979). 
141. WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 434-39 (describing Dewey’s critique of capitalism based in 
liberal democratic ideals). To be sure, the Progressives were a diverse group. Not all shared 
the commitment to radical redistribution of economic and political power; much of the move-
ment was committed to diffusing class tensions and purifying democracy through a range of 
technocratic reforms. RAHMAN, supra note 2, at 11, 55; STEARS, supra note 138, at 23; SHELTON 
STROMQUIST, REINVENTING “THE PEOPLE”: THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, THE CLASS PROB-
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the political community entitled to democratic rights. In particular, elements of the movement 
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ARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRES-
SIVE ERA (2016); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PRO-
GRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
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To that end, the Progressives sought to realign in fundamental ways the 
power of labor and capital. They believed that the working class needed to be 
organized and that the state needed to ensure the ground rules to enable such 
organization.
142
 Reformers like John Commons, the “father” of modern indus-
trial relations, and others from the Wisconsin School, joined trade unions in 
seeking to bring to the industrial sphere the basic democratic practices and due 
process protections enjoyed by workers in the political sphere.
143
 Unions and 
collective bargaining, Commons argued, would help establish the material con-
ditions under which democracy could flourish while delivering on the Constitu-
tion’s promise of liberty.
144
 Collective organization at work would also enable 
Americans to engage in democratic decision-making on a daily basis, shifting 
power away from capital and building democracy and equality from the ground 
up.
145
 
 
Progressives: Racism and Public Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 947 (2017) (arguing that although the 
Progressives inherited racist ideas from their predecessors, over time they increasingly pro-
moted racial inclusion and diversity). My focus is on the ideological commitments of the more 
radical Progressives. 
142. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 32, at 386; STEARS, supra note 138, at 109-10. 
143. See Kaufman, supra note 42, at 3, 23 (describing work of Commons); see also LAURA WEINRIB, 
THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH 22 (2016) (discussing Croly’s view of unions); Howell John 
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HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43, 43-60 (1996) (tracing the 
development of the idea of industrial democracy among different groups in the Progressive 
Era); Nelson Lichtenstein, Great Expectations: The Promise of Industrial Jurisprudence and Its 
Demise, 1930-1960, in LICHTENSTEIN & HARRIS, supra, at 113-22 (discussing the industrial de-
mocracy theory advanced by Sumner Slichter and the Brookings Institution, which was ulti-
mately more focused on industrial discipline than democratic rulemaking). On the Progres-
sive Era labor movement’s ideology of industrial democracy, see JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, 
LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF 
MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912-1921 (1997); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF 
THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-
1925, at 22-44 (1987); and David Montgomery, Industrial Democracy or Democracy in Industry?: 
The Theory and Practice of the Labor Movement, 1870-1925, in LICHTENSTEIN & HARRIS, supra, 
at 22 [hereinafter Montgomery, Industrial Democracy]. 
144. JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 373-74 (4th rev. 
ed. 1936); see also Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and 
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At the same time, the Progressives had faith in government; they envisioned 
expanded state institutions to achieve greater democratic control over the econ-
omy.
146
 For example, they created public utilities to regulate key social goods at 
risk of subversion or corruption if left to private or market forces.
147
 Well known 
for their commitment to technocratic expertise, Progressives argued that such 
expertise was useful only if subject to democratic control.
148
 In their view, ex-
perts should advise the people and serve the popular will, not themselves make 
value judgments.
149
 
To enable the public, and labor in particular, to exercise its will against the 
will of capital, Progressives sought to create new mechanisms for democratic 
participation. In Dewey’s view, public institutions could serve as “structures 
which canalize action,” providing a “mechanism for securing to an idea [the] 
channels of effective action.”
150
 Politics could provide the spaces, practices, in-
stitutions, and associations for enabling the collective action necessary to create 
more egalitarian social and economic systems. Public opinion and the ballot, 
however, were insufficient tools to achieve such change. For the public to solve 
its problems, organizations of citizens, and organizations of workers in particu-
lar, needed concrete ways to exercise power over the range of economic and po-
litical decision-making. 
Progressives thus envisioned a broad role for worker organizations and other 
civic associations in government—and a robust role for the state in enabling such 
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eds., 2016). 
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ICAN DEMOCRACY 139, 154-60 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017). For a 
discussion of modern implications of the public utility concept, see K. Sabeel Rahman, The 
New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018). 
148. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 32, at 386; see also LEON FINK, THE LONG GILDED AGE: AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM AND THE LESSONS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 10 (2015) (arguing that the social 
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involvement. The goal was to redistribute power over decision-making and 
thereby ensure more egalitarian outcomes.
151
 They imagined a society of citizens 
whose equality was guaranteed by their “direct and active participation” in the 
governance process.
152
 Writing for the Independent in 1918, Dewey explained: 
[I]n Great Britain and this country, . . . the measures taken for enforcing 
the subordination of private activity to public need and service have been 
successful only because they have enlisted the voluntary coöperation of 
associations which have been formed on a non-political, non-govern-
mental basis, large industrial corporations, railway systems, labor un-
ions, universities, scientific societies, banks, etc.
153
  
Tripartism became an increasingly attractive institutional form. Throughout 
the pre-New Deal period, Dewey, along with Commons and others, advocated 
for shared power between labor, business, and the public through boards and 
councils.
154
 They recognized that, to succeed, tripartism required not only vol-
untarism but also active state support for associational life, and worker organi-
zation in particular.
155
 Dewey wrote: “It does not intimate that the function of 
the state is limited to settling conflicts among other groups, as if each one of 
them had a fixed scope of action of its own.”
156
 Herbert Croly went so far as to 
argue what would in today’s discourse be unthinkable: that “the non-union in-
dustrial laborer should, in the interest of a genuinely democratic organization of 
labor, be rejected.”
157
 Moreover, reformers envisioned an expansive sort of tri-
 
151. See, e.g., id. at 73; see also BRAND, supra note 130, at 52 (describing Dewey’s commitment to 
encouraging broad participation in economic decision-making in order to achieve fundamen-
tal structural changes in the economy); WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 434-39 (discussing 
Dewey’s efforts to develop a workable form of democratic socialism). 
152. WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 188. 
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A BOOK FOR THE YOUNGER GENERATION (1918); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE STATE IN THE NEW SO-
CIAL ORDER (1922). On the parallels between American progressivism and European social 
democracy more generally, see KLOPPENBERG, supra note 32; and RODGERS, supra note 32. 
155. BRAND, supra note 130, at 50-51, 80; WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 439; Rogers M. Smith, 
The Progressive Seedbed: Claims of American Political Community in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First Centuries, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY, supra note 146, at 264, 269-70. 
156. DEWEY, supra note 138, at 73; see also BRAND, supra note 130, at 52. 
157. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 387 (1918); see id. at 39, 138-39, 277, 386-
87; Herbert Croly, The Future of the State, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 1917, at 179; see also BRAND, 
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partism—a system of social democracy not limited to a narrow set of issues. Tri-
partism was instead a way of governing the economy more broadly. And they 
saw no divide between individual employment rights and collective labor action, 
nor did they confine labor law to collective bargaining. Commons, for example, 
defined the field of labor relations to include not only bargaining rights and 
wages, but also benefits, social security, and even corporate governance. In his 
view, active involvement of representatives of employers, workers, and the pub-
lic would lead to better-formulated and better-enforced legislation and less ex 
post litigation, while also advancing fundamental democratic aims.
158
 Over time, 
the more radical democratic Progressives like Dewey also became convinced that 
the ability to take direct political action, through strikes and other collective ac-
tion, was an essential part of achieving a democratic political economy; deliber-
ation alone was insufficient.
159
 
Together, the Progressives and their contemporaries formed an intellectual 
world in which politics and the economy could not be disentangled and institu-
tional reform of one entailed attention to the other. Their rich and sophisticated 
picture of political economy also enabled them to imagine institutional reforms 
that by contemporary lights might seem impossibly radical. But in this era of 
radical rethinking, proposals for tripartism and robust social democracy became 
possible, indeed plausible, ways of reorganizing American life. 
B. Early Wage Boards 
Change in the early twentieth century was not merely intellectual; across the 
country concrete reform began to be realized, especially at the state level. Pressed 
by reformers of different stripes, numerous states across the nation began to en-
act wage-and-hour legislation protecting women and children.
160
 Contrary to 
 
supra note 130, at 57-60 (describing Croly’s rejection of “overbearing legalism” and embrace 
of a more communitarian philosophical framework). Croly was more committed than Dewey 
to administration by technocrats and experts. Joel M. Winkelman, Herbert Croly on Work and 
Democracy, 44 POLITY 81, 99-100 (2012). Yet, he too was convinced that state building had to 
occur in conjunction with association building and that the latter project could both assist and 
constrain the state. BRAND, supra note 130, at 58, 70. 
158. Kaufman, supra note 42, at 23. 
159. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 93 (1935); STEARS, supra note 138, at 96-99. 
160. Nebraska was first to propose a state minimum wage statute in 1909, and it ultimately passed 
the law in 1913; Massachusetts enacted its minimum wage law in 1912; California, Oregon, 
and Washington quickly followed with stronger statutes in 1913. GLICKMAN, supra note 124, 
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conventional wisdom, these laws were not simply about guaranteeing subsist-
ence, nor were they conceived as guaranteeing individual rights. While more 
conservative, middle-class reformers viewed minimum wage and maximum 
hours legislation as ways to ensure subsistence for women workers, labor leaders 
and leftist feminist reformers, including the NCL’s leaders, hoped that these 
laws would begin a transformation toward greater social and political equality.
161
 
From the outset, the efforts to pass wage-and-hour legislation were intertwined 
with collective labor activity. For example, the dramatic textile strike in Law-
rence, in which women workers played a prominent role, aided passage of the 
very first minimum wage law in Massachusetts in 1912.
162
 Indeed, the NCL, 
known primarily for its commitment to improving minimum conditions for 
women and children, was fiercely committed to the principle of organizing 
workers, despite intransigence from the AFL.
163
 Feminist-socialist reformers like 
Florence Kelley, who served as General Secretary of the NCL, saw wage-and-
hour laws and the industry commissions as means to achieve economic safe-
guards for women while building a nascent form of representation in industry 
for women.
164
 In briefs to the Supreme Court and in public statements, NCL 
 
of labor in Progressive Era experiments); JEROLD L. WALTMAN, THE POLITICS OF THE MINI-
MUM WAGE 11-15 (2000) (describing the role of the NCL in advocating for minimum wage 
laws). Not all women reformers at the time supported gender-specific protective legislation; 
deep divisions existed between the Women’s Party, for example, which opposed sex-based 
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of this Article. For further discussion of these issues, see STORRS, supra note 126, at 43-59, 287-
92 nn.7-61. 
161. WALTMAN, supra note 160, at 53; see also GLICKMAN, supra note 124, at 21, 61-77, 131-32, 136-40 
(analyzing the differences between labor and middle-class conceptions of a living wage). 
162. STORRS, supra note 126, at 46. The Lawrence textile strike began when textile employers cut 
women workers’ pay in response to a state law requiring a shorter workweek. Led by the In-
dustrial Workers of the World, almost thirty thousand workers, many of them women and 
immigrants, walked off their jobs. The strike lasted more than two months, through brutally 
cold weather, with workers at nearly every mill in Lawrence participating. See Ardis Cameron, 
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43-46 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985). 
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164. RODGERS, supra note 32, at 237-38. 
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leaders defended wage-and-hour laws, and tripartite boards in particular, as a 
way both to improve material conditions and to remedy power differentials.
165
 
The experience of World War I, including the use of war labor boards, 
strengthened the resolve of Progressive union leaders and reformers who re-
jected the craft unions’ antipolitical orientation. Having witnessed the significant 
impact the government could have on economic activity and industrial relations, 
Progressives deepened their commitment to achieving social democracy.
166
 They 
began to advance even more ambitious political and social goals. In addition to 
new wage-and-hour laws, the United Mine Workers of America, for example, 
urged nationalization of the coal mines, public ownership of the railroads, legis-
lation to make employer interference with unions a criminal offense, and na-
tional health insurance.
167
 
Though unions suffered significant defeats and loss of membership during 
the 1920-22 depression,
168
 minimum wage campaigns remained successful. By 
1920, a total of thirteen states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico, had enacted minimum wage programs.
169
 By 1938, twenty-five states had 
some form of minimum wage law.
170
 Unlike today’s FLSA, nearly all of these 
early wage-and-hour statutes used some form of industry committee,
 
modeled 
in part on Great Britain’s wage boards, enacted just a few years prior.
171
 The 
committees or wage boards required the participation of labor, business, and the 
public in the administrative process. For the feminist and Progressive reformers, 
wage boards reflected a commitment to direct worker participation in political 
decision-making. As Goldmark and Frankfurter wrote in their brief to the Su-
preme Court defending Oregon’s minimum wage law: 
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170. Id. at 517 n.15. 
171. See Frank T. de Vyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
323, 326-27 (1939); see also JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC AS-
PECTS 38-39, 315-18 (1906) (describing wage laws of New Zealand and Victoria, Australia); 
Harry Weiss, British Wage Boards and the American Fair Labor Standards Act, 47 AM. FEDERA-
TIONIST 33, 34-35 (describing the British wage-board system); House vs. Senate Version, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 1938, at 22 (noting that by 1938, tripartite committees were considered “the 
standard practice in State minimum wage laws”). See generally FINK, supra note 148 (empha-
sizing the international dimensions of the Progressive movement). 
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Certain intangible results, equally as important as the wage determina-
tions, have been brought about through the operation of the law. The 
method of administration—boards composed of employers, employees 
and representatives of the public—has brought employer and employee 
together on common ground and has given each a realization of the 
other’s difficulties, while the employee has been made to feel her value as 
an individual to the community.
172
 
For the fledgling industrial unions, the legislation was part and parcel of a “new 
unionism” that would transcend narrow class perspectives and help create a new 
political economy.
173
 While the AFL’s craft unions continued to focus on remov-
ing the state from union activity, the industrial unions saw wage laws generally, 
and the industrial commissions in particular, as a means of providing rights to 
all workers, while strengthening workers’ collective power in the economy and 
in politics.
174
 
The reaction from employers and the judiciary was strong and negative. Em-
ployers resisted unions intensely and courts frequently enjoined collective action 
among workers.
175
 The Supreme Court even resisted the more modest goal of 
providing for subsistence wages, repeatedly striking down the early state wage-
and-hour statutes, including most famously in Lochner v. New York176 and Adkins 
 
172. Stettler Brief, supra note 131, at 686 (quoting Caroline J. Gleason, For Working Women in Ore-
gon, SURVEY, Sept. 9, 1916, at 586). 
173. See, e.g., FRASER, supra note 129, at 136, 171, 215-21; cf. FINK, supra note 148, at 96, 102-08, 111-
16 (describing labor-movement ideology and its relationship to Progressive Era experiments 
with industrial commissions and dispute resolution from 1880 to 1920). 
174. See FINK, supra note 148, at 96, 102-08, 111-16; FORBATH, supra note 28; FRASER, supra note 
129; GLICKMAN, supra note 124, at 61-77; 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note 122, at 141-42. The AFL’s 
skepticism was both ideological and practical. As the AFL pointed out, some of the early wage 
boards actually constrained unions’ power. Colorado’s board, for example, was empowered 
to enjoin strikes. See Earl Hoage, Meeting Wage Cuts in Colorado, 38 AM. FEDERATIONIST 1332, 
1332-34 (1931). 
175. See TOMLINS, supra note 126; Forbath, supra note 126. For an example of judicial resistance, 
see Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 233, 253 (1917), which sanctioned yel-
low-dog contracts that authorized employers to insist on pledges by their workers not to join 
a union as a condition of employment, thus making it impossible to organize without the 
consent of target firms. For a history of the success of lawyers litigating against labor on behalf 
of the American Anti-Boycott Association, see DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: 
FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995). 
176. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For background on the Lochner Era, see, for example, HOWARD GILLMAN, 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1935); and PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 
(1998). 
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v. Children’s Hospital.177 Importantly, however, the Court’s concern was not that 
the laws delegated authority to private organizations. Indeed, between the end 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, states and localities 
delegated lawmaking power to associations of citizens in a range of ways—often 
to groups of businesses or property owners—and courts upheld nearly all such 
mechanisms.
178
 According to historian James Willard Hurst, “[b]elief in the re-
lease of private individual and group energies . . . furnished one of the working 
principles which give the coherence of character to our early nineteenth-century 
public policy.”
179
 Instead, the Lochner Court struck down the law at issue for a 
different reason: it purportedly interfered with employers’ freedom to contract 
with their employees, and thereby violated liberty interests protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
180
 Nonetheless, numerous laws 
escaped or survived the Court’s review, including laws regulating conditions of 
women and children in dangerous workplaces,
181
 as well as some maximum 
hour legislation
182
 and workers’ compensation laws.
183
 In short, though the 
 
177. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
178. See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (upholding an ordi-
nance prohibiting billboards except upon permission of a majority of neighboring property 
owners); St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908) (upholding a stat-
ute authorizing a private railway association to establish standard drawbar heights); Butte 
City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 125-28 (1905) (upholding a statute making rules devel-
oped by miners binding on all mining claims); Ex parte Gerino, 77 P. 166 (Cal. 1904) (up-
holding a statute empowering private medical societies to name the members of the state 
Board of Medical Examiners). For further discussion of the role of private delegation in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRI-
VATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002); Elisabeth S. Clemens, Lineages of the Rube Goldberg 
State: Building and Blurring Public Programs, 1900-1940, in RETHINKING POLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS: THE ART OF THE STATE 187 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2006); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making 
by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 231-34 (1937); and Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1501-02 (2003). For background on a related transfor-
mation in American government, from profit-seeking officials to salaried ones, see PARRILLO, 
supra note 123. 
179. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY UNITED STATES 32 (1956). 
180. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
181. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see also S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 1 (1941). 
182. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding an Oregon statute providing that, with 
certain exceptions, “[n]o person shall be employed in any mill, factory or manufacturing es-
tablishment in this state more than ten hours in any one day”). 
183. See Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 
210 (1917); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). For a discussion of the development 
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Court’s formalistic approach to liberty posed a significant obstacle, reformers 
throughout the nation successfully persisted in experimenting with new forms 
of labor regulation, including approaches that brought worker organizations 
into administration while guaranteeing substantive rights.
184 
C. NIRA and Its Demise 
The economic crisis of the 1930s offered a unique opportunity for institu-
tional experimentation and the first major federal attempt at tripartism. Initially, 
as the Depression worsened, public support for wage-and-hour laws increased, 
along with public opposition to judicial intervention.
185
 The AFL came to sup-
port, albeit tepidly, generally applicable wage-and-hour laws,
186
 while leaders of 
the newer industrial unions like Sidney Hillman, president of the garment work-
ers’ union, and John Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers and soon-to-
be head of the emerging Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), openly 
sought to harness state power to guarantee a set of social and economic rights 
for all workers, including women, immigrants, and African Americans.
187
 Econ-
omists and economic elites more generally also began to support a minimum 
 
of workmen’s compensation law and the relationship between tort law and the emerging reg-
ulatory state, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004). 
184. For work that complicates the “era of Lochner” narrative, demonstrating the extent to which 
law and regulation persisted despite the Court’s formalistic laissez faire jurisprudence, see 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); NOVAK, supra note 123, at 245-
48, 308; and Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: 
A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 84 (1985). Cf. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCH-
NER (2011) (arguing that Lochner was well grounded in precedent and has been unfairly ma-
ligned). 
185. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-1939 
(1990). 
186. See PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 30-31. 
187. See FRASER, supra note 129, at 259-323 (discussing Hillman’s role in the early New Deal ad-
ministration, as well as his recognition that state intervention could only work if combined 
with militant organizing); GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 154 (2001) (discussing the CIO’s commitment to racial inclusion); 
LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 42-46 (discussing Lewis and Hillman’s 
desire to push the New Deal toward an embrace of social democratic politics); Forbath, supra 
note 120, at 70-71 (describing the CIO’s call for jobs, security, and industrial democracy as 
every citizen’s right); cf. GLICKMAN, supra note 124, at 156 (arguing that labor came to see a 
republican language of politics as consistent with an emphasis on wages and consumption). 
But see TOMLINS, supra note 126, at 243 (arguing that government support ultimately under-
mined worker power). 
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wage on the theory that it would lead to more robust consumption and a health-
ier economy.
188
 
Reform, however, would soon go beyond a minimum wage and embrace a 
dramatic rearrangement of economic power. NIRA, passed in June 1933, was 
President Roosevelt’s response to the demand for a new framework of social and 
economic rights—the centerpiece of his initial New Deal.
189
 Notably, NIRA did 
not attempt to set a national minimum wage, nor did it create an independent 
board of experts to set and administer a wage. Rather, it delegated to associations 
of workers and businesses the role of policy making and allowed those groups to 
play a representative role, subject to presidential approval. Specifically, NIRA 
enabled trade associations and unions to negotiate entire industries’ codes of 
conduct, which were then to be approved by the President. If a trade association 
failed to adopt a code, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) itself could 
do so.
190
 At the same time, the law protected workers’ right to organize and bar-
gain collectively.
191
 In so doing, NIRA realized a long-held dream of Progressive 
reformers—a direct and institutionalized role for labor in the administrative 
state. These intellectuals and labor leaders had profoundly influenced President 
Roosevelt’s initial approach to economic regulation.
192
 But those who urged tri-
partism leading up to the New Deal were not all on the left. Centrists believed 
that some scheme of business-government cooperation could further industrial 
peace.
193
 And on the right, though many business leaders opposed any expan-
sion of the administrative state and infringement on their right to contract, oth-
ers believed that business benefited from a greater formal role in governing de-
cisions.
194
 
NIRA capitalized on such broad political support to inaugurate the most am-
bitious experiment in tripartism in American history.
195
 The new statute had a 
significant impact on workers’ wages and workers’ power. In 1932, prior to the 
statute’s enactment, unions suffered from declining membership, little economic 
 
188. GLICKMAN, supra note 124, at 147-48, 155. 
189. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933). 
190. Id. § 3(d), 48 Stat. at 196. 
191. Id. § 7(a), 48 Stat. at 198-99. 
192. Corporatism undergirded corporate and antitrust theory and policies of the era as well, with 
Roosevelt Administration officials arguing for a system of fair competition, not just free com-
petition, and—in the context of corporate law—in favor of a system of community and social 
obligations. Wachter, supra note 25, at 593-97. 
193. HAWLEY, supra note 30, at 13. 
194. Id. 
195. BRAND, supra note 130, at 92. 
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power, and niche involvement in the economy.
196
 After enactment, they saw a 
rapid gain in membership,
197
 increasing thirty-three percent in just the two years 
that NIRA was in operation.
198
 New industrial unions offered a sweeping vision 
of economic democracy and began to organize aggressively. The law facilitated 
their efforts: section 7(a) provided a right to organize and prohibited interfer-
ence by employers.
199
 Moreover, to be approved, industry codes “had to meet 
specific conditions regarding the rights of employees to participate in union ac-
tivities.”
200
 NIRA thus legitimized unions, making them central actors on the 
national political and economic stage. Unions capitalized on this position, cam-
paigning with the slogan that “[t]he President wants you to unionize.”
201
 
At the same time, however, NIRA had significant problems that frustrated 
its redistributive aims. The statute lacked procedures to sufficiently cabin the 
influence of the most powerful economic actors. Corporations used the code 
process, which covered prices and industry practices, as well as wages, to gain 
advantage against business competitors.
202
 They also were loath to deal with un-
ions, shutting them out of decision-making processes with no penalty. Making 
matters worse, the statute lacked a clear egalitarian mission to guide agency and 
committee action; it established no clear benchmarks for wage increases or em-
ployment rights; and it lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. Initial wage 
rates were low, barely improving conditions for workers and producing signifi-
cant frustration in labor circles.
203
 Even before the Court invalidated NIRA, the 
Act was collapsing under its own weight.
204
 
 
196. Wachter, supra note 25, at 588. 
197. Id.; see IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1943: TURBULENT 
YEARS 37-125 (1970) (summarizing unionization campaigns provoked by the passage of sec-
tion 7(a) of NIRA); FRASER, supra note 129, at 290 (describing Hillman’s commitment to 
organizing in the wake of NIRA). 
198. Wachter, supra note 25, at 604. 
199. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933). 
200. Wachter, supra note 25, at 601. 
201. Id. at 602; see also BRAND, supra note 130, at 237-40 (describing how the mineworkers capital-
ized on the NRA and emphasizing Roosevelt’s interventions on their behalf); FRASER, supra 
note 129, at 290, 295-96 (detailing organizing by garment workers following NIRA’s enact-
ment). 
202. BRAND, supra note 130, at 94-95. 
203. FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 224 (1946). 
204. BRAND, supra note 130, at 94-95; HAWLEY, supra note 30, at 130; Wachter, supra note 25, at 
604; see also Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 241-42 (1994) 
(“When the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA in May of 1935, the program had few 
friends, and prospects for congressional extension of its two-year charter were gloomy.”). 
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In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Court brought NIRA to 
a conclusive end.
205
 The Court’s holding focused on excessive delegation from 
Congress to the executive branch, and not on executive delegation to citizen as-
sociations.
206
 In particular, the Court objected to section 3 of the statute, which 
allowed the President to give industry-developed codes of fair competition the 
force of law, holding that the provision ceded too much legislative power to the 
President.
207
 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes explained that Con-
gress had provided no meaningful standards to restrict the President’s discre-
tion, leaving industry to “roam at will and the President [to] approve or disap-
prove their proposals as he may see fit.”
208
 Justice Cardozo, ordinarily a 
champion of Progressive causes, concurred: “No such plenitude of power is sus-
ceptible of transfer.”
209
 
Despite its focus on interbranch delegation, the Schechter Poultry Court also 
gave various indications that tripartism raised constitutional concerns. The ma-
jority emphasized that NIRA did not follow the traditional independent com-
mission model,
210
 and it worried that the industry codes bound even those par-
ties that failed to assent.
211
 Justice Cardozo again agreed on this point, noting, 
“[A]nything that Congress may do within the limits of the commerce clause for 
the betterment of business may be done by the President upon the recommen-
dation of a trade association by calling it a code. This is delegation running 
riot.”
212
 
Shortly thereafter, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,213 the Court rejected tripartite 
bargaining more directly. It struck down a law enabling a majority of the coal 
miners and large coal producers in a region to negotiate binding wage-and-hour 
standards for all regional miners and producers. According to the Court, the law 
constituted a most “obnoxious” legislative delegation because it allowed the ma-
jority of coal producers and miners in the industry to bind other private parties 
“whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the 
 
205. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
206. Id.; cf. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
207. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537-39. 
208. Id. at 538. 
209. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
210. Id. at 533 (majority opinion); see also id. at 537 (“Such a delegation of legislative power is un-
known to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives . . . of Con-
gress.”). 
211. Id. at 529. 
212. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
213. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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same business.”
214
 “The delegation is so clearly arbitrary,” wrote Justice Suther-
land, “and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions 
of this court which foreclose the question [of its constitutionality].”
215
 According 
to the Court, “in the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with 
the power to regulate the business of another.”
216
 Permitting a majority of pri-
vate participants in an industry to determine the rules for the minority consti-
tuted a “clearly arbitrary” delegation of power that interfered with personal lib-
erty and private property in violation of due process.
217
 After Carter Coal, the 
doctrinal viability of tripartism, its political appeal notwithstanding, was in se-
rious doubt. 
i i i .  flsa’s ambition and its industry committees 
For many commentators, the invalidation of NIRA and other early New Deal 
efforts represents a critical turning point—the end of the nation’s brief experi-
ment with a method of governance that formally involved labor in the develop-
ment of economic policy.
218
 Labor scholars have demonstrated that, in enacting 
the Wagner Act of 1935, the labor movement and its allies in government sought 
similar ends through different means.
219
 But studying the Wagner Act on its own 
 
214. Id. at 311. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. The Court also held that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act exceeded Congress’s com-
merce power because it regulated intrastate coal production. Id. at 308-10. With respect to its 
Commerce Clause holding, Carter Coal is widely considered to have been abrogated. See, e.g., 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1 (1937). The Court’s evolution on private delegations and tripartite bargaining, as well as on 
the Commerce Clause and the right to contract, is discussed infra Section III.B.3 and notes 
405, 430 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. While the legal literature emphasizes the rejec-
tion of corporatism, historians have underscored the continued importance of tripartite struc-
tures during World War II and in particular industries. See HAWLEY, supra note 30, at 187-
280; LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 100-03; see also supra notes 24, 30 
and accompanying text. 
219. E.g., Barenberg, supra note 28, at 1412-27 (emphasizing continuity between Dewey’s ideas and 
Senator Wagner’s normative understanding of collective bargaining, which aspired to achieve 
industrial democracy and an egalitarian employment relationship); Forbath, supra note 120, 
at 60-61 & n.265 (detailing the citizenship rights-based arguments for the Wagner Act); Wil-
liam E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 174-75 (2001) (describing 
New Dealers’ efforts, through the NLRA, to achieve “democratic, not juridical, construction 
of the ground rules of economic life”); cf. James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
660 
yields a blinkered picture of labor law at the time, making it seem privatized and 
voluntarist. By contrast, examining FLSA alongside the NLRA produces a dif-
ferent vision.
220
 Far more explicitly than the NLRA, FLSA’s first incarnation em-
bodied a commitment to directly involving worker organizations in govern-
ance—and to enabling unions to bargain for all workers. Indeed, many 
commentators at the time saw FLSA as a direct outgrowth of NIRA and tripartite 
models abroad.
221
 
More generally, contemporaries understood FLSA not as an unambitious 
and minimalistic statute as oft-described today, but rather as part of a broader 
social democratic project aimed at shifting power over the economy. FLSA’s ad-
vocates aspired to universalize labor rights, rejecting the line between the collec-
tive and the individual, and they sought to democratize governance and the 
economy. The statute ultimately fell short of these aspirations, but it nonetheless 
created a dialectic between popular mobilization and regulation. The regime 
achieved, in limited form, an approach to administration that married the sub-
stantive ends of empowering worker organizations and guaranteeing worker 
rights to procedural means that solicited and enabled those same organizations’ 
participation in governance.
222
 The passage, operation, and demise of FLSA’s 
industry committees are well worth revisiting: they offer a picture of an effective 
tripartite institution whose birth and death were products of changing and 
changeable political forces. 
 
106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997) (detailing laborers’ invocation of constitutional freedoms, especially 
those of the Thirteenth Amendment); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the 
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (2002) (lamenting the use of the Commerce Clause instead of the Reconstruction 
Amendments as the basis for upholding the NLRA). 
220. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (describing the relative lack of attention to FLSA 
in the literature). 
221. See John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 464, 464 (1939) (“The roots of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 are deep 
in a movement that extends back over a period of years, yet it is evident that the closest rela-
tionship exists with the wage and hour standards established under the National Industrial 
Recovery Act.” (footnote omitted)); The New NRA, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1937, at 88, 88 
(emphasizing the relationship of the draft bill to NIRA and to the British model). Efforts to 
continue tripartism were not limited to FLSA. See JAMES GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974) 
(noting that the NLRB initially employed a soft form of tripartism). 
222. For an excellent examination of another way in which labor and its allies pursued a more social 
democratic approach to regulation during this period, see KLEIN, supra note 45, at 158-61 
which shows that labor saw health security as part of a broader economic security project and 
sought universal health benefits and participation rights in elaboration of those programs. 
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A. The Legislative Debate 
Following the enactment of the Wagner Act and amid massive CIO organiz-
ing drives, President Roosevelt made both economic security and collective labor 
rights a key part of the 1936 Democratic Platform and his subsequent pro-
gram.
223
 After a year of CIO-led strikes,
224
 President Roosevelt’s Solicitor Gen-
eral, Robert Jackson, declared in 1938 that the Administration’s goals included 
“the ending of the oppression of starvation wages and sweatshop hours” as well 
as “collective bargaining for labor.”
225
 Ending these practices, the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration claimed, entailed protecting interrelated workplace rights that be-
longed to all Americans. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act was, in the view of President Roosevelt and 
his labor secretary Frances Perkins, a critical next step in that process. Supporters 
of FLSA in the Administration and beyond hoped it would do more than what it 
does today, ensure subsistence-level wages. Rather, the bill’s drafters saw it as a 
way to deliver on a set of “fundamental rights”
226
 and to ensure a “system of 
basic equality, extending into political, economic, and social realms.”
227
 In a sig-
nificant departure from the modern view of FLSA, the bill’s supporters saw its 
guarantee of individual rights as part of a broader project in democracy.
228
 In-
deed, FLSA’s backers in Congress expressly claimed that the law would expand 
the role of unions in politics and the economy, particularly in the nonunion 
South, and would provide a minimalist surrogate labor union for still-unor-
 
223. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “We Are Fighting to Save a Great and Precious Form of Government 
for Ourselves and the World”—Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency, Philadel-
phia, Pa. (June 27, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
230, 232-34 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938); see JACOBS, supra note 45, at 150-53; KLEIN, supra 
note 45. 
224. KATZNELSON, supra note 36, at 273 (describing the sit-down strikes of 1937). 
225. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 27 (2007) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, 
The Call for a Liberal Bar, 1 NAT’L LAW. GUILD Q. 88, 88-91 (1938), reprinted in THE NATIONAL 
LAWYERS GUILD: FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 23-24 (Ann Fagan Ginger & Eugene 
M. Tobin eds., 1988)). 
226. 83 CONG. REC. 7310 (1938) (statement of Rep. William Fitzgerald) (“The wage and hour bill 
is an honest and sincere effort to meet and not to avoid the just demands of the workingman 
that his fundamental rights be observed.”). 
227. Id. at 7312 (statement of Rep. William Sirovich); see also id. at 7311 (arguing that the bill em-
braced a civilized capitalism based on firm economic rights of citizenship). 
228. See, e.g., id. at 7322 (statement of Rep. Herbert Bigelow) (stating that the “very life of the 
Nation as a democracy depends on this bill”). 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
662 
ganized workers.
229
 Senator David Walsh, chairman of the Labor Committee 
and a Democrat from Massachusetts, announced that “the Government is at-
tempting to set up machinery which . . . ought to be helpful in providing collec-
tive bargaining through a Government agency for the men and women who are 
not organized.”
230
 In his view, FLSA promised that unorganized workers “will 
not be left helpless . . . . We will see to it that you, too, are given some of the 
benefits and some of the privileges of collective bargaining.”
231
 
Labor generally embraced FLSA’s approach, though not without important 
exceptions. In particular, the AFL sought to exempt unionized workplaces from 
coverage under FLSA, on the ground that labor conditions were better left to 
private negotiation than to governmental supervision.
232
 But the CIO and lead-
ers of the industrial unions lauded the more universal and social democratic ap-
proach. They welcomed the idea of an intertwined labor and employment law; 
in their view, FLSA would serve as a mechanism to enhance collective bargaining 
and help reduce downward wage pressure on organized shops.
233
 Sidney Hill-
man, for example, argued that in industries such as textiles, garments, and shoes, 
private collective bargaining could not cover the whole industry, and the only 
way to raise standards uniformly was to have it done by the government. Forcing 
high standards on a few employers at a time would drive those employers out of 
business before the rest of the industry could be effectively organized.
234
 
Liberal voices in the contemporary press adopted a similar position. The ed-
itorial board of the New Republic, for instance, wrote in support of FLSA: 
 
229. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. 
on Educ. & Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, Part 1, 75th Cong. 180-82 (1937) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937] (statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary 
of Labor); 81 CONG. REC. 7800 (1937) (statement of Sen. David Walsh); Marc Linder, The 
Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151, 161 & n.60 (1990). The 
need to shore up collective bargaining was apparent to the Administration; by this point, the 
NLRB was already under fire from conservatives, and President Roosevelt’s power was wan-
ing. ERNST, supra note 44, at 63, 75, 101-04; BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED 
STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at 168-69 (1983); PERKINS, supra note 203, at 256-61. 
230. 81 CONG. REC. 7652 (1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh). 
231. Id. at 7800. 
232. See PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 83, 89; PERKINS, supra note 203, at 258; Murray Edelman, New 
Deal Sensitivity to Labor Interests, in LABOR AND THE NEW DEAL 157, 188 (Milton Derber & Ed-
win Young eds., 1957); Samuel, supra note 128, at 35-36. 
233. See PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 83, 89; Forsythe, supra note 221, at 467; Samuel, supra note 128, 
at 32-34. All of the CIO unions favored higher rates and fewer exemptions. Notably, they did 
not favor tying minimum wage increases to the cost of living as they believed that would 
“forever shackle” labor to its current status. League Favors New Wage-Hour Measure, CIO 
NEWS, Apr. 9, 1938, at 2. 
234. PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 89; Forsythe, supra note 221, at 478. 
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[T]here are other industries and regions where, for one reason or an-
other, unions cannot make much headway, or severe competition pre-
vents localized advances, and where as a consequence the conditions of 
labor lag behind the general standards. It is desirable to aid the workers 
in these sweated industries for their own sakes.
235
 
FLSA had to be understood in conjunction with the Wagner Act, the New Re-
public editors continued, since real gains in wages and administration could only 
be made with strong labor organizations.
236
 The editorial board of the Nation 
similarly emphasized the relationship of the draft bill to collective bargaining, 
concluding that the AFL approach of keeping all labor relations private had been 
“discarded” and that “[t]he new labor movement recognizes that government 
has a useful function in providing the machinery for collective bargaining.”
237
 
FLSA’s procedural mechanisms reflected these commitments.
238
 From the 
beginning, the draft bill included tripartite committees of labor, business, and 
the public in order to engage affected parties in the governance process and to 
extend collective bargaining through employment law.
239
 Initially, tripartism 
was available on an optional basis; the first draft bill provided for an independent 
 
235. The New NRA, supra note 221, at 88-89. 
236. Id. at 89 (“More important still, the administration of the NRA proved again what the expe-
rience of other nations had shown, that real and permanent gains could be made only when 
labor organization was strong enough and well enough led to achieve good conditions and 
enforce them in practical administration.”). 
237. Ceiling and Floor, NATION, Dec. 11, 1937, at 632-33; see also A White Milestone for Labor, NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 22, 1938, at 174 (“Once again, the American people through their Congress 
have recognized a collective responsibility in regard to a matter heretofore considered a private 
and personal affair between worker and boss.”). 
238. Between the first draft of the Black-Connery bill in 1937 and the subsequent enactment of 
FLSA thirteen months later, Congress reworked the entire statute about ten times and its ad-
ministrative procedures at least five times. Forsythe, supra note 221, at 466, 475; see also 
PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 82-129 (providing a detailed description of FLSA’s legislative his-
tory and of the unexpected difficulties Roosevelt faced in passing the bill). 
239. See, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 7798-7800 (1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh); PAULSEN, supra note 26, 
at 84-86. Writing years later and reflecting on NIRA, Perkins explained her belief in including 
union leaders in administration: “Some industries had labor well organized. If they did not 
have large membership, at least they had a corps of thoughtful, competent people able to see 
better than any government economist what the terms of a code ought to be.” PERKINS, supra 
note 203, at 224. Perkins was influenced by Dorothy Sells, an expert in the British model, who 
argued that granting power to administrators alone was paternalistic; in Sells’s view, the pro-
cess of tripartite administration in Britain had helped promote collective bargaining, as well 
as industrial peace and compliance with law. See PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 84. See generally 
DOROTHY SELLS, BRITISH WAGE BOARDS: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1939) 
(providing background on Sells’s views on collective bargaining and wage boards). 
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board that could, in its discretion, appoint an advisory committee.
240
 But the 
debate soon pushed in favor of industry committees with greater power.
241
 Con-
gress ultimately settled on a mandatory tripartite system modeled on a New York 
statute that had been struck down in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo—one 
of the last of the Lochner Era cases.242 According to members of the conference 
committee, mandatory industry committees consisting of unions, business, and 
the public would serve as a democratic check on power delegated to the FLSA 
Administrator and would guard against arbitrariness in regulation.
243
 
 
240. Forsythe, supra note 221, at 466, 475. Subsequent drafts replaced the independent board as 
numerous senators expressed concern about so much power being granted to an independent 
administrative board. Id. at 475-76; see also, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 7793-94 (1937) (statement of 
Sen. William Borah) (“I have a very strong feeling that the employees of this country, who 
most need protection, will never see the proposed board, and the board will never see 
them . . . .”). AFL President William Green, who viewed the NLRB as too sympathetic to the 
CIO, drafted a letter announcing the bill had lost his support because of its use of an inde-
pendent board. Green Urges Halt on Wage-Hour Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1937, at 1. 
241. The AFL’s worries about an overempowered agency resulted in its support for mandatory 
committees. Forsythe, supra note 221, at 477. Ironically, Southern Democrats who opposed 
FLSA altogether also temporarily lent their support to mandatory committees, opining that 
they would be more democratic. Senator Walter George, for example, a conservative Demo-
crat from Georgia, argued that the advisory nature of the committee system was insufficient 
to render the scheme democratic; in his view, reports of an advisory committee were “imma-
terial . . . when it is written into the law that the board may reject the report of any advisory 
committee.” 81 CONG. REC. 7785 (1937) (statement of Sen. George). His critique of the advi-
sory committees did not indicate support for the bill, however. Senator George also opposed 
the bill on the ground that it gave government too much power to determine “life or death” 
of industry, and that it reached the agricultural industry despite purporting not to. Id. at 7785-
89. For accounts of widespread Southern opposition to FLSA, see Sean Farhang & Ira Katznel-
son, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 1, 14 (2005); and Robert K. Fleck, Democratic Opposition to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 25, 31-32 (2002). See also PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 139 (describ-
ing industry efforts to obtain exemptions). 
242. 298 U.S. 587 (1936); see S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 18 (1941). In Tipaldo, the Court had sug-
gested it might have upheld the New York law had the petitioners sought reversal of earlier 
precedent. 298 U.S. at 604-05. Just a year after Tipaldo, Adkins was overruled by West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), leading officials in the Roosevelt Administration to 
conclude that Chief Justice Hughes’s dissent in Tipaldo must “be accepted as the law of the 
land.” Joint Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, supra note 229, at 11 (statement of 
Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
243. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2738, at 31 (1938) (Conf. Rep.); see also 83 CONG. REC. 9163-64 (1938) 
(statement of Sen. Elbert Thomas) (describing reasoning of committee); Walter D. Murphy, 
Federal Legislation: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 27 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 (1939) (“This 
device was provided in order to protect employers and the public from arbitrary action by 
administrative officials and to remove any possibility of such action.”). Some members of the 
legal academy were skeptical of this argument. See, e.g., Z. Clark Dickinson, The Organization 
and Functioning of Industry Committees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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Unsurprisingly, industry groups like the Chamber of Commerce and con-
servatives in Congress vigorously opposed the goal of using FLSA to support a 
government-backed form of collective bargaining.
244
 Many in the business com-
munity still objected to the very notion of legislating wages, but more specifically 
they rejected the committee system. They argued it would create a morass of 
government bureaucracy
245
 and would be controlled by particular interests that 
could not possibly provide fair representation for all.
246
 
Conservatives also framed their arguments in constitutional terms, focusing 
on claims about impermissible bureaucracy, forced representation, and excessive 
 
PROBS. 353, 360 (1939) (“Although it is always the industry committee which proposes a wage 
order, the Administrator evidently has large indirect powers of initiative through his freedom 
of choice of committee men and his express power to reject the recommendations of any com-
mittee and to discharge that committee and appoint a new one for the same industry.”). So 
were some Republicans. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC. 9258 (1938) (statement of Rep. Fred Hartley) 
(referring to the Administrator as an “industrial dictator . . . because he will have the authority 
to appoint industry committees . . . . If their conclusions do not suit him, he can fire them and 
appoint a new one . . . .”). Notably, the debate centered on the extent to which the industry 
committees would check the Administrator’s power, not on how best to check arbitrary action. 
On that point, the industry committees were widely favored. 
244. PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 88. Some members of the business community, in light of the 
broader political climate, concluded that minimum wage legislation was inevitable and the 
goal was to minimize its reach. PERKINS, supra note 203, at 257 (describing the political climate 
and resignation of industry to the bill). Others, particularly Northern business groups, sup-
ported the bill, recognizing that it would help reduce competition from low-wage Southern 
industries. PAULSEN, supra note 26. 
245. Joint Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, supra note 229, at 144 (statement of Paul 
S. Hanway, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, National Fibre Can and Tube Association) (warn-
ing of “innumerable complaints and delays originated solely to continue the paid employment 
of [the industry committees’] multitudinous staffs”); 83 CONG. REC. 9258 (1938) (statement 
of Rep. William Lambertson) (expressing concern that the FLSA Administrator would create 
hundreds of industry committees); Dies Claims Votes to Beat Wage Bill by Recommittal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1937, at 1 (reporting that many House leaders worried about “a quick growth 
of a cumbersome government wage supervision through scores of [industry] committees”). 
246. Joint Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, supra note 229, at 144 (statement of Paul 
S. Hanway) (cautioning that “the scheme is bad. It lends itself to political pressure [and] it 
develops a type of pork-barrel regulation . . . . ”); 82 CONG. REC. 1586 (1937) (statement of 
Rep. Francis Case) (arguing that industry committees “will be bodies of partisans contesting 
for the interests of the persons on the committees”); 81 CONG. REC. 7723 (1937) (statement 
of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg) (urging members of the Senate to recall how code committees 
under NIRA were dominated by large corporations at the expense of small businesses). 
Southern conservatives in particular worried they would lack representation on the commit-
tees, and Southern Democrats acceded only once they had assurances that the core Southern 
industries, employing black laborers, would be exempt. Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 
241, at 14; Andrew Seltzer, Causes and Consequences of American Minimum Wage Legislation, 
1911-1947, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 376, 377 (1995). 
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delegation. At the time, their strategy made sense: the Court’s 1937 NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. decision to uphold the NLRA limited the salience of 
Commerce Clause and liberty-of-contract arguments.
247
 During legislative de-
bates, conservatives thus emphasized the similarities between FLSA’s industry 
committees and the two major pieces of tripartite New Deal legislation that had 
been struck down in Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal for violating the nondele-
gation and due process doctrines.
248
 Supporters of FLSA countered that industry 
committees would operate within narrow constraints established by statute, un-
like the committees at issue in Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, and that the 
proposed Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division at the Department of 
Labor would retain ultimate veto power.
249
 In short, tripartism could coexist 
 
247. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
248. The New York Times reported that many House leaders saw industry committees “as a step 
that would virtually revive the NRA system of codes as applying to wages and hours.” Dies 
Claims Votes to Beat Wage Bill by Recommittal, supra note 245, at 1. The Chicago Daily Tribune 
reported that the wage bill would “reestablish a large part of the machinery of the defunct 
NRA.” Arthur Sears Henning, Slam Lewis; Pass Wage Act, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 15, 1938, at 
1; see also Bernard Kilgore, Modified “NRA” Codes Proposed by House Group, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
8, 1937, at 1 (“[T]he whole proposal strongly resembles the old NRA code-making machin-
ery.”). Representative Robert Ramspeck, Democrat from Georgia, for example, repeatedly ar-
gued that industry committees existed “outside any department of the Government,” creating 
a situation  
similar to the Carter Coal case and to the code authorities under [the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act], that is, delegation of power to an agency not within the 
Government, not an official of the Government, or not an agent of the Government. 
This goes beyond the power of Congress to delegate its authority. 
82 CONG. REC. 1788 (1937) (statement of Rep. Ramspeck). This sentiment was widely shared 
among conservative members of the House. On more than one occasion Representative 
Ramspeck’s argument was met with applause. See, e.g., id. at 1498. 
249. Joint Hearings on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937, supra note 229, at 10-15 (statement of 
Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Att’y Gen.); 83 CONG. REC. 9263 (1938) (statement of Rep. 
Hamilton Fish). In an attempt to win over his conservative colleagues, Representative Ham-
ilton Fish noted that both the New York Times and “a conservative Republican paper,” the 
Boston Herald, were cautiously in favor of the conference committee’s bill. 83 CONG. REC. ,263 
(1938) (statement of Rep. Fish); see also id. at 7302 (statement of Rep. Ramspeck)(reading a 
statement made to the subcommittee by Benjamin Cohen, an advisor to the President); S. 
Harold Shefelman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: The Recent Congressional Enactment Per-
taining to Wages, Hours, and Child Labor, 14 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 66, 80 (1939) (“It is to 
be noted that Congress heeded the admonition of Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opin-
ion in the Schechter case by setting up standards and guides for the determinations of the 
Industry Committees and of the Administrator.”); Note, Constitutional Aspects of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 101 (1938). 
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with the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence, they successfully argued.
250
 Ulti-
mately, FLSA passed by a 291 to 89 vote in the House and a similar margin in the 
Senate, with the vote dividing more along North/South lines than Republi-
can/Democrat lines. President Roosevelt signed the bill into law on June 27, 
1938.
251
 
B. Wage Boards in Operation 
In its final version, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 empowered tripar-
tite negotiation on an industry-by-industry basis, within defined statutory lim-
its. The Act defined universally applicable minimum wage requirements and an 
upper bound above which minimum wages could not rise.
252
 But unlike the Act 
today, the enacted statute required a wage-and-hour administrator in the De-
partment of Labor to appoint industry committees comprised of representatives 
from labor, business, and the public to set wages.
253
 And unlike NIRA’s com-
mittees, the FLSA committees were tasked with a clear goal: they were to pro-
pose industry-specific minimum wage standards, which could be greater than 
the universal minimum but less than the upper bound.
254
 Also unlike under 
NIRA, big business did not have the upper hand—the committees were evenly 
divided among labor, business, and public representatives (who frequently sup-
ported labor). 
The industry committees’ task was thus substantially constrained by law—
to set wages above a minimum but below a maximum by October 1945, when 
the forty-cent minimum wage figure would take effect automatically.
255
 Yet 
 
250. Indeed, lawyers in the Roosevelt Administration had resisted the President’s calls to simplify 
the bill with just this challenge in mind. PERKINS, supra note 203, at 261; Forsythe, supra note 
221, at 467 n.21. 
251. PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 128-29; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat No. 13 (June 
24, 1938), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/june-24-1938 
-fireside-chat-13-purging-democratic-party [https://perma.cc/HAD7-3PNJ] (proclaiming 
that the law was perhaps “the most far-reaching, the most far-sighted program for the benefit 
of workers ever adopted here or in any other country”). 
252. Forsythe, supra note 221, at 478-97. 
253. Id. at 477. 
254. Id. 
255. Section 8(a) stated the policy of the Act to reach forty cents per hour in each sector “as rapidly 
as is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment,” and section 8(b) 
required the boards to “recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates 
for the industry which it determines, having due regard to economic and competitive condi-
tions, will not substantially curtail employment in the industry.” Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, ch. 676, § 8(a), (b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1064. 
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within these statutory limits, the tripartite committees had substantial authority. 
They were charged with making specific wage recommendations to the Admin-
istrator, who was then required to hold a public hearing and, as long as the rec-
ommendations were found to be in accordance with the statutory standards, was 
bound to adopt them.
256
 Only if the recommendations failed to comply with the 
statute could the Administrator request that the committee reconsider, or ap-
point a new committee to make a new recommendation; and even then, the Ad-
ministrator had no discretion to alter the committee proposal.
257
 
The reaction to FLSA fell along predictable political and class lines. CIO un-
ions and Progressives generally were disappointed with the final bill’s low wage 
rates and exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers, but they agreed that 
the bill was a significant victory.
258
 And despite the AFL’s earlier reluctance, the 
more conservative Federation vied with the CIO in claiming responsibility for 
the law’s passage.
259
 Meanwhile, business, particularly from the South, contin-
ued to voice staunch opposition to the bill generally and to the wage committees 
in particular.
260
 
1. Who Speaks for Whom? 
Against this background, the Department of Labor and its wage committees 
began their work. At first, Elmer Andrews, the newly appointed Administrator 
of the Department’s Wage and Hour Division, moved cautiously, appointing 
members to only seven industry committees by mid-June 1939.
261
 When pressed 
by the garment unions, however, he included the textile industry; he then turned 
 
256. Forsythe, supra note 221, at 482. 
257. Id. at 482-83. 
258. See, e.g., Ceiling and Floor, supra note 237, at 632. 
259. Samuel Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 368, 377 (1939); see also Labor’s Power Seen in Wage-Hour Victory, CIO 
NEWS, June 18, 1938, at 1; Labor’s Strength Wins Wage-Hour Bill Action: CIO Leads in Fight for 
Progressive Legislation, CIO NEWS, May 7, 1938, at 1; Predict Wage-Hour Bill Will Curb Sweat-
shops, Give Aid to Unions, CIO NEWS, June 18, 1938. 
260. See infra notes 289, 302-315, 319 and accompanying text. 
261. John W. Tait, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 192, 208-09 (1945); see 
also Elmer F. Andrews, The Tribulations of a Wage-Hour Administrator, 4 PUB. OPINION Q. 25, 
27-29 (1940) (describing the extensive process involved in establishing the first industry com-
mittee). 
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to tobacco, shoes, and hats, among others.
262
 By the end of 1940, twenty com-
mittees had been established, primarily in large low-wage industries.
263
 
Defining industries and ensuring fair representation—difficulties in any tri-
partite labor regime—presented a particular challenge for Andrews. The statute 
defined “industry” broadly as “a trade, business, industry, or branch thereof, or 
group of industries, in which individuals are gainfully employed.”
264
 It left the 
Administrator almost total discretion to enumerate the industries.
265
 Likewise, 
the Administrator was required to appoint employee, employer, and public 
members to the committees with “due regard to the geographical regions,” but 
otherwise he had full discretion as to how to choose members.
266
 Some worried 
that the discretion to define industries would result in a proliferation of commit-
tees, as in the case of NIRA, while the discretion to pick members would result 
in the committees becoming an arm of the Administrator.
267
 In practice, how-
ever, Andrews and his successors prioritized both efficiency and principles of 
democratic engagement. They defined industries broadly to limit the number of 
committees, thereby avoiding some of the pitfalls of NIRA, and they sought in-
put from stakeholders, as well as from economists, on the structure and scope of 
committees.
268
 They appointed employee and employer members based on the 
suggestions made by trade unions and industry associations, choosing repre-
sentatives with knowledge of and broad-based membership from the relevant 
 
262. PAULSEN, supra note 26, at 135; Harold November, Industry Committees Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 47 AM. FEDERATIONIST 271, 271 (1940). 
263. John I. Kolehmainen & John C. Shinn, Labor and Public Representation on Industry Committees, 
31 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 175, 176 (1941); see also S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 5 (1941) (describing 
establishment of ten committees as of February 12, 1940). 
264. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(h), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 203(h) (2018)). 
265. See id. §§ 5(a), (b), 8(a), 52 Stat. at 1062, 1064; S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 5-7; Elroy D. 
Golding, The Industry Committee Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 50 YALE L.J. 1141, 
1151 (1941). 
266. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 5(b), 52 Stat. at 1062; Dickinson, supra note 243, at 355-56. 
267. See S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 7 (describing how concerns regarding the experience of NIRA 
shaped the Administrator’s approach to industry definition); Dickinson, supra note 243, at 
360 (expressing concern that the law gave the Administrator too much power to shape the 
committees). 
268. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 7-8 (contrasting the FLSA and NIRA approaches); Andrews, supra 
note 261, at 27 (describing the decision to form larger industry committees based on econo-
mists’ advice and to solicit input from industry members). 
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workforce and industry.
269
 The existence of robust labor unions and organized 
business groups made this approach feasible. 
More specifically, on the employer side, Andrews sought to select members 
that would represent both a range of geographic interests and a range of industry 
segments; the more broadly defined industries thus resulted in larger commit-
tees.
270
 Still, employers, especially from the South, frequently charged that their 
interests were not represented.
271
 On the worker side, the Administrator chose 
representatives only from noncompany, democratic unions.
272
 But the deep ide-
ological and membership differences between the AFL, CIO, and unaffiliated in-
dependent unions meant that each union federation demanded representatives 
from its own leadership. The Administrator responded by choosing representa-
tives based on the proportion of membership that each organization could claim 
in a particular industry.
273
 Thus, in the absence of formal criteria, the Adminis-
trator fell back on an accepted democratic rationale: giving each union a say cor-
responding to its share of worker representation in the industry. Unions also 
pushed for influence throughout the new agency beyond the committees, with 
AFL President Green emphasizing that, to ensure “democratic” administration, 
the Administrator needed to have a staff “of seasoned experience in representing 
organized workers.”
274
 
 
269. Dickinson, supra note 243, at 356; Kolehmainen & Shinn, supra note 263, at 176-77; Arthur J. 
Riggs, The Administrative Process of Fixing Wages Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 14 
MISS. L.J. 369, 377-79 (1942). 
270. Andrews, supra note 261, at 28; Harry Weiss, Minimum Wage Fixing Under the United States 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 51 INT’L LAB. REV. 17, 25 (1945). 
271. See Andrews, supra note 261, at 27; see also infra notes 302-315, 319 and accompanying text. 
272. The Wagner Act prohibited employers from dominating or interfering with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization, or contributing financial or other support to it, end-
ing the widespread practice of employer-established company unions. National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2018); see Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domi-
nation in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 753, 798-824, 860-74 (1994). 
273. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 12; Andrews, supra note 261, at 28-29; Kolehmainen & Shinn, supra 
note 263, at 176. Out of the 123 employee-members from the first 20 industry committees, 61 
were affiliated with the AFL, 42 with the CIO, and 20 with independent unions. Kolehmainen 
& Shinn, supra note 263, at 176. For an illustration of the divide between the unions, see, for 
example, Shall Government Control Unionism, 45 AM. FEDERATIONIST 801, 801-02 (1938), 
which objects that the NLRB was giving too much access to the CIO and accuses the CIO of 
being a government-endorsed union. 
274. William Green, Representation a Democratic Right, 46 AM. FEDERATIONIST 1052, 1053 (1939); 
see also id. (“Labor experience is one of the groups of experience which should be included as 
a basis for administrative policies and that experience is gained only in the ranks of Labor. . . . 
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But what of unorganized workers? Though the statute did not require that 
those representing labor in the wage committees be union leaders, in practice, 
all employee representatives were chosen from unions. No unorganized workers 
were appointed.
275
 Some observers criticized this approach as unfair to unor-
ganized labor, whose interests would not be effectively represented.
276
 Labor’s 
response to the criticism was rooted in both pragmatism and principle. In its 
view, unions could adequately represent nonunion workers and selection of non-
union employee-members would, in any event, make little sense. The AFL’s 
newspaper, American Federationist, asserted: 
It is inconceivable that individual workers can be represented without 
organization. To represent means the authority and responsibility to act 
for workers in an industry . . . . For the Administrator to select an indi-
vidual worker from a plant and make him a member of an industry com-
mittee would be absurd. The person so selected would have neither abil-
ity nor authority to speak for anyone else but himself. One worker can 
represent many employees only through an organization of employ-
ees.
277
 
Unions may also have feared that allowing nonunion workers to serve would 
risk reviving the company unionism predominant before the enactment of the 
NLRA and banned by section 8(a)(2) of that statute.
278
 Unspoken in this debate, 
however, was the racially exclusionary nature of many AFL unions, as well as the 
fact that most unions were male dominated. Still, whether out of principled 
agreement or unwillingness to take on the unions, Elmer Andrews and successor 
Administrators accepted the union view.
279
 Most academic commentators, writ-
ing contemporaneously, agreed that unions were well suited to represent even 
unorganized workers.
280
 
 
Representation in administrative decisions is as essential to democracy as representation in 
legislative decisions.”). 
275. Golding, supra note 265, at 1157. This differs from the contemporaneous practice of the British 
wage boards, which included unorganized labor members. Weiss, supra note 171, at 34. 
276. Dickinson, supra note 243, at 364; Golding, supra note 265, at 1157; Virginia Grace Cook, The 
Administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act with Special Reference to Enforcement 287-
88 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author). 
277. November, supra note 262, at 279. 
278. Cf. Barenberg, supra note 272, at 798-824, 860-74 (discussing the history of section 8(a)(2)). 
279. Andrews, supra note 261, at 29. 
280. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 269, at 379. 
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Selecting representatives for the “public” seats proved even more challeng-
ing, with critics pointing out the difficulty of evaluating the merit of any partic-
ular selection.
281
 Initially, the Wage and Hour Division consulted with the NCL 
and other civic organizations to populate the industry committees.
282
 Later, the 
Division compiled a list of suggestions from a range of groups and individuals, 
and selected public members from this list;
283
 though increasingly, the Division 
turned to professors of economics.
284
 
2. Bargaining Versus Administration 
The industry committees’ operation was a mix between collective bargaining 
and administrative decision-making, blending democratic deliberation with 
technocratic analysis.
285
 The committees conducted fact finding and grounded 
their conclusions using the statutory criteria,
286
 while at the same time, the de-
cision-making emerged from compromise between business and labor with the 
public members acting as referees.
287
 For example, the first committee, repre-
senting much of the garment industry, met for over six months. Chaired by Don-
ald Nelson, the Vice President of Sears, Roebuck, it counted among its members 
Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and several 
leaders from AFL and CIO locals, as well as industry leaders from around the 
 
281. See Dickinson, supra note 243, at 356; Weiss, supra note 270, at 27-28. 
282. See Golding, supra note 265, at 1158; Weiss, supra note 270, at 28 n.1. 
283. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 12 (1941); Weiss, supra note 270, at 28. Employers and employees 
were not involved in the selection process except in one case. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 12-
13. 
284. See Weiss, supra note 270, at 28 (noting that, on average, “each public member served on two 
committees”). Out of the 123 public-member appointments to the first 20 industry commit-
tees, 59 were professors (35 of which were economics professors). By the conclusion of the 
industry-committee program, 314 out of 438 public-member appointments went to professors 
(204 of which were economics professors). Id. The remainder of the public-member appoint-
ments included lawyers, business executives, newspaper editors and publishers, social work-
ers, representatives of consumer or industrial organizations, and labor mediators. Id. 
285. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 18-19 (“Observers generally agree that the committee’s deliberative 
process is, in practice, little more than collective bargaining.”); see Murray Edelman, Interest 
Representation and Policy Choice in Labor Law Administration, 9 LAB. L.J. 218 (1958); Cook, supra 
note 276, at 308. 
286. Weiss, supra note 270, at 32-33, 41. 
287. Riggs, supra note 269, at 382; see S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 18-19; Golding, supra note 265, 
at 1177; cf. November, supra note 262, at 278 (noting similarities between the industry-com-
mittee process and collective bargaining). 
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country.
288
 The committee issued a comprehensive report filled with economic 
data. The report detailed problems in the industry that still resonate today, in-
cluding competition from abroad and the movement of capital from the orga-
nized and higher-wage North to the unorganized, low-wage South. Ultimately, 
the committee recommended a minimum wage for the whole industry of 32.5 
cents an hour. Southern members dissented in a separate report, objecting in 
particular to the committee’s treatment of the “cotton growing” states and their 
insufficient representation.
289
 
Consistent with the collective-bargaining approach, committees over time 
cut down the amount of evidentiary material that went into their reports,
 
provid-
ing only statements of reasons and minimal discussion of the evidence consid-
ered.
290
 Also in line with the nature of collective bargaining, proceedings in-
volved considerable disagreement and ultimate compromise.
291
 Many 
recommendations were approved unanimously,
292
 but only because the practice 
was to retake votes after preliminary polling revealed the minority had “no 
chance of changing the decision.”
293
 
 
288. INDUS. COMM. NO. 1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF INDUSTRY 
COMMITTEE NO. 1 FOR THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WAGE AND 
HOUR DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1939), reprinted in 1 Transcript 
of Record at 66, 74, Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of the Wage & Hour Div. of the Dep’t of 
Labor, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) (No. 330). 
289. INDUS. COMM. NO. 1, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STATEMENT OF THE MINORITY OF INDUSTRY COM-
MITTEE NO. 1 SUBMITTED TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
(1939), reprinted in 1 Transcript of Record, supra note 288, at 162, 164-65; see also KATHERINE 
RYE JEWELL, AS DEAD AS DIXIE: THE SOUTHERN STATES INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL AND THE END OF 
THE NEW SOUTH, 1933-1954, at 226 (2010). 
290. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 17; see, e.g., INDUS. COMM. NO. 15, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDUSTRY COMMITTEE NUMBER 15 FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
MINIMUM WAGE RATE IN THE EMBROIDERIES INDUSTRY TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WAGE 
AND HOUR DIVISION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 2-3 (1940). The entirety of the report sub-
mitted by the embroideries industry committee in September 1940 is three pages; by contrast, 
the textile industry committee’s report spanned sixty-one pages in the transcript of record of 
the Opp Cotton Mills case, in addition to thirty-three pages of appendices and sixty-one pages 
of minority statement. 
291. Weiss, supra note 270, at 36, 38. 
292. Of the 114 recommendations made by 71 committees, 73 were adopted unanimously; only a 
few committees had adopted their recommendations by a close vote. Id. at 37-38. 
293. Id. at 36. 
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Committee recommendations did not have the force of law until the Admin-
istrator approved them after a public hearing, but the scope of the Administra-
tor’s power during this process was limited.
294
 He could not alter a recommen-
dation; he could merely veto it, and only for failure to meet statutory standards. 
To be sure, the public hearings were taken seriously. They resembled traditional 
administrative hearings—quasi-judicial, often adversarial,
295
 with significant 
public comment over several days.
296
 Ultimately, however, the primary work was 
done by the committees, with executive officials taking a backseat. Indeed, the 
Administrator rejected only two committee recommendations during the life of 
the industry committees, reflecting the limited nature of his review.
297
 
The committees’ impact extended beyond minimum wage increases, func-
tioning to empower labor more broadly. Unions used the hearings to mobilize 
support for higher wages and to raise the profile of their organizations. They 
also took seriously their responsibility to represent nonunion workers, viewing 
the process as a way to undertake a form of collective bargaining for unrepre-
sented workplaces. The AFL’s newsletter exhorted that “[a]lthough high wage 
employers and public representatives frequently support labor’s demands, it is 
the job of the employee [union] members of the committee to get the majority 
of the committee to accept the facts and figures substantiating the highest min-
imum wage.”
298
 During the textile industry hearing, for example, union wit-
nesses provided extensive testimony about sweatshop conditions in unorganized 
shops, particularly in the South; they introduced comprehensive data; and they 
responded to employer objections at length.
299
 They emphasized the connection 
between minimum wages and collective bargaining. The Vice President of the 
Textile Workers Union explained that conditions in Southern mills made it im-
possible to organize: “There is one town in the south where they won’t let me 
come within 10 miles of the plant.”
300
 Southern employers responded to labor’s 
 
294. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 8(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1064-65. 
295. See Weiss, supra note 270, at 38; Comment, Wage Order Procedure Under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 35 ILL. L. REV. 840, 853 (1941). 
296. See Weiss, supra note 270, at 39; see also, e.g., J.C. Atchison, Apparel Pay Floor Draws Fire at 
Hearing, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Mar. 15, 1940, at 1, 6. 
297. See Weiss, supra note 270, at 39. One, from the jewelry industry committee, was rejected be-
cause the definitions of subclassifications adopted by the committee were “too confusing,” 
and the other, from the first apparel industry committee, because of “substantial overlapping” 
of subclassifications that were given different treatment by the committee. Id. 
298. November, supra note 262, at 272. 
299. See Lamar Q. Ball, Dixie Dialect Disappears at Andrews Textile Hearing, ATLANTA CONST., June 
28, 1939, at 1; see also November, supra note 262, at 276-77. 
300. Ball, supra note 299, at 1. 
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arguments with the same hostility they expressed toward unionization, warning 
of shuttered plants and unemployment if wages were raised.
301
 
In this way, the public hearings became a microcosm of broader debates 
about the role of labor and capital—and the role of race and national power—in 
the United States. Debate typically divided not only between employers and em-
ployees but also regionally, between North and South. The Atlanta Constitution 
evoked the Civil War in describing the textile hearings, and Southern governors 
testified against the recommended wage increases.
302
 At the shoe industry hear-
ing, representatives from a St. Louis manufacturing association clashed with the 
head of the New England Shoe and Leather Association. While the St. Louis 
businessmen complained that wage increases would increase unemployment, 
the Boston businessman asked whether “chiselers” should be able to jeopardize 
legitimate members of the industry.
303
 Other hearings showed divisions between 
high-road and low-road employers within a single region. William Dubin, of the 
New Jersey Washable Dress Contractor’s Association, testified that “chiselers 
and law-evaders in small towns located throughout Massachusetts, Rhode Is-
land, New Jersey and Pennsylvania” were forcing law-abiding companies out of 
business.
304
 In short, for both FLSA’s supporters and its detractors, the wage 
committees symbolized the national government’s effort to extend labor rights 
to low-wage, immigrant industries in the North and, even more controversially, 
to limit (albeit only partially) the ability of Southern industry to gain advantage 
using a system of exploited labor and racial hierarchy. 
3. Constitutional Challenge 
Low-wage and Southern employers, who registered their dissent throughout 
the industry-committee and hearing processes, also challenged the regime in 
court.
305
 Invoking previously successful arguments from the Lochner Era, they 
 
301. See id. 
302. Id. (invoking the Confederacy, describing how union witnesses painted a “tragic picture of 
how northern unions are suffering” with Northern capital taking advantage of low wages in 
the South, and detailing Southern response); see also 40-Cent Shoe Wage Minimum Recom-
mended, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Aug. 26, 1941, at 1; Atchison, supra note 296, at 1; J.C. 
Atchison, Differential Argued at Shoe Wage Hearing, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 29, 1939, at 
1; Sharp Conflicts at Wage Hearing, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Dec. 15, 1939, at 16. 
303. Sharp Conflicts at Wage Hearing, supra note 302, at 16. 
304. J.C. Atchison, Apparel Wage Categories Again Debated, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Mar. 14, 1940, 
at 1. 
305. See Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 241; Richard S. Salant, 49 YALE L.J. 1140, 1141 (1940) 
(reviewing SELLS, supra note 239). Opposition was not limited to FLSA; employers brought 
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charged that FLSA violated their liberty-of-contract rights and exceeded Con-
gress’s commerce power.
 
As is well known, those arguments were roundly re-
jected in United States v. Darby.306 FLSA’s wage-and-hour provisions, the Court 
held, were within Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and consistent 
with the Fifth and Tenth Amendments.
307
 
Employers also framed their objections in rule-of-law terms, targeting the 
Administrator’s considerable discretion. They challenged in particular the in-
dustry-committee system, objecting to the wage-board process of representation 
and negotiation. In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage & Hour 
Division, for example, a Southern cotton mill employer argued that the wage-
board system unconstitutionally delegated legislative power.
308
 Further, the em-
ployer charged both that the tripartite system was insufficiently representative 
and that the procedures were insufficiently judicial to guarantee due process.
309
 
The Court rejected these claims, upholding the wage-committee procedure 
without dissent. The statute, the Court concluded, adequately cabined the dis-
cretion of the wage boards and the Administrator. After all, the system estab-
lished a clear policy to reach a certain wage within each sector by a certain date, 
and it required the committees to recommend the highest possible minimum 
wage rate that would not substantially curtail employment in the industry.
310
 
Moreover, due process, the Court reasoned, did not require that the industry 
committee conduct a judicial-like hearing, especially given that the Administra-
tor was subsequently required to hold a public hearing.
311
 Nor did it require that 
employers have representatives of their choosing on the wage board. As long as 
the Administrator had fairly chosen individuals to represent employer interests, 
process was adequate.
312
 
Employers’ objections to the wage-committee procedure fared no better in 
the lower courts. In a series of cases, judges deferred to the wage boards’ deci-
sion-making processes. For example, in Andree & Seedman, Inc. v. Administrator 
 
countless challenges to the NLRA. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of 
the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 549-67 (describing changes in doctrine in re-
sponse to employer resistance); Klare, supra note 48, at 286-87, 292-93, 301-10, 322-25, 327-
34, 337 (detailing employer resistance to the NLRA and how the Court responded by curtail-
ing worker rights). 
306. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
307. Id. 
308. 312 U.S. 126, 142 (1941). 
309. Id. 
310. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 8(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1064. 
311. See Opp Cotton Mills, 312 U.S. at 152-53. 
312. See id. at 150. 
an american approach to social democracy 
677 
of the Wage & Hour Division, petitioners challenged the legality of industry com-
mittees on the grounds that they were not properly representative and did not 
adequately follow rules regarding witnesses.
313
 The court rejected both claims, 
giving great deference to the agency’s construction of the committees and hold-
ing that the statute required neither the committees nor the Administrator to 
consider all relevant evidence, so long as they considered the economic, compet-
itive, and employment factors prior to making a finding.
314
 Other lower courts 
similarly rejected challenges to the construction of the committees and to the 
scope of their procedures.
315
 
Commentators were conscious of the effect of court decisions on tripartism. 
They divided, for example, on whether Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling was a victory or 
defeat for the industry committees.
316
 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld 
against employer challenge the Wage and Hour Administrator’s authority under 
FLSA to prohibit industrial homework in the embroideries industry—i.e., gar-
ment work performed in the worker’s own home—without an industry commit-
tee having expressly recommended such a rule.
317
 Some argued that this move 
weakened the authority of the industry committees by effectively authorizing the 
Administrator to rewrite a wage order without submitting it to committee re-
view.
318
 Other observers disagreed, emphasizing that the Court’s ruling was so-
licitous of the committees. The conditions in the industry, one Harvard Law Re-
view writer opined, “would have made the committee more rather than less 
willing to recommend a forty-cent minimum wage, at that time a rather high 
minimum wage for the industry.”
319
 The defenders’ view tracked that of the 
Court’s. Ultimately, while Gemsco may have presaged employment law’s subse-
quent turn to technocracy over popular control, the Court in Gemsco sought to 
make the committees’ work effective and to further the statute’s ultimate goal of 
raising wages. Noting that homework was integral to the embroideries industry, 
the Court explained that the Administrator’s intervention was merely ensuring 
 
313. 122 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
314. See id. at 636-37. 
315. See S. Garment Mfrs. Ass’n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Nat’l Ass’n of Wool 
Mfrs. v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
316. 324 U.S. 244 (1945). 
317. See Cook, supra note 276, at 279. 
318. Id. 
319. E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 
321, 350 (1946). 
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the efficacy of the committees’ rates and guarding against circumvention of the 
statute.
320
 
4. Efficiency and Stability 
In the end, all seventy of the industry committees established between 1938 
and 1941 recommended a forty-cent minimum—and the wage orders covered 
twenty-one million workers.
321
 The last industry committee was appointed in 
September 1943,
322
 and the last wage order for a forty-cent minimum went into 
effect in July 1944,
323
 more than a year before October 1945, when the forty-cent 
minimum wage figure would have taken effect automatically.
324
 
Liberal commentators and academic observers were generally positive in 
their assessments of the wage committees. Some complained that the collective-
bargaining approach meant that the committees’ progress was “slow and halt-
ing.”
325
 The process, these critics lamented, was led by amateurs with opposing 
viewpoints, rather than by experts.
326
 Yet because the industry committees’ de-
liberation was a mix between collective bargaining and administrative delibera-
tion, the detractors’ arguments gained little traction. One measure of success was 
the timeliness of the committees’ actions and the scope of the ultimate coverage. 
The universal minimum wage of forty cents an hour was achieved almost two 
years before the date it would have become effective automatically, and, for many 
 
320. 324 U.S. at 257-59, 263. 
321. WAGE & HOUR & PUB. CONTRACTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS IN 
WARTIME: ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1944) [hereinafter WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 ANNUAL 
REPORT]; Weiss, supra note 270, at 18, 21. 
322. Weiss, supra note 270, at 23. 
323. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 321, at 21. 
324. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018)); see also WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 321, at 20; Weiss, supra note 270, at 18. 
325. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 18 (1941). 
326. Id. at 19 (collecting criticisms and responding); cf. Salant, supra note 305, at 1141-42 (ques-
tioning whether the amateur behavior of the representatives was surprising and emphasizing 
that the lack of representatives’ objectivity and diligence was inevitable given the structure of 
the committees). 
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industries, the increase was established at a much earlier date.
327
 The wage or-
ders directly raised wages for approximately 2.7 million workers
328
 and had an 
indirect effect on workers who earned a wage above the ordered minimum.
329 
“Never before,” wrote a Columbia University graduate student in 1949, “had 
the wage order technique been used in a country in which industries were so 
large, so diverse, and scattered over so vast an area.”
330
 Notably, the orders cov-
ered approximately the same number of workers (twenty-one million) as the 
scheme under the NRA, which required around five hundred and fifty industry 
codes.
331
 In addition, while the British wage boards took an average of two years 
between their first meetings and the effective dates of recommendation, it took 
the fifteen earliest industry committees only about one year to order raises and 
the later committees between six and eight months.
332
 
Commentators in the academy and the legal profession celebrated the indus-
try committees not only for their efficacy in raising wages, but also for their abil-
ity to advance industrial democracy and stability—a product of the boards’ hy-
brid technocratic and participatory approach. According to a Justice Department 
report, the committee device was widely considered by contemporaries to be 
“flexibl[e],” “careful,” and “democratic,” facilitating participation of those most 
affected, while also ensuring a role for experts.
333
 One contemporary described 
the alternative system of “wage fixation by administrative officials unchecked by 
the action of industry committees” as “undesirable.” Writing in the Yale Law 
Journal, he concluded: “The road to stable industrial democracy is in the long 
run traversed, not by excluding from industrial government persons whose in-
terests are affected, but by educating them to assume governmental responsibil-
ity.”
334
 
 
327. Weiss, supra note 270, at 18. 
328. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 321, at 20; Weiss, supra note 270, 
at 45. Approximately 1.6 million workers received wage increases at the time the forty-cent 
wage orders went into effect. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
321, at 20; Weiss, supra note 270, at 46. 
329. Weiss, supra note 270, at 46. For example, the Wage and Hour Division estimated in 1941 that 
the minimum wage orders for the hosiery industry (requiring a 32.5-cent minimum) contrib-
uted to a 9.3 percent increase of the average wage (from 38.6 cents to 42.4 cents). The Division 
observed similar effects in the cotton-goods industry as well. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 1944 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 321, at 22-24, 35-36. 
330. Cook, supra note 276, at 323. 
331. Weiss, supra note 270, at 24; see also Cook, supra note 276, at 323. 
332. Weiss, supra note 270, at 43-44. 
333. S. DOC. NO. 77-10, pt. 1, at 18 (1941). 
334. Golding, supra note 265, at 1179. 
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5. Union Growth and a “Decency Standard of Living” 
Union interaction with the boards was complex. Unions were often frus-
trated with aspects of the committee system, complaining that the process was 
too slow; that the wages ultimately ordered, as cabined by statute, were too low; 
and that too many workers were excluded.
335
 At the same time, they vigorously 
backed the industry-committee process, recognizing that increasing wages de-
pended on their active involvement and “militant support.”
336
 Moreover, almost 
immediately, the unions came to exploit the wage boards and FLSA more gener-
ally as a means of enhancing workers’ collective power—a synergy that helped 
to shape an intertwined system of labor and employment law. 
For example, despite its initial criticism, the AFL developed strategies to 
marshal FLSA and the wage boards in support of its organizing campaigns. It 
prepared detailed interpretative bulletins explaining the rights FLSA conferred 
upon employees.
337
 In the American Federationist, AFL President William Green 
wrote several columns in which he emphasized that wage boards were a reason 
that unorganized workers should join unions. The unorganized, he emphasized, 
had no access to knowledge about FLSA and could not make the statute function 
on their behalf; access to industry committees, effective use of their proceedings, 
and enforcement of their orders required the help of the union. Ultimately, 
Green concluded, FLSA was an instrument of unionism for it both required that 
workers organize in order to take full advantage of the statute and, combined 
with the Wagner Act, made organization “much more possible for all work-
ers.”
338
 
On the ground, local AFL union leaders who served on industry committees 
used the resulting orders to mobilize support for their unions and framed the 
enforcement of FLSA as a union responsibility. When the forty-cent minimum 
wage went into effect in the millinery industry, Max Zaritsky, President of the 
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International Union, commented: 
 
335. Boris Shishkin, Wage-Hour Administration from Labor’s Viewpoint, 29 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 63, 
63 (1939) (complaining that the progress in the work of the wage committees “has been slow 
and halting” and that “[t]here has been a tendency to arrive at wage recommendations blind-
folded by drawing lots rather than by careful weighing of all available facts”); see also Novem-
ber, supra note 262, at 277. 
336. Harold November, Enforcement of the Wage and Hour Law, 47 AM. FEDERATIONIST 144, 144 
(1940). 
337. Herman, supra note 259, at 385. 
338. Editorial, Wages and Hours Law, 45 AM. FEDERATIONIST 806, 806-07 (1938); accord Editorial, 
New Union Function, 45 AM. FEDERATIONIST 918, 918-19 (1938). 
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“It took seven long months of hard effort and bitter struggle to obtain this min-
imum. I consider the establishment of the 40-cent minimum one of the most 
significant gains of our organization and our people in recent years.”
339
 Zaritsky 
warned employers that the workers would not wait upon the government to en-
force the forty-cent minimum, but would themselves guard against employer 
violations. To members of the Union he said: “We must appoint ourselves en-
forcement agents, the law gives us that right and offers us the opportunity.”
340
 
Moreover, the forty-cent minimum wage spurred a new organizing drive among 
the Hatters. Union organizers visited homes of workers and “pointed out that 
for the enforcement of the order they must depend not only on the government 
whose facilities are limited, but upon a strong union which would see to it that 
there were no violations or that if there were violations, those guilty would be 
punished.”
341
 
The CIO was similarly aggressive in capitalizing on FLSA to promote organ-
izing. Its weekly newspaper regularly featured stories about FLSA and the wage 
boards.
342
 Local CIO unions created a system for educating workers about the 
wage orders and for enforcing them. They urged workers to submit any FLSA 
complaints through the union, emphasizing that such a method would trigger 
protections provided by section 7 of the NLRA;
343
 and they initiated wage re-
covery suits on behalf of large groups of employees.
344
 The CIO also organized 
 
339. November, supra note 262, at 276-77. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. See, e.g., 1,600,000 Gain Through Wage-Hour Act, CIO NEWS, Jan. 23, 1939, at 2; Andrews OKs 
Hosiery Wage Rates, CIO NEWS, Aug. 21, 1939, at 7; Ask Higher Textile Pay Base, CIO NEWS, 
Oct. 13, 1941, at 5; Lee Pressman, Fixing Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours, CIO NEWS, 
Aug. 13, 1938, at 7 (explaining in detail the new bill, including the operation of industry com-
mittees, in an article drafted by the CIO General Counsel). 
343. Herman, supra note 259, at 385; Henry C. Fleisher, Building “A Floor Under Wages”: Uncle Sam 
Makes Ready to Enforce Complex Pay-Hour Statute, CIO NEWS, Oct. 15, 1938, at 5 (“Unions 
should be on guard against employer efforts to disregard the terms of the law.”). 
344. Million Dollar Wage Suit Filed by CIO Steel Workers, CIO NEWS, Oct. 18, 1943, at 4 (describing 
a suit filed by the union under the wage-and-hour law and emphasizing role of the union in 
protecting workers’ rights under employment law); accord Miners Win Wage Hour Case, CIO 
NEWS, Apr. 7, 1941, at 3; Shoe Union to Sue Pay Law Chiselers, CIO NEWS, Jan. 20, 1941, at 2; 
see also MARC LINDER, “MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT”: OVERTIME AND THE DEREG-
ULATION OF WORKING HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 283 (2000) (noting 
that the CIO “may have viewed the mass filing of portal-pay suits as furnishing additional 
bargaining strength”); Bata Shoe Co. Faces New Wage-Hour Case, CIO NEWS, Mar. 25, 1940, 
at 2 (announcing that “following a complaint by the CIO United Show Workers,” the DOL 
took action to force compliance with FLSA by a company that practiced “wage slavery”). 
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picket lines and strikes to oppose violations of FLSA, focusing on notorious vio-
lators.
345
 
These efforts to capitalize on FLSA paid off. The unions experienced a period 
of rapid expansion during the period in which FLSA’s wage committees were in 
existence.
346
 To be sure, the tripartite committees were by no means the only, or 
even the primary, cause of the unions’ growth.
347
 But they were one piece of a 
broader legal and cultural landscape that encouraged organization among work-
ers and then gave those organizations a privileged position in the governing pro-
cess. Combined with the Wagner Act and the wartime labor boards, FLSA’s ad-
ministrative scheme made clear that employers would have to negotiate as equals 
with unions both in the marketplace and in government. In this way, FLSA and 
the NLRA together “provided the most hospitable climate ever fashioned in 
American history for trade unions and for decent enforceable conditions of em-
ployment.”
348
 
At the same time, the limitations of FLSA and the industry committees were 
substantial. In the years after passage, the CIO, its affiliate unions, and reform 
groups like the NCL campaigned to amend FLSA to cover exempt workers and 
raise its minimum wages, while also seeking state legislation.
349
 They sought to 
guarantee “that all American workers are entitled, in return for their labor, to at 
least a health-and-decency standard of living.”
350
 Resistance was fierce, in the 
committee hearings and in the courts. Southern employers routinely failed to 
comply with the law, while pressing Congress for amendments to curtail both 
 
345. See Herman, supra note 259, at 385 n.107; “Pecan King” Bows to CIO, Strikers Get $57,000 Raise, 
CIO NEWS, Oct. 27, 1941, at 6. 
346. See Lichtenstein, Corporatism to Collective Bargaining, supra note 30, at 122-23. During the two 
decades beginning with the New Deal, unions grew rapidly, with a peak annual growth rate 
in 1937 of 45%, and with most years exhibiting expansions in membership of between 4 and 
20%. In 1948, growth slowed to under 1%. See Irving Bernstein, The Growth of American Un-
ions, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 301, 303-04 tbl.I (1954); see also It’s NOT the Same Old South as CIO 
Makes a Stand in Dixie, CIO NEWS, Nov. 17, 1941, at 14-15 (describing successful organizing 
drives in the South). 
347. Maintenance of membership through dues check-off and union shops became the norm dur-
ing this period, representing key drivers of the increase in members. See LICHTENSTEIN, LA-
BOR’S WAR AT HOME, supra note 30, at 80-81. 
348. Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 241, at 2. 
349. See Louise Stitt, State Fair Labor Standards Legislation, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 454, 458 
(1939) (describing CIO-backed state legislation that would cover domestic and professional 
workers); CIO Resolutions Urge Security, Liberty, Peace, CIO NEWS, Nov. 25, 1940, at 2; Defend 
the Wage-Hour Law, CIO NEWS, Apr. 29, 1940, at 4; Hillman, Mrs. Norton Ask Consumers’ 
Support for Wage-Hour Law, CIO NEWS, Dec. 18, 1939, at 3. 
350. Defend the Wage-Hour Law, supra note 349, at 4. 
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FLSA and the NLRA.
351
 In a prescient speech delivered before a Farmer-Labor 
Party gathering in Duluth, Minnesota in August of 1941, CIO Legislative Direc-
tor John Jones warned: “No one can observe the legislative record of our times 
without recognizing that virtually all the gains won by labor through its trade 
unions may be taken away through repressive anti-labor legislation.”
352
 
C. Wartime Growth, Postwar Retrenchment, and the Emergence of 
Contemporary Workplace Administration 
Despite these difficulties, by the mid-1940s it looked like the United States 
might expand its system of labor tripartism beyond the limited scope of the wage 
boards and build a more social democratic economy. Wartime mobilization was 
a critical turning point. The 1937 “Roosevelt Recession” had increased unem-
ployment, weakening union organizing efforts and emboldening employers and 
local police to repress labor action. But the war brought an employment boom 
and the establishment of the new War Labor Board (WLB), which saw the ad-
vance of trade unionism as essential to the war effort. The WLB and other new 
wartime agencies forced employers to bargain with unions and consumers over 
national wage and economic policy, subject to administrative oversight. Indeed, 
the aggressive orders of the tripartite WLB went far beyond those of the FLSA 
industry committees, while other agencies, like the Office of Price Administra-
tion, engaged different constituencies on the goals of price stability.
353
 
Against this background, by 1945, American labor unions reached their his-
torical apogee. One in three nonagricultural workers were members of a union—
and organized labor increasingly functioned as a powerful social movement that 
 
351. See Farmers Hit Wage-Law Amendments, CIO NEWS, May 13, 1940, at 3; Labor & Politics, CIO 
NEWS, Aug. 25, 1941, at 4; Labor Girds for Wagner Act Test; Wage-Hour Law Saved, CIO NEWS, 
May 13, 1940, at 1; Labor Saves Wage Law, Girds for Defense of Wagner Act, CIO NEWS, May 13, 
1940, at 3. 
352. Labor & Politics, supra note 351. 
353. On the War Labor Board, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, A CONTEST OF IDEAS: CAPITAL, POLI-
TICS, AND LABOR 80-84 (2013); LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME, supra note 30, at 51-
53; LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 56, 63, 101-02; and Wachter, supra 
note 25, at 610-13. On the role of the government in this period more generally, see Meg Ja-
cobs, “How About Some Meat?”: The Office of Price Administration, Consumption Politics, and 
State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946, 84 J. AM. HIST. 910 (1997); and Theda Skocpol 
& Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal, 97 POL. 
SCI. Q. 255 (1982). As the history of wage boards indicates, however, tripartism in the United 
States was not simply a wartime phenomenon. 
the yale law journal 128:616  2019 
684 
reached far beyond its members.
354
 In the aftermath of the war, leaders like Wal-
ter Reuther of the United Auto Workers pushed for a more permanent social 
democratic system in which unions would be granted formal power to bargain 
over economic and social welfare policy.
355
 Meanwhile, black workers, with sup-
port from the CIO, continued to press for an expansion of labor rights to African 
Americans.
356
 
This success, however, was short-lived, due to opposition to tripartism from 
within the labor movement as well as from external forces. In particular, the AFL 
opposed making the WLB’s tripartism permanent, reviving its longstanding op-
position to state involvement in labor relations. This position also found support 
from business and conservative forces, particularly white Southerners hostile to 
the empowerment of black laborers, who successfully mobilized in opposition to 
existing labor rights. They sought to dismantle state-sponsored bargaining and 
to curtail workers’ rights more generally.
357
 Then, in 1947, Congress decisively 
changed the statutory and regulatory landscape by passing the Taft-Hartley Act 
over President Truman’s veto.
358
 No longer did federal policy favor concerted 
 
354. See LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 56, 63, 100-05. For more on the 
expansive political role of unions, see generally GEORGE LIPSITZ, RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT: LA-
BOR AND CULTURE IN THE 1940S (1994); THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, supra 
note 30; ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985 (1986); and 
ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO, 1935-1955 (1995). But see FRASER, supra note 129, at 441-94 (ex-
ploring Sidney Hillman’s largely sidelined role in FDR’s Administration by World War II). 
355. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 220-47, 270. 
356. See Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 241, at 7; Forbath, supra note 120, at 82-83; A Fake Min-
imum Wage, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1946, at 567; see also LEE, supra note 64, at 35-56 (de-
scribing legislative and NLRB efforts). 
357. See Lichtenstein, Corporatism to Collective Bargaining, supra note 30, at 134; see also JAMES A. 
GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 
IN TRANSITION 1937-1947, at 251-59 (1981) (describing the conditions that gave rise to Taft-
Hartley); TOMLINS, supra note 126, at 148-50 (describing divisions within the labor move-
ment, as well as opposition from the business community); Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 
241, at 6 (“Where southern members approved of policies in tandem with their nonsouthern 
Democratic colleagues, these policies became law; where they dissented, they could exercise a 
veto rejecting the modal policy positions of the Democratic Party.”); Forbath, supra note 120, 
at 83 (describing how “the Dixiecrats defeated the civil right to work with filibusters and the 
social right to work by gutting the administration’s bill in committee”); cf. LEE, supra note 64, 
at 56-78 (describing the first wave of right-to-work laws in the early 1940s). 
358. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2018) 
(amending the NLRA). On the passage of Taft-Hartley, see generally KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, IN-
VISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL 31-32 (2010); and 
ARCHIBALD COX, The Evolution of Labor-Management Relations, in LAW AND THE NATIONAL LA-
BOR POLICY 13-18 (1960). Labor historians disagree as to whether the Taft-Hartley Act was a 
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action and collective bargaining. Instead, it took on the voluntarist and privat-
ized orientation it maintains today, guaranteeing employees’ “full freedom” to 
refrain from engaging in union activity while only weakly protecting their right 
to engage in it.
359
 Moreover, the Act limited unions’ ability to effect power over 
the economy, channeling their activity to individual worksites and firms. For ex-
ample, the Act forbade unions from engaging in secondary boycotts, a practice 
wherein workers had successfully exerted economic pressure and won significant 
gains across industries by refusing to handle goods from firms where other 
workers were embroiled in a union dispute.
360
 In addition, courts came to inter-
pret the Act as permitting individual states to enact “right-to-work” laws.
361
 This 
key change weakened unions by creating a classic collective action problem in 
which workers could obtain the benefits of unionism without paying for it. More 
fundamentally, the embrace of right to work affirmed a position analogous to 
the one pressed by employers against the wage committees: that individuals have 
the right to object to, and exit from, representative bodies. 
 
codification and consolidation of preexisting legal restrictions or a turning point. See TOM-
LINS, supra note 126, at 250-51 (discussing the extent to which reorientation was present in 
prior NLRB and Supreme Court decisions); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor 
Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 763-65 (1998) (reviewing the debate). On the anticommunist 
campaigns that eventually culminated in the Taft-Hartley loyalty oath, see LANDON R.Y. 
STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT (2013). 
359. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
360. Id. § 158(b)(4); see also JULIUS GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS 90-100 (2016) (de-
tailing the law on secondary boycotts and picketing); Kate Andrias, The Fortification of Ine-
quality, 93 IND. L.J. 5, 12-15 (2018) (describing how the Court upheld the restrictions on sec-
ondary boycotts despite earlier precedent protecting workers’ right to picket). 
361. The law banned closed-shop provisions that require union membership as a condition of be-
ing hired. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Subsequent court decisions interpreted the Act also to permit 
laws prohibiting agreements under which unions obtain a “union security clause” obliging all 
employees to pay any fees as a requirement of employment. For reasons eloquently explained 
by Judge Wood, this statutory interpretation is questionable. See Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 
654, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the best reading of the stat-
ute is that it permits states to bar agreements that require nonmembers to pay the same dues 
and fees as members pay, and perhaps to pay anything more than the pro rata cost of activities 
“germane” to collective bargaining and contract administration); see also Brief of Law Profes-
sors Andrias, Estlund, Fisk, Lee & Weinrib as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants/Cross-
Appellees, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 139 v. Schimel, 863 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Nos. 16-3736, 16-3834), 2017 WL 468135, at *1 (arguing that “the NLRA broadly preempts 
state laws regulating union-management relations and provides the exclusive source of law 
governing the interpretation and validity of collective bargaining agreements”). At the same 
time, the law did not alter the union’s duty to represent all employees, even nonpayers. 29 
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b). 
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In the same year that it enacted Taft-Hartley, Congress also amended FLSA 
by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act.
362
 That Act is known for limiting suits seek-
ing pay for “off-the-clock” time, imposing a two-year statute of limitations for 
all FLSA claims and reducing available damages.
363
 But the Act was not only 
about limiting the ability of individual workers to obtain relief. Its proponents’ 
chief aim was to reduce collective litigation brought by the CIO on behalf of 
workers.
364
 This strategy proved successful: not only did it result in an overall 
decline in enforcement, but it also largely removed unions from the business of 
mass enforcement of statutory employment rights.
365
 
The resurgent hostility to labor affected FLSA’s industry committees as well, 
with Congress ending the system of tripartism in 1949. The original FLSA 
amendments sponsored by the Truman Administration at the beginning of the 
Eighty-First Congress would not have repealed the industry committees. Rather, 
the Administration urged using industry committees to establish higher indus-
try minimum rates, above and beyond a new floor of seventy-five cents an 
hour.
366
 Moreover, some congressmen urged an expansion of the committees’ 
powers, including authorizing them to set differentials for skilled workers.
367
 
Others sought to maintain the committees but give them more discretion, in-
cluding the power to reduce wages if economic conditions were to change.
368
 
Throughout the initial legislative debates, committees were generally discussed 
favorably,
369
 garnering support not only from administrative officials and un-
ions, but also from the NCL.
370
 
 
362. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262. 
363. Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 241, at 19. 
364. Id. at 21. 
365. In 1947, the last year before Portal-to-Portal rules came into effect, 3,772 enforcement actions 
were filed in federal court, the most in any single year before or since. After the amendments, 
the number of enforcement actions plummeted; in 1948, the number fell by seventy-two per-
cent to 1,062. During the decade following enactment the average annual number of suits filed 
was 754—a decline of some eighty percent from the high-water mark of 1947. See id. 
366. H.R. 2033, 81st Cong. (1949). 
367. Linder, supra note 42, at 69 n.72. 
368. H.R. REP. NO. 81-1453 (1949); H.R. REP. NO. 81-267 (1949); 95 CONG. REC. 11011 (statement 
of Rep. Brooks Hays). 
369. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 12553 (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender). 
370. Elizabeth Magee, Letter to the Editor, Seventy-Five Cent Minimum, WASH. POST, May 1, 1949, 
at B4 (letter from General Secretary of the National Consumer League supporting an increase 
in the minimum wage to $0.75 and praising the industry-committee role in the operation of 
FLSA); see also Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the Comm. 
on Educ. & Labor, 81st Cong. 15 (1949) (testimony of Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor); 
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Yet opposition predictably emerged, from Southern Democrats as well as 
from Republicans and industry representatives, setting the stage for the demise 
of tripartite representation. By this time, Southern Democrats had abandoned 
support for FLSA and the New Deal agenda, and Southern industry had crushed 
the CIO’s effort to organize workers in the South.
371
 The conservative coalition 
objected to any increase in the minimum wage, and it sought to exclude more 
businesses, particularly those employing black workers, from FLSA’s cover-
age.
372
 Soon it became clear that one way to win a wage increase would be to 
trade-off the industry committees.
373
 Divisions within the labor movement con-
tributed to the decision to take the deal. According to one commentator, “Had 
organized labor taken a stronger, more united position, perhaps it would have 
been possible to have obtained both a seventy-five cent minimum and the wage 
order procedure.” But “[t]he AFL preferred to rely on collective bargaining to 
raise wages above the seventy-five cent minimum.”
374
 This left the CIO alone in 
defending the committees, while still pushing for a higher minimum. 
 
id. at 87 (testimony of Harry Weiss, Director, Wage Determinations and Exemptions Branch); 
id. at 1680 (statement of Rep. Thomas Burke). 
371. See Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 241 (discussing role of Southern Democrats in opposing 
labor law legislation after the early years of the New Deal); see also BARBARA S. GRIFFITH, THE 
CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR: OPERATION DIXIE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE CIO (1988); F. RAY 
MARSHALL, LABOR IN THE SOUTH (1967). 
372. See, e.g., Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the Comm. on Educ. 
& Labor, supra note 370, at 87-88 (statement of Rep. Samuel McConnell); id. at 1138 (state-
ment of J. Raymond Tiffany, General Counsel, National Small Businessmen’s Association; 
General Counsel, Book Manufacturer’s Institute); id. at 1147-48 (testimony of Richard P. 
Doherty, Director, Employer-Employee Relations Department, National Association of 
Broadcasters); id. at 1428 (statement of Charles H. Merideth, Executive Vice President, In-
dustrial Association of Quincy, Ill.); see also Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1949: Hear-
ings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 81st Cong. 207 (1949) (statement 
of Carl B. Jansen, President, Dravo Corp.) (arguing that industry committees granted the 
Secretary too much power over raising or lowering wages). 
373. Cook, supra note 276, at 290-91; see also Retailers Win Concessions in New Wage Bill, WOMEN’S 
WEAR DAILY, Mar. 4, 1949, at 1; Robert F. Whitney, 75-Cent Base Wage in Danger in House, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1949, at 1. 
374. Cook, supra note 276, at 290-91; see also Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1949: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, supra note 372, at 100 (statement of 
Walter J. Mason, National Legislative Rep., American Federation of Labor); Amendments to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Hearings Before the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, supra note 
370, at 19 (statement of Rep. Graham Barden) (“I am just wondering if you are not stepping 
in here and throwing a tremendous stumbling block right in the way of collective bargaining, 
when you take an industry committee and give them jurisdiction over a particular field that 
we have . . . placed in the field of collective bargaining.”). 
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In the end, the proposal to expand the committees’ role was abandoned, and 
they were effectively abolished. Section 5 was rewritten to limit the function of 
industry committees to the recommendation of minimum wages for employees 
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, below the federal level.
375
 The result, con-
temporary observers concluded, ultimately harmed not only unions but also un-
organized workers, who “would probably have gained more by adoption of a 
sixty-five cent minimum and retention of the wage order procedure in [the] con-
tinental United States.”
376
 
* * * 
After the demise of FLSA’s industry committees, the dismantling of the war-
time boards, and the adoption of the other late-1940s reforms, workplace law 
slowly solidified into its current shape.
377
 Tripartite models persisted in a few 
sectors of the economy and in some states,
378
 but they disappeared from the core 
federal statutes. Labor law and employment law became more clearly separated. 
 
375. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 52 Stat. 1060; H.R. REP. NO. 
81-1453, at 17 (1949). At the same time, in a victory for FLSA’s supporters, the Administrator 
was given more power, including expanded enforcement power. For a discussion of the expe-
rience of wage boards in Puerto Rico, see MILES GALVIN, THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT 
IN PUERTO RICO (1979); and César F. Rosado Marzán, Dependent Unionism: Resource Mo-
bilization and Union Density in Puerto Rico 30, 44-47, 63-65, 71-78 (June 2005) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author). 
376. Cook, supra note 276, at 280. 
377. The retrenchment of a social democratic vision for FLSA and workplace law parallels devel-
opments in civil rights law and public benefits law. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 225, at 1-15 
(showing how, in the 1930s, the petitions of black agricultural workers in the American South 
and industrial workers across the nation, along with efforts of the DOJ Civil Rights Division, 
called for a civil rights law that would redress economic as well as legal inequalities, but how 
this vision was abandoned in the years leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), resulting in the contemporary understanding of civil rights); KLEIN, supra note 45, at 
4-5 (showing how “[i]n the 1930s and 1940s, trade unionists, leftists, African Americans” and 
others pushed for state-provided economic security programs, but how corporations eventu-
ally succeeded, in the post-World War II period, in severing connections between workers 
and the state); cf. LEE, supra note 64, at 81-114, 135-54 (showing how an integrated view of 
collective and individual rights was never fully abandoned). 
378. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 84-88 (discussing state wage boards); Kate Andrias, Social Bar-
gaining in States and Cities: Toward a More Egalitarian and Democratic Workplace Law, HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. ONLINE (2017), http://harvardlpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Andrias 
-Social.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S57-AVNR] [hereinafter Andrias, Social Bargaining]; supra 
notes 24, 30 and accompanying text (citing the examples of the tripartite war board and tri-
partism in particular industries). The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (2018), could 
be viewed as another example of a persistent form of government-facilitated collective bar-
gaining. 
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FLSA came to be regarded not as a way to extend the fruits of collective bargain-
ing, but rather as a separate regime among a patchwork of proliferating individ-
ual employment law statutes. Relatedly, the statute was no longer viewed as a 
critical piece of a broader egalitarian and collective program, but as a way to en-
sure bare minima on an individual basis—a much more modest goal. 
Unions continued to advocate for minimum wage increases and a host of 
other employment and social welfare reforms.
379
 And for several decades, due to 
their market power, unions were able to engage in pattern bargaining in certain 
industries, effectively forcing multiemployer agreements and influencing wages 
even for nonunion workplaces.
380
 But the law no longer granted worker organi-
zations formal power in wage setting for nonunionized workers.
381
 Increasingly, 
unions came to be understood as representing existing members at particular 
workplaces—not as leading social partners empowered to represent the interests 
of the working class more broadly.
382
 Meanwhile, union growth stalled in the 
face of unrelenting employer resistance, globalization, and the fissuring of the 
employment relationship, along with union complacency and, in some unions, 
corruption and discrimination; as a percentage of the workforce, union density 
declined.
383
 By the 1990s, workers’ collective power throughout the political 
economy was much diminished.
384
 
Although wage boards remained on the books in several states and in the 
U.S. territories, they largely fell into disuse.
385
 Where they were used, they did 
not involve quasi-bargaining between labor and business on a statewide basis, 
nor were they coupled with efforts to expand the membership of unions. Rather, 
they functioned much like other executive agencies, implementing the policy 
goals of the state’s chief executive, who appointed the swing vote to the 
boards.
386
 
 
379. See LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 30, at 185-86. 
380. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, soft sectoral bargaining persisted, in the form of “pattern 
bargaining,” in industries like auto and steel despite the absence of a legal regime mandating 
such activity. Id. at 126-28. 
381. See id. at 185-86. 
382. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 32-35; Klare, supra note 48, at 318-25. 
383. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 13-32 (discussing reasons for the decline of unions). Union den-
sity declined almost immediately after the 1940s reforms. See Bernstein, supra note 346, at 
302-08 (documenting the rise and fall of union density). 
384. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 96, at 27-28; ROSENFELD, supra note 9, at 170-81; Andrias, 
supra note 8, at 21-36. 
385. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 84-85 & n.446 (collecting state wage-board statutes and describ-
ing their use). 
386. Id. at 87. 
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Alongside changes in labor law and representation, there was a broader shift 
in administrative process away from the social democratic power sharing to 
which the FLSA industry committees aspired. Indeed, the enactment of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in 1946 was, in large part, a response to demands 
from the legal and business communities who objected to the government’s 
muscular intervention in the economy during the New Deal and World War 
II.
387
 By the end of the 1940s, administrative process had embraced the “rule of 
lawyers,” a commitment to due process, and judicial-like proceedings—in part 
to limit popular rule like that encouraged by the earlier workplace regime.
388
 
Over the next decades, various additional developments created the administra-
tive state as we know it today: agencies moved away from adjudication and to-
wards rulemaking; technocratic expertise became more important; multiple new 
procedural requirements restrained the ability of agencies to act and enhanced 
judicial review of their actions; and cost-benefit analysis became a critical com-
ponent of administration.
389
 Regardless of whether one views lawyers or tech-
nocrats as predominant in today’s system,
390
 the notion, articulated by Frances 
Perkins many years ago, that the best experts for determining labor policy are 
workers’ representatives and their employers, no longer finds great support in 
administrative process. 
 
387. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New 
Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession 
and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1131 (1997). 
388. See ERNST, supra note 44, at 125; JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE 5 
(2012) (emphasizing the extent to which legalism and fairness were tightly linked and arguing 
that the emphasis on law and procedure made administrative governance acceptable to Amer-
icans); Kessler, supra note 44, at 725, 757-58 (describing and critiquing Ernst); Stewart, supra 
note 77, at 1670-76 (describing statutory and procedural limitations on agency action). 
389. For a defense of the move toward the use of cost-benefit analysis in the Office of Information 
Regulatory Affairs, see, for example, Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: 
An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824, 873-76, 879-82 (2003); and Christo-
pher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1986). On the turn towards rulemaking, see GRISINGER, supra note 388, 
at 253-55; on the embrace of proceduralism, sometimes at the expense of efficacy, see Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of 
Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 420 (1996); and Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure 
Fetish (Oct. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
390. Lawyering remained important in later decades. Movements concerned about industry cap-
ture of government pressed for new forms of accountability through litigation, and they won 
new judicial constraints on the administrative state. See Paul Sabin, Environmental Law and 
the End of the New Deal Order, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 965, 968 (2015). Lawyers also continued 
to play a critical role in the technocratic apparatus. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 761. 
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Notions of democracy in administration also shifted dramatically. As then-
Professor Elena Kagan and others have demonstrated, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and continuing through subsequent decades, presidential control over admin-
istration increased considerably.
391
 Proponents defended the move as a means to 
achieve democratic accountability.
392
 On this account, because the President’s 
constituency is national, he or she can represent competing interests when de-
veloping regulatory policy.
393
 This is a very different conception of democracy in 
administration than the one that dominated during the era of the FLSA industry 
committees. The prevailing view today is that political accountability is main-
tained through open comment and presidential control—instead of through the 
direct involvement of select, but important, groups in the polity. 
To be sure, in the years after the demise of the industry committees, public 
participation in the administrative state remained important, but it occurred 
largely through expansion of, and reforms to, liberal pluralism. Increasingly, all 
citizens were invited to provide comments in the formulation of policy. The law 
no longer affirmatively granted worker organizations, or other civil society 
groups, a seat at the table, nor did it encourage their expansion.
394
 Meanwhile, 
as unions and other civil society organizations declined in strength, corporate 
political activity grew.
395
 As a result, business entities were increasingly able to 
capture, or at least dominate, the administrative process. 
 
391. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 6-7 (2011); Kagan, supra 
note 69, at 2246, 2272-2315; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Admin-
istration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing 
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 185 (1986); see 
also Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013) (describing 
presidential control over enforcement policy). 
392. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 69, at 2331-39 (arguing that presidential control over administra-
tion serves the goal of democratic accountability); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 391, at 3 
(“Some degree of presidential review of the regulatory process is probably necessary to pro-
mote political accountability . . . .”); cf. Andrias, supra note 391, at 1083 (discussing how pres-
idential control may or may not enhance accountability). 
393. See Croley, supra note 389, at 831 (describing the theory of presidential accountability). 
394. See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300, 
1308-10 (2016) (summarizing existing vectors for participation); Stewart, supra note 77, at 
1723-56 (describing how, during the 1960s, courts concluded that the right to participate in 
agency decision-making and to obtain judicial review should no longer be limited, as it had 
been under the traditional model, to regulated firms and extended these rights to the new 
public interest advocacy groups). 
395. See DRUTMAN, supra note 7, at 47-72; THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEM-
BERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 127-74 (2003). 
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Reformers responded with a range of tactics. They sought to insulate agen-
cies from capture through design and disclosure
396
 and to encourage citizen par-
ticipation through e-rulemaking and other mechanisms.
397
 Under the banner of 
“new governance” or “experimentalism,” they tried to engage citizens and asso-
ciations in policymaking through mechanisms of decentralized participation and 
experimentation.
398
 But unlike the early New Deal workplace regime, these con-
temporary approaches did not affirmatively seek to build associations of citizens 
as a means to redistribute power in the political economy.
399
 Moreover, market 
efficiency, rather than egalitarianism, tended to be the guiding philosophy, lead-
ing to increasing reliance on privatization as a governing strategy.
400
 Ultimately, 
by most scholars’ and public commentators’ estimations, the reforms did little 
to redistribute power in administrative governance away from dominant, 
wealthy interests.
401
 
 
396. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21-23 (2010) (discussing the relationship between capture and agency de-
sign); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 115-23 (2018) (argu-
ing that transparency was redirected from private entities to government in the 1960s-1970s). 
397. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (2011); Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets 
Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 677, 692. But cf. Cary Coglianese, Citizen Partic-
ipation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 948-49, 964-68 (2006) (ex-
pressing skepticism about the promise of e-rulemaking). 
398. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). Another response 
was the development of “negotiated rulemaking,” created in the 1990s but used successfully 
only a few times; it engaged representatives from regulated firms, trade associations, and cit-
izen groups in agency-established committees. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The 
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256-57 (1997); see also 
William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subver-
sion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1386 (1997); Peter H. Schuck & Steven Kochevar, 
Reg Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 417 (2014). 
399. See Coglianese, supra note 398, at 1257 (describing goals of negotiated rulemaking as “saving 
time and reducing litigation”). 
400. See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (2017). 
401. See Lisa T. Alexander, Reflections on Success and Failure in New Governance and the Role of the 
Lawyer, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 737, 739-40 (concluding that “many new governance experi-
ments . . . [have] fail[ed] to achieve th[eir] central normative objective of distributive jus-
tice”); Andrias, supra note 7 (detailing political science and law review studies). 
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iv.  industry committees:  constitutional viability,  worker 
power, and a new democracy 
In the end, the FLSA industry committees were at once remarkably success-
ful and fatefully limited at achieving the aim of the early twentieth-century Pro-
gressive reformers and unionists. Not surprisingly, the successes and failures re-
flect both the particular political conditions that produced FLSA and persistent 
challenges of power-sharing regimes. Understanding the extent to which the re-
gime succeeded in building worker power and rendering the economy more 
egalitarian and democratic—and the extent to which it did not—can help inform 
thinking about future reforms. 
A. Constitutional Viability 
The FLSA system survived judicial review because it struck a balance be-
tween modern administrative practice and alternative conceptions of fairness, 
expertise, and democracy advanced by reformers, Progressive theorists, and in-
dustrial unionists. According to some observers, there were functional ad-
vantages to this approach.
402
 By maintaining a decision-making role for the Ad-
ministrator, as well as providing a role for the general public and agency experts, 
the FLSA industry-committee system recognized the values of expertise, rule of 
law, and political accountability—even as it privileged the involvement of unions 
and business in negotiating standards. The advice of economic experts, the open 
public hearing, and the ultimate decision-making check provided by the Admin-
istrator limited the risk that the committee members would protect themselves 
at the expense of others in the industry or at the expense of the public, as NIRA 
boards were accused of doing.
403
 At the same time, granting unions and business 
a privileged seat at the table gave affected parties influence over the policy deci-
sions that shaped their lives. Worker and business leaders brought a particular 
form of concrete, day-to-day expertise to the decision-making process. They 
were able to engage in that process in a more deliberative and sustained way than 
would have been permitted had the statute provided only a public hearing or 
open comment process. The tripartite approach also strengthened the position 
of unions in society and may have facilitated industrial peace and cooperation. 
On the other hand, FLSA’s mixed approach, designed to comply with con-
stitutional limitations, meant that the committees fell short of reformers’ most 
ambitious goals. Final authority rested with government officials, not with 
 
402. See supra Section III.B.4 (discussing commentary at time of industry-committee operation). 
403. See supra notes 202-204, 248-290, 294-297. 
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worker organizations themselves. The role of the Administrator and the ap-
pointed public representatives meant that, had the system continued, the parti-
san flip-flop that characterizes many administrative agencies, including the 
NLRB, could have plagued the committee system as well.
404
 Still, under the pri-
vate nondelegation doctrine that has governed since the New Deal, the decision 
to vest final decision-making authority in executive branch officials and to limit 
the role of private actors was essential to enable the committees to survive con-
stitutional review.
405
 
Another constitutional requirement—the existence of an “intelligible princi-
ple” to guide and cabin the decision-making of the executive
406
—more obviously 
advanced Progressive goals. The clear statutory charge to the committees was to 
raise worker wages as high as possible without substantially curtailing employ-
ment in an industry—not a more contestable and amorphous goal like promot-
ing efficiency in industry, overall wealth maximization, or even labor peace. The 
statute also required the committees to achieve the goal by a certain date and 
within a statutorily prescribed range.
407
 This unambiguous mandate distin-
guished the FLSA committees from NIRA for constitutional purposes, and it 
helped minimize conflict and achieve statutorily intended outcomes.
408
 To be 
sure, class and regional conflict persisted: business opposition remained high 
throughout the industry committees’ existence, particularly from Southern em-
ployers. The companies that unsuccessfully pressed their arguments in the 
 
404. But see infra Sections IV.B and IV.C for a discussion of how the combination of tripartite struc-
tures with robust organizing and concerted action rights minimized partisan control and en-
abled more fulsome democratic engagement. 
405. In the late 1930s, in addition to upholding the FLSA industry committees, see supra notes 308-
312 and accompanying text, the Court upheld several other administrative schemes that re-
quired participation and consent by affected organizations and parties. See Sunshine Anthra-
cite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388 (1940) (upholding a scheme under which boards 
comprised of coal producers would propose fixed prices to a government agency, the National 
Bituminous Coal Commission, which could “approve[], disapprove[], or modif[y]” those 
proposals); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (upholding 
a statutory scheme that required the two-thirds approval of milk producers before the Secre-
tary of Agriculture could fix milk prices); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6, 15-16 (1939) (up-
holding a statute that required the approval of two-thirds of tobacco growers before the stand-
ard for tobacco sales imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture would take effect). 
406. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). 
407. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
408. Harry Weiss, The Enforcement of Federal Wage and Hour Regulations, 43 AM. FEDERATIONIST 
930, 937 (1936) (discussing the failure of NIRA and opining that “[i]t is imperative that future 
wage and hour regulations be written simply and clearly”). 
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courts ultimately succeeded in dismantling the committees in Congress.
409
 But 
despite the persistent opposition, during the committees’ short lifetime, they 
functioned with clear goals—raising wages in a timely fashion—and achieved 
them. 
At the same time, the particular intelligible principle chosen meant that FLSA 
industry committees were constrained in their ability to achieve a more egalitar-
ian economic regime. They negotiated only about minimum wages, without ju-
risdiction over hours, working conditions, health care, vacation time, sick time, 
family leave, or other social welfare policies. In addition, FLSA imposed a statu-
tory ceiling on the wage increases the committees could recommend. This de-
fined scope was necessary to obtain enough Southern and Republican support 
to win passage of the Act and helped assuage the AFL’s concern that the law not 
displace private bargaining. But a more redistributive statutory mandate, so long 
as it was clearly defined, could have better advanced the ambitious goals of re-
formers like John Dewey, John Commons, Frances Kelley, and the more progres-
sive unions of the CIO.
410
 
B. Formalizing Labor Power 
The industry committees were also successful in helping build labor’s power 
in the political economy, albeit less so than the more radical Progressives and 
industrial unionists had desired. The committee work occurred at the same time 
as massive industrial organizing drives and successful strikes, protected by the 
NLRA. The two regimes were interdependent. Unions used the FLSA structure 
to aid their organizing and strike efforts. They invoked the industry committees 
to legitimize their organizations and engaged in strikes to protest violations of 
FLSA. They also used the process to gain more power in administration, sitting 
down as equals with some of the largest companies in the United States.
411
 This 
redistribution of power was short-lived due to limitations imposed by the Taft-
Hartley Act (which proved nearly fatal to unions over time), the repeal of the 
committees themselves, and long-term, aggressive resistance by business. But 
for a time, the combination of administrative power sharing and labor organiz-
 
409. See supra Section III.B.3. 
410. See Kaufman, supra note 42. For examples of the broad scope of some European tripartite 
models, see SWENSON, supra note 111; THELEN, supra note 111; and Andrias, supra note 8, at 
35. 
411. See supra Section III.B. 
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ing substantially increased worker wages while suggesting the possibility of a 
fundamental redistribution of power in both politics and the economy.
412
 
That FLSA’s industry committees existed alongside and operated synergis-
tically with the NLRA’s union-organizing protections distinguished the regime 
from the liberal pluralistic approach that eventually replaced it. As Dewey 
pointed out, simply allowing existing organizations to participate in administra-
tion, even pursuant to a broad statutory mandate, does not change the underly-
ing power dynamics.
413
 Interest-group pluralism, without a mechanism for 
building organizational strength, is unlikely to equalize the playing field: “[I]t is 
difficult to see how even occasional intervening action of the general public is to 
be made effective . . . until the group activities upon which it is to operate are 
better organized and more open to recognition.”
414
 In contrast, taken together, 
the NLRA and FLSA’s industry committees offered more than a means to par-
ticipate on already uneven territory. They encouraged new organization among 
workers and facilitated those organizations’ ability to exercise power in the de-
mocracy. The mixed system also helped distinguish the regime from subsequent 
state-level tripartism that was controlled by the partisan executive. Because 
FLSA’s tripartite deliberations operated with broad-based union and business 
participation and occurred against the background of significant worker organ-
izing and strike activity, no single executive-picked committee member could 
play a decisive role. 
Still, Dewey worried that tripartite systems enacted in the early twentieth 
century were not accompanied by sufficient changes in the background common 
law rights of employers and employees, or in the ownership of capital, and there-
fore would not fundamentally change the character of the American economy or 
democracy.
415
 His concern ultimately proved prescient both at the federal level, 
where the FLSA experiment was narrow and short-lived, and at the state level, 
 
412. Indeed, the experience of other localities, including Puerto Rico, supports the view that wage 
boards, if accompanied by reforms that encourage organization and permit collective action, 
can facilitate a broader redistribution of power in the economy. See GALVIN, supra note 375; 
Marzán, supra note 375, at 30, 44-47, 50-51, 63-65, 71-78 (discussing the Puerto Rico minimum 
wage laws, which established a wage board and ultimately stated that the public policy of the 
Commonwealth was to support collective bargaining and examining the relationship between 
the board and union organizing efforts). Experience with broader tripartite regimes in Europe 
and elsewhere supports this account as well. See THELEN, supra note 111; Albin, supra note 111. 
413. John Dewey, Practical Democracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1925, at 52, 53. 
414. Id. (critiquing Walter Lippman). 
415. WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 440-41, 452. Dewey came to urge more fundamental reforms, 
including nationalization of major industries and changes to property entitlements. BRAND 
supra note 130, at 52; WESTBROOK, supra note 138, at 452. 
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where tripartism’s redistributive scope has been minimal and has depended al-
most entirely on the ideological commitments of the given executive.
416
 Once the 
rights to organize and to strike were curtailed, the state’s affirmative encourage-
ment of unionization eliminated, and a market efficiency approach to regulation 
adopted, the remaining tripartite systems no longer operated to build worker 
power. Rather, they functioned much like any other executive administrative 
agency. 
Moreover, the scope of the reforms was too narrow in another, related way: 
industries dominated by African American and female workers were excluded. 
These exemptions reflected not only Southern opposition, but also conservative 
impulses among some Progressives and labor-movement leaders as well.
417
 Ul-
timately the exclusions inhibited FLSA’s ability to further an egalitarian political 
economy for all workers and helped to perpetuate racial and gender segmenta-
tion that persists in the labor market today.
418
 Had the CIO and the more radical 
Progressives prevailed in broadening the scope of FLSA’s coverage, expanding 
its egalitarian mission, and achieving other reforms in the background rights of 
capital and labor, a different picture of labor power might have emerged. 
C. Building Democracy 
From the perspective of creating new mechanisms for democracy, FLSA’s in-
dustry committees were again successful, but temporarily and partially so. The 
industry-committee process involved both union leaders and ordinary workers 
in governmental processes. Workers testified in great numbers, engaged their 
employers and other employers in deliberation and debate about proper wage 
 
416. For example, California’s state wage board is empowered to negotiate over a range of topics, 
but its agenda and the extent of its egalitarian impulses have depended almost entirely on the 
political party of the Governor, who appoints its members. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70, 70.1 (West 
2011); see also Marjorie Fochtman, From the Experts: Will the Revival of California’s Industrial 
Welfare Commission Reduce the Explosion of Wage and Hour Litigation for California Employers?, 
HR DAILY ADVISOR (Mar. 1, 2007), http://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2007/03/01/from-the 
-experts-will-the-revival-of-california-s-industrial-welfare-commission-reduce-the 
-explosion-of-wage-and-hour-litigation-for-california-employers [https://perma.cc/7EBP 
-LBWV]. 
417. See supra notes 36, 126, 141, 241, 246, 289, 302-305 and accompanying text. 
418. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. So too, independent contractors and other less tra-
ditional workers were exempt, enabling employers to structure operations in ways that still 
leave large numbers of workers unprotected by wage-and-hour and collective-bargaining law. 
See David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (July 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/lots-of-employees-get-misclassified-as 
-contractors-heres-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/G6CU-FLL7]. 
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rates, and made use of the administrative processes as a collective. They practiced 
democracy from the ground up, beyond the franchise, much in the way that 
Dewey, Commons, and others had theorized. 
The mechanics of such democratic practice presented a number of chal-
lenges, however. One persistent difficulty of administrative power-sharing ar-
rangements is that governmental empowerment of associations and organiza-
tions can render representation too static. The law may not evolve to reflect 
actual interests and evolving organizations but rather may empower bureaucra-
cies that become unrepresentative and antidemocratic. Power sharing can thus 
entrench the power of established organizations at the expense of weaker inter-
ests, leaving, for example, minority or immigrant workers unrepresented. An-
other concern is that groups empowered by the government to bargain nation-
ally can be co-opted by the government, becoming unrepresentative of their 
members, insufficiently militant, or simply unconcerned with more local issues. 
All of these concerns might render participation rights purely nominal, carrying 
little real power to influence outcomes.
419
 
The FLSA wage boards attempted to answer these challenges by pairing ad-
ministrative wage bargaining with mechanisms oriented to the enterprise level: 
the Wagner Act’s protection of organizing and collective bargaining at the firm 
level. The combination of social bargaining and energetic firm-based bargaining 
permitted local activity that provided a more accessible forum for employee par-
ticipation and gave workers power to bargain over the vast array of issues they 
faced locally.
420
 And, for a time, the government’s active endorsement of unions 
helped enable organizing drives in unorganized workplaces that expanded the 
reach of participating organizations, engaged workers in their local organiza-
tions, and, in turn, rendered the tripartite system more representative. Thus, ad-
ministrative participation came with real economic power, as workers simulta-
neously built organizations at the workplace. With the state’s active 
endorsement, the on-the-ground workplace democracy that theorists like 
Dewey and Commons envisioned flourished despite employer opposition. 
Meanwhile, the FLSA Administrator worked to address concerns about rep-
resentation by choosing committee members only from democratically selected 
 
419. On the challenges and advantages of involving associations in government and other power-
sharing arrangements, see, for example, JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND 
DEMOCRACY (1995); Archon Fung, Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and 
Realities, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 515 (2003); and Levinson, supra note 15. 
420. In the post-Taft-Hartley period, however, according to some critics, union bureaucracies os-
sified such that unions no longer provided a true forum for workplace democracy and expres-
sion. Klare, supra note 48; see also supra notes 381-382 and accompanying text. 
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unions, even though the statute did not so require. He also informally estab-
lished a selection method that considered the extent to which particular unions 
represented workers in a given region or sector.
421
 The Administrator did not, 
however, create a system to provide representation to unorganized workers. As 
discussed, many observers—including the unions themselves—concluded that 
unorganized workers were well represented by existing unions. Other contem-
poraries disagreed, concluding that “[b]y failing to secure participation of unor-
ganized labor on industry committees, the Wage and Hour Administrator has 
established a procedure which is potentially unfair.”
422
 Underlying the disagree-
ment, however, was a deeper divide about the necessary conditions for effective 
worker representation. During the early and mid-twentieth century, the notion 
that organization was a precondition for effective political participation was a 
live and popular idea, though it may seem foreign in our world, where workers 
are often conceived as atomized individuals vindicating personal rights. 
Similar challenges applied to the representation of business. Here again, the 
Administrator sought to achieve fair representation by choosing from trade as-
sociations and leading companies, but the statutory guidance could have been 
more substantial in requiring diverse representation.
423
 Even more challenging 
was the question of how to represent the diffuse public—and how not to have 
the “public” vote reduce the committees to executive control. The British system 
upon which FLSA was modeled avoided the problem by not including public 
representatives in bargaining over labor issues at all.
424
 FLSA took a different 
approach: it provided for public hearings and included public representatives on 
the committees. At first, that system worked well for workers, as the public rep-
resentatives came from civil society organizations with broad-based working-
class membership. Over time, however, the public representatives were drawn 
less from civic organizations and more from the ranks of economists, with selec-
tion driven by the executive branch. The evolution reflected the development in 
both associational life and administrative practice that occurred over the 1940s. 
 
421. See Weiss, supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
422. Golding, supra note 265, at 1157; see Cook, supra note 276, at 689; see also supra notes 275-279 
and accompanying text. 
423. See Michael Barry & Adrian Wilkinson, Reconceptualizing Employer Associations Under Evolving 
Employment Relations: Countervailing Power Revisited, 25 WORK EMP. & SOC’Y 149 (2011). On 
the complicated and contingent nature of the corporate firm, see Henry Hansmann, Owner-
ship of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1988), which argues that the investor ownership 
model of capitalism, which puts shareholders and creditors at the center, is contingent on the 
economics of enterprise, legal and political structures, changing technologies, and cultural 
differences. 
424. See WALTMAN, supra note 42, at 25-26. 
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An alternative approach, reflecting the more radical democratic aspirations of 
Dewey and others, would have required development of new legal frameworks 
to encourage the creation and growth of representative civil society organiza-
tions. Such an approach would have allowed the industry-committee model to 
travel more easily to other areas of administrative law, where diffuse interests are 
unorganized—and could therefore have been more transformative of democracy 
generally.
425
 
D. Reimagining Workplace Law’s Future 
Today, the Progressive and early New Deal vision of shared power over eco-
nomic policy seems anachronistic at best. The Court’s ruling in Janus along with 
recently enacted right-to-work laws in former union bastions will, in all likeli-
hood, sharply diminish union funding while further reducing the political power 
of working people.
426
 Indeed, Janus is just one component of a burgeoning First 
Amendment doctrine that would render much more labor activity and regulation 
unconstitutional while protecting corporate “speech.”
427
 The picture is bleak 
with respect to administrative law as well. Arguments rejecting the legitimacy of 
 
425. Full examination of the transferability of the wage-board model to other areas of law is be-
yond the scope of this Article. It is important to note, however, that the model likely works 
most easily when there are a limited number of well-defined stakeholders. The New Deal did 
include examples of broader association building through agency action. For example, Meg 
Jacobs explores how the Office of Price Administration engaged consumers and helped facil-
itate their organizing. See Jacobs, supra note 353. 
426. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); see LEE, supra note 
64 (detailing the long history of the right-to-work movement); James Feigenbaum et al., 
From the Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box: Political Effects of Right to Work Laws (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24259, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24259
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AWN-42Z3] (exploring the political effects of right-to-work laws). 
But see Noam Schreiber, Missouri Voters Reject Anti-Union Law in a Victory for Labor, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/business/economy/Missouri 
-labor-right-to-work.html [https://perma.cc/U3KQ-6GAE] (discussing the recent decision 
of voters in Missouri to reject the Republican state legislature’s attempt to impose open-shop 
or “right to work” on all workplaces). 
427. In addition to Janus, see, for example, National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 
959 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2013). For a critique of recent developments in this area, see Robert Post 
& Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015); Jedediah 
Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195, 198-203 (2014); and Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133. 
On the long history of libertarian First Amendment arguments, see LEE, supra note 64, at 115-
32; WEINRIB, supra note 143; and Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Loch-
nerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016). 
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the administrative state have gained currency among conservative academics,
428
 
politicians,
429
 and judges, including several Supreme Court Justices.
430
 One 
strand of argument sounds in originalism and the structure of government: the 
current administrative state is unconstitutional because it purportedly violates 
the Founders’ conceptions of the separation of powers, federalism, and due pro-
cess.
431
 Another is more expressly libertarian: the regime purportedly burdens 
due process and economic liberty—or it impinges on expression protected by the 
First Amendment.
432
 Some critics, including Justice Gorsuch, appear to embrace 
both strands and would impose new limits on both public and private delega-
tions, as well as inclusive systems of representation.
433
 
 
428. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY (2004); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
429. See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017); Mike Lee, Speeches: 
The Time for Regulatory Reform in Congress, MIKE LEE U.S. SENATOR FOR UTAH (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/speeches?ID=2ED7B201-8099-406A-A872 
-A07C7ADE9D36 [https://perma.cc/Q4BK-W3XA]. 
430. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concur-
ring); id. at 1240-42 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-11 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213-25 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-58 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (questioning whether Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ 
interpretations of federal statutes violates the separation of powers); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (adopting an expansive view of the non-
delegation doctrine with respect to private parties), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1225. For 
a comprehensive analysis of the conservative judicial attack on the administrative state, see 
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: The 1930s Redux: The Adminis-
trative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
431. See HAMBURGER, supra note 428. 
432. BERNSTEIN, supra note 184; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 247-84 (2014). 
433. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224-27 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (offering a due process argument); Caring Hearts Pers. Home 
Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 969 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (expressing concern 
that an expansive administrative state involves excessive delegation and “raises troubling 
questions about due process and fair notice”); see also Alexander Volokh, The New Private-
Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 931, 973-81 (2014) (arguing that delegation of coercive power to private parties 
can amount to a due process violation). Judges on the D.C. Circuit, as well, have been urging 
a more robust nondelegation doctrine that would limit delegation to private parties, as well 
as one that would limit delegation from Congress to the Executive Branch. See Ass’n of Am. 
R.Rs., 721 F.3d 666 (taking narrow view of permissible private delegation). For discussion of 
the pre-New Deal nonprivate delegation doctrine, see supra notes 205-217 and accompanying 
text. 
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Against this background, the early years of FLSA could be dismissed as little 
more than a historical curiosity. But doing so would be a mistake. Broadly speak-
ing, the current political economy bears striking similarity to that of the Gilded 
Age, with its vast inequalities in wealth, concentrated political power, and a cor-
porate-friendly judiciary. And as in the Progressive Era, workers, sympathetic 
political leaders, and intellectuals are once again searching for solutions, explor-
ing alternatives to the private, market-based, “neoliberal” solutions that domi-
nated recent decades. 
To be sure, any immediate move toward empowering organizations of work-
ers to negotiate over expansive labor and social welfare regulation at the federal 
level is unrealistic at best.
434
 But reforms along the lines of the early New Deal 
vision are possible at the state and local level in blue jurisdictions. Though fed-
eral labor law preemption forecloses nearly all state and local labor law legisla-
tion, employment law does not confront preemption hurdles.
435
 Several states, 
including California and New York, already vest the power to set wages or other 
standards with tripartite commissions, and these commissions have intermit-
tently operated to bring labor and management together under state adminis-
trative supervision and to set standards on an industry-by-industry basis.
436
 
 
434. More limited labor law reform has repeatedly failed, even under Democratic governments. 
Dorian T. Warren, The Politics of Labor Policy Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY RE-
FORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 103-28 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Mikis eds., 2014); Dorian 
T. Warren, The Unsurprising Failure of Labor Law Reform and the Turn to Administrative Action, 
in REACHING FOR A NEW DEAL: AMBITIOUS GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC MELTDOWN, AND POLAR-
IZED POLITICS IN OBAMA’S FIRST TWO YEARS 191-229 (Theda Skocpol & Lawrence R. Jacobs 
eds., 2011). For accounts of labor law’s failure in the law review literature, see Andrias, supra 
note 8, at 27 & n.127; Cynthia L. Estlund, Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527 (2002); and Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and 
States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (2011). 
435. See Andrias, supra note 8, at 89-92. 
436. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70-74, 1173, 1178 (West 2011) (authorizing an Industrial Welfare Com-
mission appointed by the governor and composed of two representatives of employers, two 
from recognized labor organizations, and one from the general public; requiring commission 
to review adequacy of minimum wage every two years; and providing for industry specific 
wage boards); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 655 (McKinney 2016) (“A wage board shall be composed of 
not more than three representatives of employers, an equal number of representatives of em-
ployees and an equal number of persons selected from the general public.”); see also COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-109 (West 2013) (authorizing a wage board comprised of an equal 
number of employer, employee, and public representatives); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4.7 
(West 2011) (establishing the “New Jersey Minimum Wage Advisory Commission” with “five 
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More recently, Seattle enacted a domestic workers’ bill of rights that includes a 
mechanism for tripartite sectoral bargaining.
437
 New York City enacted a law 
that facilitates efforts of nonunion workers to collectively engage in the political 
process.
438
 Similar mechanisms could be enacted elsewhere.
439
 
The tide could soon turn at the federal level as well. At least within academic 
circles, the idea of sectoral bargaining has assumed a new prominence, as con-
cern about economic and political inequality mounts. Public policy experts and 
legal academics have begun to urge new forms of labor law in which unions 
would bargain at the sectoral level for all workers,
440
 and in which both unions 
and the state would play a larger role in guaranteeing social welfare benefits.
441
 
Scholars are also mounting new critiques regarding the bifurcation of labor and 
employment law, arguing that unions and other worker organizations could 
once again play a critical role in shaping and enforcing employment law.
442
 
Meanwhile, administrative law scholars are reexamining the problem of democ-
racy in administration, reflecting on Progressive Era approaches and offering 
new strategies that could give citizen groups more power in the articulation of 
policy.
443
 And, most recently, a few scholars have begun not only to defend the 
 
State AFL-CIO”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:11-56a8 to -56a9 (West 2011) (providing that com-
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pations; such boards shall be composed of equal numbers of employer, employee, and public 
representatives). But see 2016 N.Y. Laws, ch. 54, pt. K, § 4 (limiting board’s authority with 
regard to wages). 
437. Office of the City Clerk, CB 11926, CITY SEATTLE (July 27, 2018), http://seattle.legistar.com
/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3532201&GUID=232AE887-44C6-4450-A040-84225AD4F11D 
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Domestic Workers, WASH. POST (July 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
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-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html [https://perma.cc/EQ4E-99VS]. 
438. A possible model is a recent New York City law that gives employees the option of contrib-
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politics. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-1301 to -1310 (2017); see Justin Miller, In New York 
City, Fast-Food Workers May Soon Have a Permanent Voice, AM. PROSPECT (June 15, 2017), 
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-voice [https://perma.cc/P52V-H3L6]. 
439. Andrias, supra note 8; see also Andrias, Social Bargaining, supra note 378. 
440. See sources cited supra note 14. 
441. Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319 
(2012). 
442. Andrias, supra note 8; Becker, supra note 31; Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening La-
bor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 
552, 558-60 (2010). 
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legality of agency fees, but also to question both the First Amendment and the 
NLRA doctrine that prohibited unions from charging for political expenses in 
the first place.
444
 
Finally, there are indications of rising demands for higher wages and union 
rights within the broader public. Since 2012, in response to organizing by the 
Fight for $15 worker movement, over two dozen states and many more localities 
have raised their minimum wages.
445
 Several of these, including California and 
New York, have enacted minimum wage increases to fifteen dollars an hour—
nearly eight dollars an hour more than the federal minimum, to be phased in 
over time.
446
 Even during the election that brought President Trump to victory, 
minimum wage increases prevailed when they were on the ballot. So too have 
regulations providing for paid leave and other benefits.
447
 These new laws are 
not just about individual employment rights. Rather, they have emerged out of 
organizing campaigns that frame the demand for better employment rights and 
social welfare benefits as part and parcel of the demand for union rights.
448
 Some 
have even emerged from tripartite bargaining, either formal or informal, among 
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ents, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466); 
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Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 361; Andrias, supra note 360, at 9-17; William Baude 
& Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171 (2018); 
Nikolas Bowie, The Government Could Not Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 
2019); cf. Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046 
(2018). 
445. Minimum Wage Basics: City Minimum Wage Laws: Recent Trends and Economic Evidence, NAT’L 
EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 26, 2015), https://www.nelp.org/publication/city-minimum-wage 
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.cc/88NR-RMC5]; Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 12, 2018), http://www
.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker [https://perma.cc/2ZFX-64T4]; State Minimum Wages: 
2018 Minimum Wage by State, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx [https://perma.cc
/X5S5-89J5]. But see Alan Blinder, When a State Balks at a City’s Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/alabama-moves-to-halt-pay-law 
-in-birmingham.html [https://perma.cc/88SA-FLKW] (describing Alabama state legisla-
ture’s efforts to overrule Birmingham’s local minimum wage). 
446. See S.B. 3, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Minimum Wage Basics, supra note 445; N.Y. Gov-
ernor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs $15 Minimum Wage Plan and 12 Week Paid Family 
Leave Policy into Law, N.Y. ST. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor 
-cuomo-signs-15-minimum-wage-plan-and-12-week-paid-family-leave-policy-law [https://
perma.cc/G9TJ-5T5Z]. 
447. Andrias, supra note 8, at 55-56. 
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unions, employers, and the state.
449
 Meanwhile, the recent teacher strikes in 
West Virginia, Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma have taken direct aim at aus-
terity politics, demanding not just fair wages and good benefits for teachers 
throughout the state, but also adequate education funding and a more progres-
sive tax code.
450
 As I have previously argued, from these efforts, the outline of a 
new, or revitalized, model of labor law is emerging that would combine a politi-
cal, social form of sectoral bargaining with both old and new forms of worksite 
representation.
451
 These labor efforts are of a piece with other growing political 
movements urging a more egalitarian and democratic political economy.
452
 
They are also of a piece with the aspirations of workers, intellectuals, and 
reformers of the Progressive and early New Deal Eras. To be sure, the wage-
board approach detailed in this Article is neither a panacea nor directly transfer-
able to our present context. Yet the history suggests the plausibility of an alter-
native model of labor, employment, and administrative law—and one with an 
American pedigree. On this basis, we might again begin to imagine a workplace 
administration that shares the egalitarian and democratic aspirations of John 
Dewey, John Commons, Frances Kelley, the CIO, and other reformers—a work-
place administration that shifts power in the political economy by encouraging 
the growth of worker organizations and incorporating them into the governing 
process; a workplace administration that expressly embraces redistributive goals 
and that commits the state, in social partnership with unions and business, to 
work toward those goals.
453
 As with the FLSA committees, and as with earlier 
calls for reform, the aim would be not “government determination or imposition 
of all of the terms of the employment relationship,” but rather “systematic revi-
sion of the background legal context in which employees participate through 
 
449. Id. at 64-67, 84-87. 
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451. See Andrias, supra note 8. 
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(July 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/politics/democratic-party 
-midterms.html [https://perma.cc/N3CJ-4LSF]; Michelle Goldberg, The Millennial Socialists 
Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/opinion
/democratic-socialists-progressive-democratic-party-trump.html [https://perma.cc/M79B 
-9ML9]; Steve Peoples, Democratic Socialism Surging in the Age of Trump, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/a1770fd620d94bf58d0ff1035d3e0eea [https://
perma.cc/6L5A-3D9V]; see also Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018) (analyzing the contemporary law reform project of Black Lives 
Matter). 
453. For any contemporary statute, there would be many details to work out and many ways to 
improve on past efforts. For some preliminary thoughts, see Andrias & Rogers, supra note 11. 
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self-organization and otherwise in making the decisions that affect their working 
lives.”
454
 
conclusion 
Ultimately, the history of FLSA’s industry committees forces the reconsider-
ation of widely held assumptions about both workplace law and administrative 
law. In recent years, numerous scholars and labor law experts have bemoaned 
the “dichotomy between U.S. labor and employment law,” emphasizing that it 
consists of “two distinct forms of workplace regulation [that] are arguably in 
tension.”
455
 The history presented in this Article is further evidence that the 
sharp divide between labor law and employment law that seems natural today is 
in fact historically contingent.
456
 The reformers and unionists who pushed for 
the NLRA and FLSA, along with the drafters of these statutes, conceived of labor 
and employment law without clear bifurcation. In their view, collective rights 
were to be vindicated through public law mechanisms as well as through private 
bargaining. Conversely, individual rights could not be vindicated without collec-
tive power; workers’ involvement in employment law must also be collective.
457
 
Ultimately, the intertwined scheme they enacted was successful in enabling 
workers to raise wages throughout industries while building their collective 
power and practicing democracy from the ground up. 
The history also complicates the conventional wisdom that FLSA was unam-
bitious and inconsequential in comparison to the NLRA.
458
 The New Dealers 
and their antecedents saw minimum wage laws not as a way to achieve mere 
subsistence, but as an essential component of a broader project aimed at building 
worker power and a more egalitarian political economy. And for a period they 
succeeded in realizing this vision, albeit partially. In this way, the history sug-
gests the transformative potential of universal employment law. It also shows 
that sectoral bargaining has more of an American pedigree than is known today. 
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457. In that way, the Court’s recent decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis fundamentally errs. 138 
S. Ct. 1612 (2018). As Justice Ginsburg rightly points out in dissent, id. at 1636-38 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting), and as the history presented in this Article supports, the New Dealers believed 
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Bargaining was not limited to the work site, and it was undertaken with affirm-
ative governmental support. Within the broad statutory framework of labor and 
employment law that still exists today, worker organizations were granted for-
mal power in policy making and the capacity to bargain for all workers in an 
industry. A more social democratic form of labor law was in the marrow of the 
New Deal. 
Perhaps even more significantly, the history draws into question several 
widely shared beliefs about administrative law. Scholars date administrative 
law’s turn toward legalism and technocratic expertise to the late 1930s.
459
 On 
this account, “[b]y the end of the 1930s, the bureaucrats were in charge.”
460
 But 
the wage boards show that well past NIRA, and well beyond the war boards and 
the Railway Labor Act, a different form of administration persisted. Significant 
elements of the labor movement, along with Progressive reformers and allies in 
Congress and the executive branch, favored alternative conceptions of fairness 
and democracy in administration, along with more substantial guarantees of 
rights.
461
 Technocratic expertise was important, but only in support of the pop-
ular will. Rather than locating decision-making authority primarily with tech-
nocrats, the reformers sought arrangements that located power with associations 
of citizens. Rather than relying primarily on judicial-like procedures and ulti-
mately court review to ensure fairness, they favored a system of negotiation 
among social partners, cabined by particular redistributive aims. And rather than 
encouraging a free marketplace of liberal pluralistic participation, they self-con-
sciously linked regulation and social mobilization in order to redistribute power 
among social groups. They were successful in implementing and expanding 
their approach well into the 1940s, past the immediate economic crisis of the 
Depression, beyond the confines of the war boards, and within the framework 
of contemporary labor and employment law. 
Administrative law scholars tend to celebrate the turn toward legalism and 
technocracy. According to Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, the APA emptied 
administrative law of “any kind of ideological valence.”
462
 According to Daniel 
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462. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 44, at 471; see also Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of 
Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 954 (1997) (“The [APA], a reaction to the po-
liticization of some agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, imparted a consid-
erable measure of political and ideological neutrality to administrative law, much as the Taft-
Hartley Act, enacted in the following year, imparted a considerable measure of political and 
ideological neutrality to labor law, correcting to a degree the pro-union bias of the Wagner 
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Ernst, the “‘rule of lawyers’ insulated the administrative state from becoming a 
weapon in the hands of any particular social or economic group.”
463
 While ad-
ministrative law allows for, even embraces, political influence by the particular 
President in office or by Congress,
464
 and while judges’ own ideologies inevitably 
inflect their review of administrative cases,
465
 administrative law, as a discipline, 
does not adhere to any particular ideology—or so the theory runs. Rather, for 
leading scholars, the embrace of politically impartial legal principles legitimizes 
the administrative state.
466
 So too labor law claims the mantle of neutrality.
467
 
With Taft-Hartley, Congress declared, labor law would no longer favor unioni-
zation but rather would protect workers’ “right to self-organize” equally with 
their “right to refrain” from organization.
468
 
But the history of the FLSA wage boards, in the context of the broader labor 
law regime, not only underscores the contested origins of the lawyerly, techno-
cratic, and liberal pluralistic approach to workplace administration; it also un-
dermines the contemporary regime’s claim to neutrality. Congress voted to end 
the tripartite industry committees in favor of an administrative process more in 
line with APA values just after it enacted a host of restrictions on union rights. 
The change in procedure, as well as the change in substantive rights, curtailed 
the power of worker organizations. That is, the reforms to FLSA’s procedural 
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and administrative mechanisms made clear that unions no longer had a special 
role to play in governance, and they effectively reduced worker organizations’ 
power in the political economy. Indeed, the late 1940s reforms returned the po-
litical economy closer to the vision that prevailed before the New Deal. Workers 
and employers were free to marshal their existing resources while participating 
in the liberal pluralistic administrative state. But administration did not bestow 
power on worker organizations. The existing distribution of power was treated 
as both natural and neutral, not unlike the liberty that the Court protected dur-
ing the Lochner Era.469 As with any claim of neutrality, the dispute lies in the 
baseline.
470
 
The contemporary approach to both labor law and administrative process 
essentially takes as a given the resource and power imbalances that exist among 
different social and economic groups. In contrast, workplace administration 
prior to passage of Taft-Hartley and repeal of the FLSA industry committees in-
vested in redistributing power by protecting workers’ rights to organize and 
strike, empowering unions to represent workers generally, and giving labor un-
ions a privileged voice in the administrative domain. Business interests, particu-
larly from the South, objected that this approach distorted both labor law and 
administrative law by stacking the deck among competing interests—picking 
winners in advance—and forcing certain individuals to comply with a system 
with which they disagreed. But so too does the existing system, which greatly 
limits the power of worker organizations in both the economy and the democ-
racy. 
In short, the history of the FLSA industry committees suggests that it is a 
myth to think one can ever do workplace law, or administrative law, without 
making choices about distributions of power. Different choices about power dis-
tribution remain possible. Law’s future, like its past, is contingent on social mo-
bilization and political developments. For those who wish for a system of ad-
ministration that fosters worker power in the political economy, the industry 
committees should serve as a reminder that such things were once possible in 
the United States—and that they could be achieved again. 
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